Aijan Sharshenova

A 1999 book referred to Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy”; it’s a title that has been repeated in the 20-plus years since with various degrees of consternation by analysts exhausted by the tumultuous waves of Kyrgyz politics. In comparison to its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan certainly appears on the surface to be far more democratic, having run through six presidents in the time neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have had two each, and Tajikistan just one.

In the wake of Kyrgyzstan’s third revolution, in which street protests in October 2020 following a botched parliamentary poll served as a launching pad for Sadyr Japarov’s astronomical rise from prisoner to president, the shine on the phrase “island of democracy” has faded considerably. Japarov’s unusual rise to power has been complemented by a backslide typified by intolerance of dissent and state pressure on the media.

Kyrgyzstan’s political arena, once so celebrated, has become increasingly constrained. In the following interview with The Diplomat’s Managing Editor Catherine Putz, Dr. Aijan Sharshenova, a Bishkek-based political analyst, explains how the Kyrgyz government has increased pressure on political opponents and the media and assesses Kyrgyzstan’s biggest challenges.

Last October, Kyrgyz authorities arrested more than two dozen politicians, activists, and others, alleging a coup plot in connection to their agitation against the Kempir-Abad agreement with Uzbekistan. In the months since, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed the border agreement. Yet the authorities continue to pursue criminal cases against the agreement’s opponents. Is there more going on here? Why did the Japarov government react so harshly to this dissent?

A lot more politicians, civil society activists, and influencers have spoken against the Kempir-Abad agreement with Uzbekistan last year. I would not name their names for obvious reasons – I would not like to be somehow responsible for their persecution. 

The detainees remain imprisoned due to some obscure political or personal reasons. Objectively speaking, they hardly represent an existential threat to Japarov’s rule. There are no upcoming presidential or parliamentary election any time soon. They are not likely to mobilize a serious, sufficiently (financially or otherwise) motivated, crowd to topple the current government. They are too conscious to enter murky deals with the underworld or kleptocrats, who could actually topple the current government. I do not think they have significant foreign backing either, or that any external actors are interested much in yet another Kyrgyz revolution. In other words, they do not represent a plausible threat to Japarov and his government. 

The charges against them are quite strange, too. They were originally arrested for the intent to organize “mass unrest,” which is quite difficult to imagine given the current protest fatigue in Kyrgyzstan. The legal process is taking a long time; it seems to be stalled regularly. The details of the mysterious investigation that led to that mass detention are unclear. From January this year, the investigation and its materials are classified too, so there is little chance to understand on which grounds these 20+ people were arrested. 

Given these facts, it is possible to conclude that the detention is somehow a whim of those in power, who are either trying to make a public example of this case or have something against these detainees personally. 

The Kyrgyz government has in recent months worked to shut down the operations of RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Azattyk. Their bank accounts have been frozen and their websites blocked, a decision upheld by a Kyrgyz court in early March. We’ve discussed this before, but in brief, what role does RFE/RL play in the Kyrgyz media ecosystem and what would be the impact of its formal ouster from the country?

Azattyk is being gradually pushed out of the country. The relentlessness and persistence of the ruling regime in getting rid of Azattyk is quite astonishing given their half-hearted efforts elsewhere. 

If Azattyk is fully gone from the Kyrgyz media ecosystem, it would be an irreparable loss to the freedom of speech and the quality of Kyrgyz journalism. Azattyk has produced an impressive volume of professional journalist works and created an even more impressive number of local journalists, who went to work elsewhere both within the country and abroad. Azattyk holds not only professional memory of the last 30 years, but also has become an educational institution on its own. 

It is quite curious to note that Azattyk’s bank accounts were frozen in compliance with the anti-money laundering legislation. Azattyk published quite a few pieces of investigative journalism on transnational corruption and money laundering in past. One cannot ignore the irony or the sarcasm of whoever issued that order. 

With these two issues in mind – the arrests of dissidents and tightening control on media – is the Kyrgyz political space more constrained? Is there room, and a venue, for active and meaningful debate on policy matters?

The Kyrgyz political space has definitely become more constrained, more dangerous, more unpredictable, and less free. Quick opportunistic alliances, quick news bites, continuous quarrels, which do not contribute much but distract from important issues, as well as new levels of low have become daily life in Kyrgyzstan.

There remains some room for debate in the civil society sector, partly in mass media and online discussion platforms, but elsewhere the space for any freedom is shrinking. This is certainly a worrying sign. 

The last year, amid the Russian war in Ukraine, has put all of Central Asia in a difficult position geopolitically, economically, diplomatically. How would you characterize the Kyrgyz government’s position regarding the war? And how would you describe the trajectory of Kyrgyz relations with Russia?

Officially, Kyrgyzstan tries to maintain the difficult balance and neutrality on the matter. Formal speeches of state leaders and top-level civil servants are carefully drafted so as to not to take any sides. However, the acts and behavior of the same leadership and public services, (e.g. security services, police, the city hall, etc.) show a different story. 

Somehow, mercenaries and former Kyrgyz citizens who joined the Russian army and perished in the war in Ukraine are buried with Kyrgyz and Russian flags and with the participation of local government and military representatives. Pro-Russian activists freely screen their films or organize gatherings, while pro-Ukrainian activists are regularly detained and fined. Anti-war Russian migrants are regularly contacted and intimidated by local law enforcement.  

Finally, what would you say are Kyrgyzstan’s biggest challenges at present? 

Kyrgyzstan’s biggest challenges are manifold. First, there is always the issue of political stability in the country. 

Second, the economic situation was better than expected last year, but the socioeconomic situation is deteriorating. Inflation, unemployment, and lack of access to healthcare, education, and social services have always been somewhat troublesome, but now the state budget is stretched in all directions. 

Finally, the growing gap between the leadership and the people is a worrying sign too. While ordinary Kyrgyzstanis struggle to find medical services in their vicinity or to pay their utility bills, the security services’ leadership regularly opens a new shiny office, and the president’s lifestyle seems to compete with the lifestyles of millionaires (private jets, helicopters, expensive wardrobe, etc.).