Yoon Suk-yeol’s Polarizing First Year

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s first year in office was not covered in glory. In the early months, his administration lurched from gaffe to scandal to unforced error, painting a portrait of a president wholly out of his depth in his first-ever elected office. Those missteps cratered his approval rates, and his administration seemed perpetually stuck in crisis-response mode.

But as the first year of his presidency concludes, the ship has steadied. This may be a result of advances along the learning curve, but it also coincides with the jettisoning of his election-night promise to heal the deep polarization afflicting the country. That promise rang hollow when it was made, given the mood of the electorate that brought him to office. Instead, Yoon has seemingly concluded that cooperation with his political opponents is not possible and has turned to consolidating his base ahead of the 2024 National Assembly elections that will define his presidency.

What has emerged from this process is a president largely unshackled by concerns of political capital. Support from his base now appears unwavering, allowing Yoon to use the country’s deep polarization to push toward his vision for the future – controversy be damned. That vision is ill-defined, but has loosely been called neoliberal based on proposed reforms in education, labor, healthcare, and the national pension. He has also made redefining relations with Japan a centerpiece of his foreign policy.

To accomplish this turnaround, Yoon has taken the fight to the media, seized control of his own party, and watched on as prosecutors – an organization he was once the head of – reassert their prominence.

Messaging the Media

This new, harder-edged president emerged following the now-infamous hot mic incident on his calamitous first foreign trip in September 2022. The initial response saw Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) file a complaint with the prosecution targeting the MBC journalist responsible for airing a video that apparently caught the president uttering obscenities while walking away from a brief exchange with U.S. President Joe Biden. Later, reporters working for MBC – a major terrestrial broadcaster – were banned from boarding Code One, the presidential aircraft, for Yoon’s overseas trips.

The targeting of MBC was significant enough to attract the attention of the U.S. State Department in its Country Report on Human Rights for South Korea. At one point, the report tagged the Yoon administration’s treatment of MBS as “violence and harassment.” That tag was later removed.

Yoon hid his decision behind the fig leaf of “national interest,” saying the video threatened to undermine the South Korea-U.S. alliance. It was more obviously self-interest. In the first full survey conducted by Gallup Korea following the release of the video, his approval rate fell to 24 percent – the lowest of his presidency. The numbers were stark. Among the traditional conservative base of those 60 and older, a majority of those in their 60s (57 percent) disapproved of his job performance and only a plurality of those 70 or older (46 percent) approved. More than two-thirds of all other age cohorts disapproved.

The retaliation against MBC served as red meat to Yoon’s base. In a survey by the National Barometer Survey (NBS) at the time, 64 percent of those who support the president’s PPP approved of the ban. Meanwhile, 65 percent of the public overall said banning MBC reporters from Code One was inappropriate. That included nine in 10 (92 percent) supporters of the Democratic Party (DP), the main opposition, and 68 percent of independents. Yoon moved forward undeterred.

As tensions simmered with MBC, the president ended his “doorstepping” practice – impromptu question and answer sessions with assembled media as he entered the office for the day. These sessions were a novel approach to interacting with the media for a South Korean president. In the past, presidents rarely faced the media, instead holding highly scripted press conferences where the questions were approved in advance.

In late August 2022, the policy was popular with his base; 62 percent of PPP supporters said Yoon’s doorstepping interviews should continue. By late November, however, attitudes had flipped. Perhaps tired of the controversy created by the president’s answers and the perceived drag on his approval rates, 53 percent of PPP supporters favored discontinuing the events. Doorstepping has not returned.

The administration has also taken legal action against journalists for reporting news unfavorable to Yoon. Two reporters were sued for filing stories covering a book written by a former spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense. The book claimed that Yoon and his wife involved a shaman in the decision to move the presidential office out of the Blue House. That suit is ongoing.

The use of South Korea’s libel laws to take on media outlets hardly makes the Yoon administration unique. But this harder-edged approach in dealing with the media coincides with establishing a floor in Yoon’s approval rates, and is indicative of a president seeking to stifle criticism and solidify his base in the last months of a rocky first year in office.

Polarization and Prosecution

Perhaps nowhere has the administration’s conservative pedigree been more apparent than in the resurgence of the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office – an institution once headed by Yoon himself. The Ministry of Justice, which oversees the prosecutor’s office, is now also led by a former prosecutor and close associate of Yoon, Han Dong-hoon.

Much of the media has focused on the prosecution’s indictments of Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the opposition party and Yoon’s opponent in the 2022 presidential election. They have also indicted officials that served in the Moon administration. Suh Hoon, a former national security adviser, was arrested for an alleged cover-up related to the death of a South Korean fisheries official in waters near North Korea. Three others – and Suh as well – were indicted for the forced repatriation of two North Korean fisherman in a separate incident.

Investigations and indictments of officials from previous administrations are not uncommon. But these indictments have obscured the ongoing battle over the investigative powers wielded by the prosecutors and the police.

In its last days, the Moon administration and the DP unilaterally pushed through legislation to curtail the investigative powers of the prosecutors, one of the most powerful organizations in the country. The powers taken from the prosecutors were to be handed to the police, strengthening the ability of the police to investigate a range of potential crimes.

The move was divisive. In polling from Gallup Korea at the time, 36 percent of the public approved of the move while 47 percent disapproved. Again, those results were highly polarized. Among supporters of Yoon’s PPP, 80 percent disapproved while 68 percent of DP supporters approved of the reforms.

Yoon made no secret of his opposition to the reforms while he was prosecutor general. His very public falling-out with the Moon administration over the issue, in fact, helped catapult Yoon to fame as a conservative icon, setting up his presidential bid on behalf of the PPP.

In June 2022, with Yoon now president, his administration sought to have those reforms thrown out by the Constitutional Court in order to restore power to the prosecution. The court dismissed the petition in April 2023, ruling that the reforms are valid and will remain in effect.

Even before this ruling, however, Yoon took steps to rein in the police and their newfound investigative powers after assuming office. He could not do so legislatively, as the DP controls the National Assembly, so instead sought oversight through agency reform. Yoon established an oversight bureau within the Ministry of Interior and Safety, giving the government direct control of the police.

Critics called control of the police an unwelcome throwback to the dictatorships of the 1970s and ‘80s. Police across the country protested the move. A slim majority (51 percent) of the public disapproved according to Gallup Korea, but 65 percent of PPP supporters were on board.

At the same time, relations with the DP are in tatters. Setting aside the ongoing investigations and indictments of political opponents, Yoon’s administration has found little room for cooperation with the DP on legislation. The most recent example was an amendment to the Grain Management Act that mandates government purchases of rice from domestic producers. The DP passed the amendment through the National Assembly only to see it vetoed by Yoon.

Polling from NBS suggests the public is uncertain what to make of the veto. Half (51 percent) said it was problematic for a president to veto a bill that had passed through the National Assembly. But that likely does not factor into Yoon’s decision making; 74 percent of PPP supporters said there was no problem with the veto.

The bad blood between the administration and the DP has also reared its head on Yoon’s proposal to move forward relations with Japan. The DP continues to use that compromise as a cudgel, criticizing the administration as being pro-Japan – perhaps the most serious accusation that can be made in South Korea’s domestic politics.

The administration’s proposal to resolve the issue of compensation for Koreans forced into labor for Imperial Japan is also broadly unpopular with the public. In poll after poll, 60 percent have consistently disapproved of the deal. But Yoon has stuck by his belief that improved relations with Japan are in South Korea’s best interest. Yoon was reported to have said that he would pursue improved relations with Japan even if his approval rate dropped to 1 percent.

Taking Control of the Party

Given his dearth of political experience, it is no surprise that Yoon is not a sophisticated political operator. Of course, the habitat in which his political life was incubated did not require sophistication. Following the failed presidency of Park Geun-hye, the conservative party carried the stain of her administration into the 2019 National Assembly election, which resulted in a historic landslide for the Democratic Party. The disarray that followed stunted the conservative party and the next generation of conservative leadership failed to emerge ahead of the 2022 presidential election.

With the cabinet of potential PPP leadership threadbare, Yoon stepped into the vacuum to win the conservative nomination. The fact that he had prosecuted Park served as an important feather in his cap.

The lack of leadership within the PPP was a stroke of good fortune for Yoon’s candidacy, but it also meant that as an outsider he assumed office with virtually no powerbase within the party. And thus, Yoon has had to take the unusual step of gaining control over his own party while in office – something usually accomplished after receiving the nomination, if not before.

But the same lack of leadership within the party that propelled him to the nomination has also blessed Yoon with weak internal opponents, which became easy targets to either remove completely or sideline in the competition for the soul of the PPP.

The most significant rival was Lee Jun-seok, a newcomer to the party when he was elected party leader in June 2021 at the age of 36. He was expected to build a bridge to South Korea’s young men – Lee was recognized as a “men’s right activist” – but instead brought generational conflict. Yoon and Lee jousted throughout the presidential campaign, and soon after Yoon’s victory the party turned on Lee. He was suspended from the party over sexual misconduct allegations.

Later, text messages from Yoon to the then-acting PPP chairman captured in a photo show the president criticizing Lee. No one came to Lee’s defense. He was recently given an additional one-year suspension, which likely means he will not be eligible to run in the 2024 National Assembly election. His lack of a powerbase and brashness made Lee an easy target, and Yoon’s backers were able to excise the former chairman from the party without trouble.

The second potential rival was Ahn Cheol-soo – the tech entrepreneur-turned-politico who is better known for withdrawing from elections than for holding any office or actual influence. Ahn was a prominent third-party candidate in the 2022 presidential election before withdrawing and throwing his support behind Yoon. His support likely cemented Yoon’s victory, given the narrow margin by which the latter won – just 0.73 percentage points.

Yet that decision won Ahn little in the way of political cachet among the PPP. More recently he ran for leader of the party, and openly claimed that Yoon had his thumb on the scale in favor of Kim Gi-hyun, a known Yoon ally. This drew a rebuke from Yoon’s aides, and Kim went on to soundly defeat Ahn in the contest for party leadership.

Weeks later, Yun Jae-ok – who served on Yoon’s campaign committee – was elected floor leader of the party. Yoon’s control of the party is now complete.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the importance of the April 2024 National Assembly elections cannot be overstated for their importance to Yoon’s ambitions as president. The alignment of the party behind Yoon is a key component of getting the conservative house in order ahead of that election. Should the opposition Democratic Party retain a majority in the National Assembly, Yoon’s presidency would enter its lame duck phase with three years remaining in his term.

In that case, Yoon’s administration would also likely fail to pass even a single piece of significant legislation for his entire five-year term. His wished-for reforms in education, labor, the pension fund, and healthcare would be dead on arrival. Whatever coalition within the party he has managed to cobble together would likely unravel, and his deal with Japan would come under pressure from all sides.

Yoon’s approach of solidifying his base by taking control of the party, battling the media, and feuding with the opposition has significant drawbacks. The most prominent risk is the failure to attract new voters to the party. In early April polling from Gallup Korea, 50 percent said they hope the DP wins the most seats in the 2024 election in order to keep the ruling party in check. Of course, one year remains until the election, and much can change during that time.

Through Yoon’s first year in office, he has shown a willingness to pursue unpopular policies if those policies appeal to his base and align with his nascent vision for his presidency. While he may not have deepened South Korea’s already-severe polarization, he has also made little effort to address that divide. This approach will continue to ensure his approval rates retain their floor at roughly 30 percent, but the failure to broaden the appeal of the party ahead of 2024 may ultimately undermine his presidency as a whole.