US Pacific Policy in China’s Shadow

There has been a flurry of Pacific Islands-related press releases coming out of the United States Department of State this year.

The announcements came especially fast and furious during a bevy of meetings in Papua New Guinea this May. On May 22 and 23 alone, the State Department issued four major read-outs: “The United States and Papua New Guinea Sign New Defense Cooperation Agreement,” “U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Dialogue in Papua New Guinea,” “Secretary Blinken Witnesses the Signing of the U.S.-Palau 2023 Agreement,” and “Signing of the U.S.-FSM [Federated States of Micronesia] Compact of Free Association-Related Agreements.”

Earlier, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted the “first ever U.S-Pacific Island Country Summit” on September 28-29, 2022, at which the White House’s Pacific Partnership Strategy was launched. There is due to be a second summit in September 2023. (The meetings are held in September as many Pacific leaders are already in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, so it is more likely they would be willing to hang out for a few days for meetings in Washington.)

There is no question, then, that the United States wants to, at the least, look like it is serious about the Pacific Islands. The reason for the renewed interest is obvious. The degree to which Chinese influence operations in the region have undermined local governance has become difficult to ignore, and has the potential (and likely the intent) to undermine U.S. strategic architecture in the Pacific – and with it, the viability of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Local leaders know it. On March 9, 2023, while still president of FSM, David Panuelo wrote a letter in which he described cases of what he called China’s “Political Warfare and Grey Zone activity [that] occur[s] within our borders.”

He wrote:

One of the reasons that China’s Political Warfare is successful in so many arenas is that we are bribed to be complicit, and bribed to be silent… Senior officials and elected officials across the whole of our National and State Governments receive offers of gifts as a means to curry favor. The practical impact of this is that some senior officials and elected officials take actions that are contrary to the FSM’s national interest, but are consistent with the PRC’s national interests.

China’s efforts have combined in some cases with a legitimate dissatisfaction about Western (usually defined as U.S., Australia, and New Zealand) engagement that is then used as a justification for closer ties with Beijing. Some of that engagement would seem to run counter to the best interests of citizens in a democracy but, as described by Panuelo, certainly would seem to be consistent with China’s national interests. That includes things like the China-Solomon Islands security deal, which, according to a leaked draft, allows for the deployment of People’s Liberation Army troops in the Solomons to “protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.”

The United States’ Response

So how to read the U.S. response? Carefully. Press releases are not a reliable source of information and in the Pacific Islands, where the background is complex and dynamic, and reporting is often done from a distance (in spite of excellent local journalists), particular attention is needed.

For example, one of the State Department’s press releases begins: “Secretary Blinken’s visit to Papua New Guinea for the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Dialogue…” This implies that the leaders were there for a meeting between the U.S. and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). That’s a bit of diplomatic sleight of hand.

The leaders had in fact been brought to PNG by India for a meeting of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) to be attended by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. India had deliberately not made it a PIF meeting (and so New Caledonia and French Polynesia weren’t there) as Delhi wanted to engage directly with Pacific Islands leaders, rather than through the PIF, a multilateral organization seen by some as unduly influenced by members Australia and New Zealand. Conversely, the U.S. approach has been overtly PIF-centric.

After India had made all the arrangements, it was announced Biden would stop over in Papua New Guinea at the same time – essentially showing up at India’s party. As a result, Modi’s plans were changed so that he would leave PNG before Biden’s arrival. Then Biden cancelled and was replaced by Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

So, while the framing by the State Department that this was a U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Dialogue might play outside the region, many of the Pacific Island leaders could be forgiven for being perplexed about what it was all about and how the change of plans benefitted their nations.

Other mixed messages abound. On May 9, the State Department announced the opening of a new U.S. embassy in Tonga – but it was opened when both the king of Tonga and prime minister were out of the country for the coronation of King Charles III in Britain. The department later clarified that it was a “soft” opening for bureaucratic reasons and a proper event would be held later.

That event took place on July 26, when Blinken stopped by for the formal opening. This time the prime minister of Tonga was there, but the king was in another part of the country – and, rather unfortunately, there was a misspelling of the name of the capital of the country on the podium’s seal.

The diplomatic faux pas was unfortunate, especially given the efforts of the small team on the ground. But what is more concerning to Tongans is a practical matter: The new U.S. embassy does not currently provide consular services and there is no timetable in place for when such services will start, meaning Tongans will still have to pay to go to Fiji to apply for U.S. visas.

This uncovers another issue, which is a lack of institutional knowledge (or at least respect). The Tongan military served in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one of the understandings was that, in return, Tonga would gain in-country U.S. consular services. They did for a while, in the form of a “visa camp” that came to Tonga from the U.S. embassy in Fiji. Then that stopped. The State Department may have forgotten the sacrifice Tongans were willing to make as a part of growing their relationship with the U.S., but Tonga hasn’t. The way the embassy was opened and the lack of consular services are, at best, confusing to Tongans.

It didn’t help that a few days after Blinken visited, China’s medical ship, the Peace Ark, came into port in Tonga, providing medical services to thousands of Tongans and rendering the U.S. embassy (re)opening a distant memory.

There is a similar situation surrounding the newly opened U.S. embassy in Solomon Islands. Many Americans know about the depth of the U.S. relationship with the people of the Solomons, the site of the World War II battle of Guadalcanal, and currently in the crosshairs of China. Yet the new embassy also doesn’t have consular services, meaning visa applicants have to go to Papua New Guinea to apply. In one recent case, a surgeon from the National Referral Hospital in Solomons was offered a scholarship to do advanced training in the U.S., but he would have to pay out of pocket to fly to PNG for a visa application, something he can’t afford.

Meanwhile, in August, the Peace Ark pulled into port in Solomon Islands as well, providing treatment and medicine.

Those in the region want more people-to-people relations with the United States, which is why the matter of consular services is sensitive. If that’s not possible, they’ll take what is available. They have no choice. It’s worth noting that Solomon Islanders can get e-visas or visas on arrival to Canada, India, Europe’s Schengen zone, and elsewhere – but not the United States.

There is an apparent desire by the United States to show engagement with the Pacific Islands. But while Washington may have woken up to the region’s importance, it doesn’t seem to have realized the situation is urgent. Embassies are understaffed and under-resourced, and guidance from Australia and New Zealand is often prioritized over direct bilateral relations with Pacific Island countries.

There is often a default to the same methods, allies, and organizations that have let the region fall prey thus far to corrosive influences coming from Beijing. Washington seems unwilling to treat major threats to democracy (such as Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare postponing elections) as something to be challenged for the sake of the people of those nations, and a wider free and open Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. Department of Defense, however, seems more focused. It has realized both that the region is important and that the situation is urgent. The defense deal with Papua New Guinea, some of the work around humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and deployments in places like Palau and Yap indicate a quiet but serious attempt to shore up the region, and a willingness to look at new ways of operating, as indicated by a proposed U.S.-India-Pacific Islands military meeting to be held in New Delhi.

Defense officials seem to have realized that there is no time to spare. And that is especially the case in the three U.S. Freely Associated States (FAS): FSM, Palau, and Marshall Islands. Combined, they cover about as much of the Pacific as the continental United States.