Asia Strains to Adapt to US Pushback Against China

The deep partisan divide within the U.S. Congress will only intensify as legislators start gearing up for the 2024 elections in earnest. But if there is a single issue that continues to capture the public’s fear and unite an otherwise fractured United States, it is China. The binding force of a hostile stance toward Beijing shows no sign of relenting. Whether or not key U.S. allies and partners in Asia share Washington’s ever-hawkish stance toward China is another issue.

A Chinese surveillance balloon flying over the United States was shot down by U.S. fighter jets in the first week of February. So far, there has been no open retaliation by Beijing, with the exception of repeated verbal condemnations. Still, the incident and China’s angry rhetoric in response has further escalated tensions between the world’s biggest powers.

The balloon incident is driving a greater wedge between the United States and its allies against China as well. Leading industrial countries have been supportive of Washington’s response, including Canada as the United States also shot down an unidentified balloon over Canadian airspace in February as well. Japan, meanwhile, quickly responded by adopting a legal change that would allow its Self-Defense Force to destroy unmanned flying objects in its airspace in the name of national security.

When it comes to U.S. political leadership in confronting China, on the other hand, support among Washington’s long-standing allies is less forthcoming. The establishment of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has garnered much excitement on Capitol Hill, and a position on the committee has become one of the most coveted assignments among legislators. In fact, the resolution to establish the group had called for 16 members, but that has now been expanded to 24, with 13 Republicans and 11 Democrats.

As the high-profile committee’s chairman, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) is rapidly emerging as a key driver in setting the U.S. agenda in not only defining but also addressing rising tensions with Beijing. Still, as the committee’s title itself makes clear, the focus is on addressing the competitive nature of relations between the two countries, and it may be less inclined to take on a more conciliatory approach to bilateral ties.

Although Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and other governments share many of the concerns that are expected to be addressed by the congressional committee, ranging from China’s human rights violation to unfair trade practices to coercive action in addition to security threats, it is unlikely that a similar legislative committee will be formed in another country. While the committee’s agenda has yet to be unveiled and its first hearing is expected to be in March, there are already concerns in Asian capitals that U.S. legislators will further fan the flames of hostility between the two sides in an attempt to demonstrate strength to U.S. voters.

Worries about the committee’s objectives also reflect wariness about the effectiveness of  former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last August. The visit has been a game-changer for how members of Congress perceive Taiwan, and visiting the island has now become a must-do for legislators. Yet such visits have not led to a reassessment of the Taiwan Relations Act or the three communiques and six assurances that establish the foundation of U.S. relations with China regarding Taiwan. Continued high profile visits by senior U.S. officials are expected to increase tensions with China even further, and – more worryingly – potentially  increase the threats that Taiwan could face from China.

The select committee on China could potentially further provoke China, which in turn could put not just Taiwan, but other countries in the region at risk of facing retaliation from Beijing.

If Washington is looking for solutions to improve relations with China, it is unlikely to be found in the agenda of the select committee, even if it makes the distinction between China and its people and the Communist Party. Intensifying the U.S. drumbeat to finger-wag at Beijing could potentially lead to a Chinese reaction that goes beyond rhetoric. Even the staunchest of U.S. allies in the region would not want to put themselves in the middle of such friction.