How will India React to the Dalai Lama’s Succession?

The question of the Dalai Lama’s succession is a fascinating and rare instance of an authoritarian, Communist regime following an obscure religious tradition, and a religious leader shifting to a more transparent model of choosing a government. 

As is widely known, the 14th Dalai Lama, both the spiritual head and secular leader of Tibet, was forced to flee from the China-occupied region during the 1959 rebellion. Having lived in exile in India ever since, the Dalai Lama continues to hold his religious position but, being already 88, he is acutely aware of his mortality. His eventual death may cause a power vacuum among the fragile Tibetan diaspora. It will also certainly give Beijing even more opportunities to strengthen its claims to the occupied country. What options might the Dalai Lama choose before his unavoidable demise, and how may India react?

A volume recently published by ISDP and ORCA India, edited by Jagannath Panda and Eerisha Pankaj, is one of the sources that casts some light on the darkness surrounding the possible answers to these questions. (Titled “The Dalai Lama’s Succession: Strategic Realities of the Tibet Question,” it is accessible on ISDP’s website)

The Chinese government is likely getting ready to declare its own Dalai Lama. In doing so, the Chinese Communist Party may take advantage of the fact that the leader is considered a reincarnation of Awalokiteswara, a Tibetan Buddhist deity of compassion, and is therefore selected through mystical, opaque ways that involve identifying the next child in which the deity incarnates itself. Moreover, Beijing claims that it was historically the Chinese empire that had the right to choose the Dalai Lama.

Certain signs that indicate where the incarnation will appear, such as observing cloud formations above the village where such a child will be born, may be relatively easily manipulated. Some of these could have been even prepared in advance (the clouds can be pre-filmed). Moreover, as pointed out by Tenzin Lhadon in the above-mentioned volume:

“It would seem out of place for a socialist government to liken itself to ‘the real living Buddha for Tibetans,’ but that was a statement given by the Communist Party Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2007.”

Thus, as ironic as it may seem, we will likely witness a Communist government keeping to an ancient religious tradition as it can be easier manipulated than any other more open, transparent ways of selecting leaders.

The current Dalai Lama is well aware of this conundrum. In 2011, he announced that he was relinquishing the secular part of his power. The internationally unrecognized Tibetan government-in-exile has democratically chosen a prime minister since then. However, the Dalai Lama remains the spiritual head of the Tibetan people. 

In the recent past, he has suggested that his successor may be born outside Tibet, perhaps in ethnically Tibetan areas in neighboring India. This has been interpreted as an obvious declaration that the Tibetan diaspora will not accept a China-born Dalai Lama, as such a person would certainly be Beijing-controlled. The Chinese government claims that the next Dalai Lama must be born in its territory. 

Understanding that a schism is at hand, the Dalai Lama has also said that after his death the existence of two Dalai Lamas (i.e. one under Beijing’s control and the other chosen by the Tibetan diaspora) is also likely. 

But the religious leader is also considering another option. In 2011,  he wrote: “When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas […] and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue” (cf. B.R. Deepak’s text in the same volume). In other words, the Dalai Lama is considering declaring that there will be no reincarnation, and thus no successor.

How will New Delhi react to the future succession tussle that is likely to ensue after the current Dalai Lama’s death? The question is of vital importance since India is not only one of the centers of the Tibetan diaspora but also the hosting country for its exiled government. There are also parts of historical and cultural Tibet that are now under New Delhi’s control (such as Ladakh). It is thus very probable that the “diaspora Dalai Lama” will be selected from among the Tibetans living in India.

New Delhi’s relations with Beijing are already very strained. Despite the smoldering border dispute, or perhaps even because of it, the Indian government is unlikely to use the Tibet issue too aggressively in its diplomacy. It would, I assume, recognize the “diaspora Dalai Lama” the way it is recognizing the current one. This would entail retaining a low-key relationship with the leader but without recognizing Tibet as an independent state or the exiled government as its legitimate representative. 

In case the incarnation is identified as a Tibetan child living in India, or as another diaspora Tibetan child born elsewhere that would in time prefer to settle in India, New Delhi can be expected to host this future leader and grant him the freedom to move in and out of the country.

On how New Delhi would react to Beijing’s choice of the next Dalai Lama – as it is likely that China would insist that India must recognize him – it is hard to tell exactly how India’s policy will be shaped. I assume that some form of a careful choice of words on certain occasions combined with studious silence at other times would allow New Delhi to steer clear of an overt clash with Beijing over this issue. India does recognize China’s rights to exercise sovereignty over Tibet, just like others countries do, but this does not have to translate by default to recognizing the authority of the Beijing-backed Tibetan spiritual head. The Indian government would likely avoid openly recognizing the “Chinese Dalai Lama” and would, in its actions, show that it considers the “diaspora Dalai Lama” as the rightful successor.