The Rise and Fall of China-US Dialogues

When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited China last month, it made headlines around the world. Not only was its Blinken’s first trip to China, but his visit had become inextricably linked to the attention-grabbing “spy balloon” saga. A Chinese surveillance balloon drifting in plain view over the midwestern United States in late January captured U.S. public attention as few foreign policy issues do – and forced the postponement of Blinken’s China trip, originally scheduled for February 5.

When Blinken finally arrived in Beijing on June 18, 2023, it was long overdue – and not just because of the four-month delay. Blinken’s six most recent predecessors, spanning three presidential administrations, had all visited China for the first time within six months of taking office. Indeed, aside from Colin Powell (who held the office from 2001-2005), the other five former secretaries all visited Beijing within just two months of assuming their posts.

By contrast, Blinken was almost two years and five months into his tenure before first setting foot on Chinese soil.

Of course, part of the delay can be attributed to the pandemic. China was largely closed for business – whether economic or diplomatic – from early 2020 through late 2022. It was only this year that China resumed diplomatic hosting duties at a full clip. That said, Blinken’s much-delayed trip to China also reflects a shocking contraction of China-U.S. high-level diplomatic exchanges since the middle of the Trump administration. The cratering of such contacts is all the more notable considering the trajectory of steady expansion seen in the 2000s and early 2010s.

Originally, the focus was on economic issues. After China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China-U.S. trade skyrocketed. From 1990 to 2000, bilateral trade grew from $20 billion a year to $116 billion, under $100 billion in net growth. Growth during the next decade came in at a whopping $340 billion: from $116 billion in 2000 to $456 billion in 2010.

Faced with the massive surge in China-U.S. trade, the Bush administration (2001-2009) decided the economic relationship needed special attention. In 2006, China and the United States established the “Strategic Economic Dialogue” (SED), spearheaded by the U.S. treasury secretary (then Hank Paulson) and the Chinese vice premier responsible for the economy (first Wu Yi, then Wang Qishan).

In introductory remarks ahead of the very first SED, Paulson described the dialogue as “an opportunity to address important long-term issues that are central to our economic relationship with China while also providing an opportunity to address the most pressing short-term issues.” The agenda, as befitting the name, was entirely economic focused: Paulson listed the trade deficit, market access, and energy cooperation as the three priorities to address.

The SED met biannually, convening five times from December 2006 to December 2008. The location alternated between China and the United States.

Upon taking office in 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama decided that regular high-level China-U.S. engagement shouldn’t be limited to the economic sphere. His administration rebranded the Strategic Economic Dialogue as the “Strategic and Economic Dialogue” (S&ED), which would now include two pillars: a “Strategic Track” (led by the U.S. secretary of state and China’s top diplomat, the head of the CCP’s Central Office of Foreign Affairs) and an “Economic Track” (essentially replicating the old SED format).

In addition to economic topics, the regular China-U.S. dialogues now addressed issues like the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, instability and terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the South China Sea, and Taiwan. Speaking after the first S&ED session in July 2009, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the meetings as “the largest gathering ever of top leaders from our two countries,” covering an “unparalleled” range of issues.

“And the result,” she added, “is that we have laid the foundation for a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship for the 21st century.”

The S&ED met annually from 2009 to 2016, with hosting duties alternating between Washington, D.C., and Beijing. China-U.S. relations had a turbulent run during that era, with tensions mounting over China’s island-building campaign in the South China Sea and the U.S. “pivot to Asia,” which Beijing read as a containment campaign. But every year, like clockwork, Cabinet-level officials gathered for the two-day conclave.

That changed under the Trump administration (2017-2021). China-U.S. relations cratered rapidly, with a high-profile trade war, mounting evidence of China’s crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and increasing tensions between China and Taiwan – and that’s before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. But as unbelievable as it may seem today, the Trump administration originally planned on further expanding regular ministerial-level dialogues with China.

In April 2017, during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, the two sides announced that the S&ED would be replaced by the “United States-China Comprehensive Dialogue,” which had four pillars: the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (chaired by the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, the director of the CCP’s Central Office of Foreign Affairs, and the vice chair of the CCP’s Central Military Commission); the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (chaired by the U.S. secretaries of commerce and the treasury and the Chinese vice premier responsible for the economy); the Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (chaired by the U.S. attorney general, the U.S. secretary of homeland security, and China’s minister of public security); and the Social and Cultural Dialogue (chaired by the U.S. secretary of state and the Chinese vice premier responsible for health, education, and sports).

With all four Comprehensive Dialogues envisioned to meet annually, they would have represented a breathtaking expansion of China-U.S. high-level engagement. But it was not to be.

All four dialogues met once between April 2017 and Trump’s state visit to China in November 2017. The White House noted at the time that the talks had aimed “to prepare for President Trump’s state visit and produce meaningful results.”

But by 2018, they had all essentially been mothballed. The Trump administration effectively scrapped the economic pillar, complaining of China’s lack of sincerity in advancing real reforms. China then killed the diplomatic and security dialogue after the U.S. sanctioned China’s military for purchasing arms from Russia and the Trump administration approved an arms sale to Taiwan. The remaining two died quiet deaths, with no formal announcements.

Since 2018, China-U.S. high-level diplomacy has occurred only on an ad-hoc basis, with Cabinet-level trips by either sides the subject of much speculation and scrutiny. It’s easy to forget, in this atmosphere, that just six years ago such exchanges were routine.

Obviously, talks have fallen victim to the general downslide in China-U.S. relations. But it’s also worth pointing out that these high-level annual dialogues weren’t enough to stop the downward spiral. That factors into a broader debate about the purpose of China-U.S. dialogues: Is talking for the sake of talking worthwhile?

The question reemerged with Blinken’s recent trip, where the visit itself was the only expected (and delivered) outcome. Critics have cautioned against a perceived U.S. tendency to “go soft” on China in exchange for the “reward” of visits that fail to offer concrete progress.

Proponents, however, say such dialogues are a crucial means of connection and interaction that can help stop the bilateral relationship from going off the rails. For that perspective, it’s useful to look at how Hillary Clinton described her own experience with the S&ED in 2009:

[S]ometimes, the most telling measures of progress are less tangible. Over the past two days, State Councilor Dai [Bingguo] and I have spent many hours in discussion. We’ve had the opportunity to meet privately and to talk very openly between ourselves to try to understand each other’s point of view…Our delegations have spent hours in consultation and negotiation, and we’ve not been limited to just the usual topic or two… 

This dialogue has established a new pattern of cooperation between our governments and a forum for discussion. It’s begun to develop a structure for moving forward on this range of issues.

Today, the U.S. and Chinese governments don’t have many opportunities to “meet privately” and “talk very openly,” and there is no remaining “structure for moving forward” on specific issues. Blinken’s visit may have helped tackle the first issue, but Washington and Beijing have yet to address the second.