Japan’s Pivot to Europe

There has been a recent flurry of outreach and new initiatives between Japan and European states and institutions. The world has a come a long way since March 2015, when Michito Tsuruoka lucidly wrote in “Japan’s Global Diplomacy” that “the Japan-Europe relationship still faces mutual indifference and the lack of a strong sense of purpose.”

At the time, Tsuruoka accurately observed, “[T]he very idea that Europe has security stakes in Asia is still new; Europe is only beginning to realize that its security, as well as its economy, is directly affected by Asia.” This, too, has shifted dramatically in the last eight years.

Now, European states and institutions are increasingly aware of the interconnectedness of security in Asia and security in Europe, and both sides are interested in exploring ways to increase cooperation. With Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s trip to Europe in early January and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Japan in late January to early February, Japan started off 2023 with a commitment to cultivate closer security relationships with individual European states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU).

On January 9, Kishida met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris. Macron and Kishida highlighted the threat of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, noted that France was a top partner in creating a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, and announced that the two countries would step up joint military exercises.

From January 9 to January 14, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, French Navy, and U.S. Navy conducted joint drills in the Gulf of Aden, practicing to defend naval vessels from attacks from the air. Japan also established a consular office in New Caledonia, a Pacific Island territory where the French military operates a base, in December.

Kishida and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni upgraded the Japan-Italy relationship to a “strategic partnership” on January 10. Cooperation will be strengthened primarily in national security and economics. The agreement follows the December decision by Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet.

The next day, Kishida and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which will allow for Japan and the U.K. to hold joint exercises in either country. Currently, the Japan-U.S. security treaty allows for U.S. troops to be stationed in Japan, but Japan has Reciprocal Access Agreements only with Australia and now, Britain. Sunak hailed the agreement as cementing the United Kingdom’s “commitment to the Indo-Pacific.”

During Kishida and Sunak’s meeting, they also discussed the plan for jointly developing their next-generation fighter jets, holding 2+2 security and foreign policy meetings, and the U.K. possibly joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateral free trade deal.

On January 8, British and Australian paratrooper units participated in the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces’ parachute drop training in Japan. It was the first time that non-U.S. foreign troops participated in the training to regain a remote island occupied by enemy forces.

Later in the month, on January 30, Kishida and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis also agreed to upgrade their relationship to a “strategic partnership” and strengthen their security, defense, and economic ties. Common interests include responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other threats in Europe and Asia (specifically in the Eastern Mediterranean and the East and South China Seas), and ensuring free and safe navigation in open waterways. Toward this goal, the leaders recognized the importance of strengthening NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and promoting NATO-Japan cooperation. Japanese coast guard training vessels are expected to call in Greece later this year.

Speaking of NATO, Stoltenberg visited Tokyo in late January for talks. Kishida and Stoltenberg confirmed the strengthening of security cooperation between Japan and NATO. They also agreed that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions is inseparable. The two sides pledged to oppose intimidation and attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas and emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

On January 24, Asahi Shimbun reported that the EU was also trying to establish a hotline between Japan’s Foreign Ministry and the European External Action Service to deepen the EU’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific. The EU is interested in deepening information-sharing with Japan because Brussels is increasingly worried about a Taiwan contingency, which could have major economic impact, and sees Japan as its most important partner alongside the United States on China issues. In addition to a hotline, regular consultations at the vice ministerial level are also being considered.

Although the United States, United Kingdom, and the 27 members of the EU have all been concerned about China since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, these states are not yet on the same page about how to deal with Beijing. For example, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was criticized by his European partners and his own coalition government for leading a delegation of senior business leaders to visit China in November.

While Europe’s outreach to Japan is spurred by concerns about China and Taiwan, Japan’s outreach to Europe is driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Japan is offering support in the ways that it can by, for example, offering mine removal gear training to the Ukrainian government as well as bulletproof vests and drones.

Recent developments indicate that Japan and Europe have started to tackle some of the key challenges Tsuruoka identified in 2015. Tsuruoka wrote, “For the relationship to become more substantial and sustainable, Japan and Europe must consider how they can use and make the most of each other.” To continue tackling this challenge, Tsuruoka’s three policy recommendations remain relevant today: (1) “Build a solid intellectual foundation for Japan-Europe cooperation,” (2) “Enhance interoperability between Japanese and European forces through joint exercises,” and (3) “Ensure synergies between Japan’s relationship with NATO and with the EU, as well as with individual countries.”

Of the three policy recommendations, the first – “Build a solid intellectual foundation for Japan-Europe cooperation” – may still be the most important. Tsuruoka elaborated, “This needs to begin by asking basic questions like, ‘Why does Europe matter to Japan/Asia?’ and ‘Why does Japan/Asia matter to Europe?’” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the subsequent perceived strengthening of Russo-Chinese relations, and increased suspicions of Chinese intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are all likely factors in answering this question with greater clarity and forcefulness in Tokyo and capitals across Europe.

However, it doesn’t mean these questions are answered definitively yet (remember Scholz’s recent visit to China and cue former Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s gaffe regarding Japan’s support for Ukraine). The questions “Why does Europe matter to Japan/Asia? Why does Japan/Asia matter to Europe?” need to be asked – and answered – over and over again to convince the publics in Japan and across Europe to support a foreign policy agenda of robust Japan-Europe cooperation in countering China and Russia.