Remembering Colonial Hong Kong: Memory vs History

On July 1, 1997, Britain handed over the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) was founded. Although Hong Kong ceased to be a British colony on that day, memories of the colonial era have never become obsolete. Instead, political discourse on British colonialism in Hong Kong has intensified in the last two decades.

In particular, Hong Kong has recently witnessed the emergence of colonial nostalgia. Many started discussing fond memories and disseminating positive historical narratives about British colonialism in post-colonial Hong Kong. The discourse about colonial rule in Hong Kong has shifted.

How is the colonial era now remembered by various sectors of society? And how do these collective memories differ from the actual British colonial rule in a historical sense?

Remembering the Colonial Era in Post-Colonial Hong Kong

Before the 2010s, colonial nostalgia was not visible in political discourse in Hong Kong. For example, in protests against the SAR government’s proposal of a National Security Law in 2003, activists and protesters made few references to the colonial legacies of Britain. Remarks and comments on Hong Kong’s colonial era, however, began bubbling up in the 2010s, when there were increased tensions between the government and activists, who believed that the Chinese government was increasingly interfering in Hong Kong’s political system, society, and cultural life.

For instance, in the movement against the introduction of Moral and National Education reforms by the Education Bureau in 2012, some students started displaying a favorable view toward British colonialism in Hong Kong. Some believed that the colonial government was “more democratic” compared to the SAR government. In some of the demonstrations, colonial flags were even waved by protesters.

This phenomenon could also be found in later social movements, such as protests in the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and the Anti-extradition Bill Movement in 2019. Some activists even started advocating to pressure Britain to “fulfill her duty” to Hong Kong and intervene in the protests – directly calling for the British government to engage itself in the city’s politics once again.

A favorable impression of British rule in Hong Kong was propagated by various activists and politicians. The construction of such narratives was fueled by the ongoing political developments in Hong Kong. For example, in an article in the New York Times in 2018, pro-independence activist Yau Wai-ching argued that Beijing has “manipulated a well-developed political and constitutional framework.” She also stressed that the concepts of “civil liberties and the separation of powers” that people believed in firmly under “the relatively enlightened rule of the British” were now abandoned, implying that progressive political frameworks and values were British colonial legacies.

In a 2019 interview with The Guardian, British politician Chris Patten, who served as the last governor of Hong Kong, suggested that the proposed extradition bill would “remove the firewall between Hong Kong’s rule of law and the idea of law which prevails in communist China,” similarly implying that “the rule of law” concept was a British legacy. These speeches probably have shaped how the public viewed British colonialism and created an impression that the British had introduced a relatively liberal political system and the “rule of law” concept to Hong Kong during the colonial era.

In addition, there are prevailing beliefs that Hong Kong was largely politically stable and economically prosperous under British colonial rule. In particular, former governor Murray MacLehose’s period (1971-1982) is often considered to be a “golden era” due to the wide range of reforms that were implemented during his reign, such as the Ten-year Housing Program, construction of “new towns,” legalization of Chinese as an official language, and the setting up of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The idea that the colonial era was a time of stability and prosperity resulted in more Hong Kongers remembering the period of British rule positively.

The new visa scheme that was introduced by Britain’s Home Office in response to the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 also served to further the notion that the “metropole” was “benevolent.” The emigration scheme offered at least 144,500 British National (Overseas) passport holders an opportunity to leave Hong Kong and move to the United Kingdom, in hope of becoming permanent residents after staying there for five years. The British Home Office minister for immigration also publicly claimed that the British government would “continue to take action to uphold” its “moral and historic commitments to the people of Hong Kong,” creating an impression that Britain has always backed Hong Kong, both in the past and in current times of crises.

These recent developments could explain why specific sections of the society at times romanticize Hong Kong’s colonial past. For example, when Queen Elizabeth II passed away in September 2022, many queued outside the British Consulate in Admiralty to pay tribute to her. Some even held candles during the queen’s funeral.

The “Real” Colonial History

These contemporary narratives, however, are not accurate depictions of British rule in Hong Kong. First, the colonial government was far from democratic; direct elections were never fully implemented before the handover of Hong Kong, despite the gradual introduction of electoral reforms after 1984.

In fact, the trajectory of Hong Kong’s political development was quite bizarre. Amid widespread decolonization in Asia and Africa, Hong Kong’s political system was largely unreformed in the immediate post-World War II period. The Legislative and Executive Councils were largely comprised of members appointed either by the governor or the queen. Although these members were consulted before laws were enacted and policies were implemented, especially those related to Chinese customs, they were primarily professional and business elites that represented sectional interests of the society.

There was no direct political communication channel between the state and the grassroots members of the society until 1968, when the City District Officer Scheme was introduced. Although a covert opinion polling exercise, named Town Talk (later reformed into Movement of Opinion Direction, or MOOD, in 1975 and Talking Points in the 1980s), was embedded in the scheme to solicit public opinions of the “man in the street” from different walks of life, the exercise’s covert nature meant that its function as an intelligence device was still prioritized over its aim to widen channels for popular political participation. There were elections in the Urban Council, but its electoral franchise was narrow before 1983, limited by income, education level, or professional status. The notion that the colonial regime was enlightened and had introduced a well-developed political framework to Hong Kong is therefore far from historically accurate.

Second, the ruling strategies of the colonial government were far more complex than what the public discourse portrays. Of course, there were times when the colonial government acted benevolently, such as how it intervened to protect vulnerable developing industries and implemented rent control in the private housing market in the early post-war period. However, some of these schemes were not merely aimed at improving the well-being of marginalized groups but were introduced with a goal of yielding political dividends.

For example, the Vegetable Marketing Organization was set up in 1946 to centralize the vegetable wholesales business in the New Territories and collectivize private markets in Hong Kong. Stopping the middlemen’s exploitation of farmers and improving cultivators’ standard of living were important motives of this state-monopolized initiative. Nevertheless, few would have known the organization was later utilized as a political device in the Cold War, mainly to reduce Hong Kong’s reliance on China’s supply of vegetables, lower the risk of a food crisis in case food supply was suddenly cut off, and compete with the Society of Plantations in the New Territories, which was supported by the Chinese government.

It is also important to remember that the colonial regime could be intrusive, manipulative and repressive. For instance, to strengthen its rule, it strategically collaborated with various social groups to create social cleavages and ensure public discourse would move toward its desired directions. To counter the rise of Chinese nationalism among the younger generation of Hong Kong Chinese and the spread of communist ideologies during the Cold War, the colonial state intervened in education through using tailored curriculum to construct and promote a “depoliticized, sanitized version of Chineseness,” as the late historian Bernard Luk put it in a 1991 article. This approach was particularly visible in the subject of Chinese history, where contemporary political issues were not discussed but the cultural history of imperial China was emphasized. These sides of British colonialism in Hong Kong are often neglected in discussions today.

Third, the “rule of law” concept was more a discourse that the British government constructed retrospectively rather than an ethos that the colonial government had always adhered to. As historian Christopher Munn has argued, colonial Hong Kong’s judicial system, especially in the 19th century, was intrusive and discriminatory. In the post-war period, the colonial government continued to exercise draconian legal measures in a high-handed manner when there was social unrest. For instance, in the 1967 riots, the colonial government compromised the rule of law concept when it invoked 12 emergency regulations, including allowing the government to pursue trial without proceedings, and to deport and detain political dissidents.

When it comes to freedom of speech and the press, the colonial government was no stranger to censorship. In 1952 and 1956, for example, it suspended a number of left-wing newspapers and arrested their publishers, editors, and printers, who were involved in producing and disseminating “seditious” publications. As legal historian Michael Ng has rightly pointed out, newspapers in colonial Hong Kong were “continuously and systematically monitored and pervasively censored through the collaborative efforts of executive actions, legislative provisions, and judicial decisions.”

These events are clear proof that the colonial regime could be quite illiberal. They are, however, not included in most contemporary collective memories of British colonialism in Hong Kong.

Fourth, the extent of political stability and economic prosperity during the colonial era has been exaggerated. In fact, colonial Hong Kong was never free from disturbances, with the 1956, 1966, and 1967 riots being notable examples. In addition, the colonial era witnessed different forms of political activism, ranging from petitions to rallies, as political scientist Lam Wai-man shows in her research. The economic prosperity also did not benefit everyone, with the working class in particular suffering from rapid industrialization, tolerating long working hours and exploitative working conditions. They were also protected by very few labor laws before the 1966 and 1967 riots, and had limited upward social mobility.

Lastly, even though colonialism is remembered fondly by today’s Hong Kongers, the British government and monarchy were not received by the public affectionately back in the colonial era, suggesting a discrepancy between memory and history. For example, according to a number of covert opinion polling exercises conducted in the period between 1975 and 1977, contemporaries displayed limited knowledge about the British Empire and showed little interest in British politics.

When Queen Elizabeth II visited Hong Kong in 1975, her trip was considered “untimely” because it coincided with an economic recession. The grassroots members of the society in particular were indifferent and did not show much enthusiasm. Others did not consider themselves as subjects of the queen and perceived themselves to be Chinese people living “under an alien government.” Many were more concerned about whether the visit would cost a substantial amount in public expenditure.

Similarly, when British MPs visited Hong Kong in 1976, many believed they were only exercising control over the Hong Kong government and were inspecting the colony. Some even viewed both the colonial and British governments skeptically; Britain’s declining economy in particular led to further public mistrust. These images of the British government and the monarchy evidently challenge present-day discourse in Hong Kong about the colonial era.

Conclusion

During the course of pursuing a political agenda, it is common to invoke historical memories to mobilize public support and justify actions. However, misuses of history can be extremely dangerous, especially when historical narratives are distorted to provoke popular sentiment and encourage radicalism.

The mismatch between memory and history of colonial Hong Kong reminds us that while it is legitimate to express grievances over injustice, we must not detach history from context and project our emotions into historical narratives merely to sustain a sense of legitimacy. More importantly, we must remember that colonialism was, and is, about oppression and exploitation. These unequal power dynamics should never be justified or praised, despite the unfortunate political developments in Hong Kong.