Japan’s Ukraine Support Continues to Grow

Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has been at the forefront of Japanese and global efforts to condemn Russia for violating international laws and norms, and to rally countries to resist Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expansionary ambitions. Although Europe is far away from Japan, Kishida is intent on setting a strong precedent for an international, collective response because he is concerned about China violating international laws and norms in similar ways in the future, much closer to the home islands.

Japan has taken initiative to counter Russia, diplomatically and economically, and continues to do so a year out. For example, on February 20, Japan provided additional financial assistance to Ukraine by guaranteeing a World Bank loan. On February 28, Japan froze the assets of an additional 122 individuals and organizations, banned exports to an additional 21 organizations, and added drone-related items to the list of products panned from being exported to Russia. On March 14, Japanese Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu met with Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov in Tokyo and stated that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) would continue to do their utmost to support Ukraine. On March 15, Tokyo announced Russia will remain stripped of its “most-favored-nation” trading status beyond the original expiration date of the end of March 2023.

However, a year into the invasion, Japan is lagging in contributions to Ukraine compared to other G-7 countries. Partly, this is due to constitutional barriers on the type of support Japan can offer Ukraine, as Japan can only provide nonmilitary aid (e.g., bulletproof vests, drones, emergency generators, heating equipment and blankets, grain storage tanks, mine detector training). Even so, Japan lags behind other G-7 countries in terms of the sheer monetary value of its contributions. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy in Germany estimated that, between January and November 2022, the United States provided Ukraine with assistance worth 47.8 billion euros, Germany provided assistance worth 5.4 billion euros, and Japan provided assistance worth 600 million euros.

Yet, there are signs that the Japanese leadership is willing to have difficult conversations about what needs to change to better support Ukraine. Currently, Tokyo can only transfer warplanes, armored vehicles, and missiles to countries with which the hardware is jointly produced. The Japanese government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are now discussing changes to Japan’s arms exports policy to allow for exports to countries being attacked by invading forces.

Kishida, in calling on lawmakers to consider such changes, explained that expanded military exports “will become a key policy tool for providing assistance to nations that have suffered aggression in violation of international law.”

Sato Masahisa, an LDP upper house Diet member, posed the provocative rhetorical question: “In the event of a Taiwan contingency or a Japan contingency, Japan would need to ask another country for weapons and ammunition, or else we would not have nearly enough. Do you think we'll be able to ask [for weapons] when we're in a crisis if we don't give to other countries during their own crises?”

Concrete debate is expected to begin after local elections this April. In addition to changes to allow for material support of countries being invaded, other changes that will likely be debated are: (1) exporting weapons to countries that cooperate with Japan, even if they do not have joint weapon development and production projects with Japan, and (2) allowing the United Kingdom and Italy to freely export to third countries the fighter jets that they are jointly developing and manufacturing with Japan.

Although pro-arms exports leaders have started mobilizing – for example, Onodera Itsunori, an LDP Diet member, formed a caucus to promote weapons exports – these debates will take place in the context of a Japanese public that is still deeply opposed. Over three-quarters (76 percent) of respondents to a Nikkei poll published in early March believed sending weapons to Ukraine was unnecessary.

Another Ukraine-related issue where Japan was lagging relative to other G-7 countries was the question of Kishida visiting Kyiv – a box Japan’s prime minister checked in a surprise visit on March 21. Until then, Kishida had been the only G-7 leader who had not yet traveled to the Ukrainian capital.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy first invited Kishida to visit in late January; Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa that a Kishida visit would be important on February 18. Ukrainian Ambassador to Japan Sergiy Korunsky said that it was “extremely important” for Kishida to visit Ukraine and see the current situation “with his own eyes” on February 24.

Given the repeated mentions of a visit by Ukrainian officials, what took so long for the trip to eventuate?

There were some concerns that it would be impossible to schedule such a trip in secret, which is necessary for security reasons, due to Japan’s parliamentary procedures. However, not long before Kishida’s trip to Kyiv, both Takagi Tsuyoshi, the LDP Diet affairs chief, and Azumi Jun, Takagi’s counterpart for the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, agreed that Kishida did not need to get prior Diet approval for the trip and could report his visit to Ukraine after he returned.

Kishida ended up piggybacking his Ukraine trip after an announced visit to India.

Another security-related challenge for Kishida is that the SDF does not have an explicit mandate to protect a dignitary overseas. Prior to the trip, there was speculation Kishida would have to rely on the U.S. military for his security if he were to visit Kyiv. On March 22, however, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu told reporters that in fact Ukraine’s military had provided security for the Japanese prime minister. Matsuno emphasized that the SDF had no role in transporting Kishida to Ukraine or guarding him while he was there.

From debating its restrictive arms export policy to restrictive parliamentary procedures and SDF mandates, the severity of the Ukrainians’ plight is forcing the Japanese leadership and public to have difficult conversations that they have managed to avoid having for decades.

No country is expected to be altruistic and put the interests of other countries above its own, but in this case, it is a win-win scenario. Decisions that the Japanese government make to aid Ukraine will help Japan aid other countries in the future – and thus, aid itself. Exporting weapons to Ukraine now will build up Japan’s defense industrial base, pave the way for providing weapons to other partner states, and create the basis for reciprocity when Japan may need defense imports in the future. Changing parliamentary procedures and the SDF mandate for the prime minister to be able to travel secretly and with SDF protection will allow Kishida as well as future prime ministers to be better, more global advocates of upholding the international laws and norms that Japan’s security relies on.

How seriously Japanese leaders understand this will be seen when changes to the arms exports policy are discussion after the April local elections. It’s also worth watching whether Japan makes any lasting changes to the SDF’s mandate based on lessons learned from Kishida’s Kyiv trip.