Why Is China So Soft on the Afghan Taliban?

It has been a rough three months for those concerned about the situation Afghanistan. In December 2022, the Taliban government banned all girls from attending school – precisely the outcome international observers had feared since the regime’s return to power in August 2021. The next month brought a worrying resurgence of terrorism, another prominent concern about Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. January 2023 saw an attack near the Afghan Foreign Ministry as well as a deadly suicide bombing at a mosque in Pakistan, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – which Islamabad insists is receiving sanctuary, if not outright support, from the Talban regime in Afghanistan.

China, however, has remained mostly silent on the worrying developments in its neighboring country. That is even more curious given that China risks being directly impacted by the rise in terrorism, both via attacks in Afghanistan proper and attacks in Pakistan by groups with bases on Afghan soil.

The bombing outside the Afghan Foreign Ministry on January 11 is believed to have been an attempt to target Chinese diplomats, as there was a delegation from China visiting the ministry at the time. The attack killed five and injured 40, but none of the casualties were Chinese nationals.

Still, China got the message that its personnel in Afghanistan were at risk. Its embassy warned Chinese nationals to leave the country – again. The embassy had to issue a similar warning previously in December 2022, when terrorists attacked a Chinese-owned hotel in Kabul.

New Foreign Minister Qin Gang had his first contact with his Afghan counterpart after the January bombing. The call between Qin and the Taliban’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, started with a stern warning: “China attaches great importance to the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions and projects in Afghanistan, and hopes that Afghanistan will take strong measures to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions in Afghanistan.”

Qin was given the usual assurances from Muttaqi that “Afghanistan will never allow any forces to use its territory to engage in activities that sabotage Afghanistan-China friendship and undermine China’s interests.” That pledge has been repeatedly offered since the Taliban returned to power – and just as repeatedly proven hollow.

Qin’s call with Muttaqi also came a full month after the Taliban finally banned all girls and women from attending school (previously, girls were only barred from attending secondary school, but could go to both primary schools and universities). But the Chinese foreign minister expressed absolutely no concern for human rights in his conversation.

In fact, his comments could be read as tacit support for Taliban restrictions on women and girls. China “respects the independent choice made by the Afghan people, and respects the religious beliefs and national traditions in Afghanistan,” Qin intoned, as though policies enacted by the Taliban – who, remember, took power by force – somehow represent the “choices” and “national traditions” of the Afghan people.

Qin continued to drive the point home, adding, “China never interferes in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.” That stance directly undermines his later urging for the Taliban government’s “establishing a broad-based and inclusive political structure, [and] adopting moderate and sound domestic and foreign policies.” The implication is clear: China would like to see the Taliban show some basic respect for human rights, but it ultimately doesn’t care enough to intervene.

Even a horrific terrorist attack in China’s “iron brother,” Pakistan, couldn’t induce Beijing to criticize the Taliban. China expressed shock and strong condemnation after a branch of the Pakistani Taliban attacked a mosque in Peshawar, killing 101 and injuring over 200 more. But while Islamabad openly accused the Taliban of harboring TTP militants, Beijing took care to avoid casting any blame on the Taliban. Indeed, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, refrained from even mentioning that a TTP faction was responsible for the bombing.

“China is against all forms of terrorism and we firmly support Pakistan’s efforts to fight terrorism, defend national stability, and protect people’s lives and safety,” Mao told reporters on January 31. But if Pakistan wants “support” in the form of pressure on the Taliban to uproot the TTP, China is not offering much help.

While there may not be much public rhetoric on offer, it’s clear that China remains concerned about Afghanistan’s direction. On February 7, China’s special envoy on Afghan affairs, Yue Xiaoyong met with ambassadors from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, as well as a minister counselor from the Russian embassy, and “exchanged views on the current situation in Afghanistan and regional cooperation related to Afghanistan with them.”

According to the Foreign Ministry readout of that conversation, all parties “call[ed] on Afghanistan to build a broad-based and inclusive government, exercise moderate and prudent governance and resolutely combat terrorism, and further expand the concerted efforts of the international community in stabilizing and assisting Afghanistan.” But the official readout made no specific mention of the many ways the Taliban have fallen short of those urgings already.

China has been more explicit about its concerns in the past. In a meeting of the so-called extended troika – China, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States – in March 2022, all four countries “stressed that various terrorist forces entrenched in Afghanistan remain a threat to the security of the region, and called on relevant Afghan parties to take more visible measures to fulfill their counter-terrorism commitment and dismantle and eliminate all types of terrorist groups.”

China even offered slightly stronger language on the need for a more inclusive government. “All parties in Afghanistan are called on to realize national reconciliation through substantive dialogue and negotiation, and work for a broader, more inclusive and united political architecture in Afghanistan in the future,” the readout said.

Judging by the frequency of attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the terrorist threat has only grown in the year since. Meanwhile, far from advancing a “more inclusive” government, the Taliban have further restricted women’s rights. Yet China’s statements, paradoxically, have grown softer.

It’s not surprising that China would refrain from outspoken criticism on human rights, but banning girls from school and women from the workplace should be a step too far even for Beijing. That’s apparently not the case, however. Instead, it’s clear that China’s interests in Afghanistan boil down to one thing: security. And Beijing is willing to trade Afghan women’s lives to ensure it.

As then-Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Taliban counterpart in October 2021, China recognizes “the objective reality of the Afghan interim government's rule throughout the country.” Even back then, two months into Taliban rule, it was clear the bargain Beijing was looking to make: In return for the Taliban ensuring China’s security interests were taken care of, China would offer a respite from rights-based criticism and potentially some economic largesse to boot.

This quid-pro-quo was not subtle. “China appreciates the Afghan Taliban’s understanding of and emphasis on China’s major security concerns and believes that the Afghan Taliban will take more resolute and practical measures to crack down on the international terrorist force of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement,” Wang said. That’s the Taliban’s end of the bargain.

“Once the security situation in Afghanistan is stabilized,” Wang continued, “China will discuss with Afghanistan the cooperation in the field of economic reconstruction and support the country to boost its connectivity with the region.”

In addition, Beijing would offer the valuable gift of silence on the Taliban’s rights violations. “China respects Afghanistan's pursuit of its own development path and governance model that suit its national conditions,” Wang assured his Afghan counterpart.

There was no dangled carrot of “economic reconstruction” in Qin’s latest call to Muttaqi. China seems to have given up hope that the Taliban can stabilize Afghanistan enough to make it a good investment. China is even unwilling to join its ally, Pakistan, in pushing the Taliban to address the issue of cross-border terrorism. Also absent from Qin’s comments was any vague hand-waving in the direction of human rights.

Instead, Beijing is just pushing to make sure its nationals in Afghanistan aren’t directly in the line of fire – the bare minimum it could possibly ask for from the Taliban. China is taking care not to even hint at criticism in any other area, lest it jeopardize Taliban cooperation on security interests.

Even then, however, China might not get what it wants.