The Effects of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine on the Korean Peninsula

Despite being halfway around the world and a conflict between two European states, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is likely to have a lasting impact internationally – and on the Korean Peninsula in particular.  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven a reassessment of national security and economic relationships in multiple countries. In Europe, the invasion has created a sense of unity among NATO members that had waned since the collapse of the Soviet Union and a deeper rethink within the European Union of its dependence on Russia for energy, as well as how Russia has used energy as a tool of war. The war has also sparked concerns about the European Union’s economic dependence on China, another potential strategic vulnerability. 

These concerns and the impact of the war, however, are not confined to Europe. In terms of geopolitics, the war in Ukraine has sharpened divisions that had been growing internationally before the war. Relations between the United States and Russia have significantly deteriorated, while China’s moderated support for Russia has also deepened preexisting divides between Washington and Beijing.

The deepening geopolitical divisions among the major powers from the war in Ukraine can be seen on the Korean Peninsula as well.  

North Korea has used the conflict to draw closer to Russia through its political and rhetorical support of Russia’s invasion. At the United Nations, North Korea was one of only five countries to vote against a U.N. resolution calling on Russia to end its invasion of Ukraine. Pyongyang has expressed its full support for the “justified struggle of the Russian people to protect the autonomy and security of the country and to defend national interests,” while also echoing Russia’s reasoning that United States and the West are to blame for the conflict.

These deeper political ties have helped to provide Pyongyang with political space to conduct more than 90 cruise and ballistic missile launches in 2022, more than in any other year.

South Korea, in contrast, moved to bring itself in line with the United States and Europe on the conflict. While Seoul was clear that it would not announce independent sanctions on Russia, it did agree to enforce U.S. and European sanctions. These include export controls on the sale of strategic items to Russia, as well as banning transactions with Russia’s central bank and blocking some Russian banks from the global SWIFT network. While not initiated by the government, South Korea’s four largest cryptocurrency exchanges also took steps to prevent users from Russia from accessing their exchanges.

The embrace of U.S. and European sanctions has had a direct impact on South Korea’s trade with Russia. Through November 2022, South Korean exports to Russia declined by 34.7 percent and imports by 10.4 percent. This contrasts with South Korea’s trade overall, which saw exports grow by 7.8 percent and imports by 21.2 percent.

There have been especially sharp declines in South Korea’s exports to Russia of strategic items, such as electrical machinery and semiconductors. Overall exports of electrical machinery, a category that includes semiconductors, have declined by nearly 50 percent compared to last year. Semiconductors exports to Russia are down a steeper 65.8 percent and exports of memory chips have almost completely stopped since April. Exports of solid state semiconductor storage devices are also down 77.4 percent.

The economic impact for South Korea extends beyond sanctioned items. While not banned under sanctions, exports of South Korean vehicles to Russia are down 63.3 percent and vehicle parts 65.9 percent.

In addition to formal sanctions, South Korea has taken steps to reduce its energy imports from Russia. Imports of crude petroleum were down 55 percent by volume, liquefied natural gas (LNG) by 36.1 percent, and refined petroleum products by 70.1 percent. Seoul has largely been able to make up for the loss of Russian crude through increased imports from the Middle East, and the decline in Russian LNG with growing supplies from Australia. However, imports of Russian coal are up 14.3 percent.

Beyond reducing its purchases of Russian fossil fuels on the whole, Seoul has expressed political support for U.S. efforts to place a cap on the price of Russian oil exports. It has also allowed some LNG imports to be diverted to Europe to help with shortages there.

Until there is a negotiated peace to the war, these changes in trade patterns will remain in place. However, even after the war ends there is a good chance that export controls will remain on semiconductors and other items that could support the rearmament of the Russian military. These are likely long-term changes for South Korea’s trade with Russia.

Regular commercial trade has not been the only area impacted by the war. The war has also opened up new markets for South Korean arms exports. As the United States and Europe have shipped weapons and equipment to Ukraine, they have turned to South Korea to restock their own supplies. The United States is expected to purchase 100,000 rounds of 155-millimeter artillery from South Korea. Poland has agreements with South Korea to buy tanks, howitzers, and fighter jets, and other European countries are considering the purchase of South Korean arms.

Through November 2022, South Korean arms exports were valued at $17 billion, up from $7.25 billion in all of 2021.

South Korea is reportedly not alone in benefiting from arms exports due to the war. According to U.S. intelligence, North Korea is providing Russia with artillery for its war effort in Ukraine.

If reports are true that Russia has turned to North Korea for arms, it has significant implications for the long-term effectiveness of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. Prior to the war, Russia had been drifting away from the U.S.-led consensus on sanctions on North Korea. In 2019, Russia and China introduced a resolution at the U.N. Security Council that would have eased sanctions as part of an effort to revive dialogue with the regime in Pyongyang. A similar resolution was reintroduced by Russia and China in 2021.

Russian purchases of arms from North Korea would be a clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, but the potential violations extend beyond arms trade. Reports also indicate that North Korea plans to send overseas laborers to the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine for reconstruction work. This would be a violation of U.N. sanctions. Russia has also long been tied to lax enforcement of sanctions on trade in petroleum with North Korea.

While Russia’s struggles in its invasion of Ukraine explain its willingness to turn to North Korea for support regardless of sanctions, these violations put pressure on the sanctions regime and make Chinese enforcement increasingly important. If both states were to step back from sanctions enforcement in a meaningful sense, U.N. sanctions on North Korea would largely exist in name only.

If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already deepened political divisions, changed economic patterns, and threatened to undermine international sanctions on North Korea, what are its potential implications for conflict and peace on the Korean Peninsula?

As with any war, North Korea is likely to draw lessons from the current conflict. Three potential lessons stand out. The first relates to economic entanglements. North Korea has long been wary of deeper economic ties with the global economy and the war in Ukraine is likely to reinforce those convictions. The United States’ ability to cut Russia off from the global financial system and the impact of Europe’s dependence on Russian and oil and gas likely serve as clear indicators to Pyongyang that its strategy of limiting its dependence on the outside world is correct. 

Most of the efforts to denuclearize North Korea have rested on the premise of an exchange: economic benefits for the dismantlement of Pyongyang’s weapons programs. The war in Ukraine likely further reduces the appeal of an agreement based on economic benefits. 

Pyongyang will have also taken note of Russia’s use of nuclear threats to limit Western involvement in the conflict. While the situation on the Korean Peninsula is different due to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, the primary lesson for North Korea will be that the possession of nuclear weapons will deter a direct attack on the regime – much as it has deterred Western nations from providing Ukraine the means to strike deep into Russian territory. 

The last lesson North Korea is likely to take is tactical. Russia has effectively used cheap Iranian drones to inflict significant damage on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Only time will tell the long-term impact on the Ukrainian population, but these tools could be used in a future conflict to terrorize the South Korea population.

There will, of course, be limits to the advantages that North Korea gains from these tactics. European states have not been deterred from providing support to Ukraine despite Russian nuclear threats and efforts to weaponize energy exports, while the Ukrainian population has not caved to Russian efforts to freeze them during winter. Still, the war will likely influence North Korean strategies going forward.

There are lessons for South Korea as well. The Ukrainian military is currently using as many rounds of artillery a week as the United States is capable of producing in a month. The Russian army is lacking in basic equipment. In recent years, South Korea has taken steps to modernize its military, but the war in Ukraine is an important reminder that any protracted conflict requires sufficient supplies of basic hardware and supply lines to get new weaponry produced and to the front lines.

If North Korea is learning the potential advantages of drone warfare, South Korea needs to learn from Ukraine’s experience about the importance of being able to defend and quickly reconstitute civilian infrastructure.

There are lessons for economic engagement with North Korea as well. One significant proposal for economic cooperation with North Korea in the past was the development of a pipeline across North Korea to bring Russian gas to South Korea and potentially Japan. Previously, Russia had provided assurances that it would continue gas shipments via tankers if North Korea threatened to cut off the pipeline. With North Korea and Russia’s drawing closer and Moscow’s efforts to use energy as a weapon against Europe, the idea of importing Russian gas via North Korea would be a strategic risk. 

Russia’s use of economic coercion to advance its military objectives also raises questions about South Korean dependence on China for key inputs. Given China’s own demonstrated willingness to utilize economic coercion, South Korean policymakers need to consider the strategic risk of Seoul’s dependence on China for a range of items.

While talks with North Korea had broken down well prior to the war, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is highlighting potential strategic risks for both Koreas. It is also further damaging the prospects for reaching a negotiated solution with North Korea by deepening divisions among the main players and potentially reinforcing to Pyongyang the importance of keeping its nuclear weapons. In time, the geopolitical situation may become more conducive to a political settlement, but for the immediate future the ripples from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will likely continue to be felt on the Korean Peninsula.