Can Japan Be a Climate Change Leader?

Japan has often portrayed itself as a leader in the global effort to mitigate climate change. However, the country’s track record has been distinctly mixed.

After the oil shocks of the 1970s, Japan emphasized energy efficiency and the development of its civilian nuclear program to successfully reduce its dependence on foreign oil. But the country struggled to build on its previous gains just as global efforts to combat climate change gained momentum in the 1990s.

The announcement of a 2050 net zero target by then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide in 2020 appeared to mark a turning point. However, Suga stepped down after only a year in office. In the current Japanese political system, leadership from the top is critical, but the country also needs to cultivate bottom-up initiatives to accelerate its green transition.

Current Prime Minister Kishida Fumio must recommit to an ambitious climate change agenda if Japan is to reestablish its international leadership role.

Japan Has Fallen Short

Climate change mitigation has developed into a major arena of international cooperation over the past 30 years. The energy price shock triggered by the war in Ukraine, combined with increasing attention to green industrial policy in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, has further elevated the urgency of decarbonization and energy transitions. A wide range of policies, initiatives, and strategies in the power sector have been adopted to promote sustainable energy and achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 7.

Japan, the third-largest economy in the world, is striving to achieve a carbon-neutral society by 2050 while reducing greenhouse gasses (GHGs) as an international responsibility. With this in mind, the country’s national energy strategy particularly emphasizes energy security, economic efficiency, and environmental protection, as well as safety (3E+S).

However, Japan routinely ranks disappointingly low in global climate change rankings. This is due to limited progress on GHG emissions reductions, which were largely flat for two decades after the mid-1990s, and criticism of Japanese policies, such as the country’s support for coal-fired power plants. The stagnation of Japanese energy policy coincided with electoral and administrative reforms, which gave politicians stronger incentives and greater authority to reduce prices for Japanese energy consumers.

Japan has missed several chances to transform its climate and energy politics. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster compelled the shutdown of all Japanese nuclear power plants, creating an acute electricity shortage. There were early signs that the disaster might prove to be a pivotal moment in Japan’s climate policy: The government, then under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), legislated an ambitious feed-in tariff to promote renewable energy, and Japan’s traditionally powerful energy utilities were severely delegitimized.

However, the election in 2012 of the Abe Shinzo of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) marked a new era of stagnation in Japanese energy and climate policy. Abe’s government, which would remain in power until 2020, primarily focused on economic growth rather than emissions reduction.

Suga’s announcement of a net zero emissions target shortly after taking office in 2020 appeared to mark another turning point, signaling that the top leadership of Japan would prioritize climate change policy. However, while the Japanese government’s public pronouncements signal ambition, the overall panorama, which emphasizes business-as-usual activities and technological innovation, is not consistent with rapid decarbonization.

What are some of the factors that continue to hamper a more ambitious climate change policy in Japan?

The Continued Influence of Vested Interest Groups

Despite political change and the Fukushima disaster, Japanese policymaking in the energy sector still heavily weighs the voices of traditional actors, thanks to the continuing political dominance of the LDP and the relatively low priority placed on environmental policy by recent prime ministers, with the exception of Suga. Influential interest groups – particularly large electric utilities and energy-intensive business interests – have often resisted drastic change, motivated by fear of stranded assets and higher input costs.

Influential politicians of the LDP,  the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) have generally prioritized a cheap and stable energy supply, viewing decarbonization primarily through the lens of business opportunities rather than environmental objectives. The Ministry of Environment is the strongest advocate within the government of ambitious climate action, but it is less influential and often overruled on major government decisions.

This configuration of political actors influences who has a seat at the table in formulating Japanese energy and climate policy. For example, invitees to the “Meeting on a Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement as Growth Strategy” have mainly drawn from industry representatives and business elites from Keidanren and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, among others.

The reversion to traditional patterns of policymaking can be attributed in part to the timing of the Fukushima disaster, which took place under the 2009-2012 DPJ government. The DPJ government sought significant changes to Japan’s status quo energy policies – for example, regulatory reform of the “nuclear village” and the promotion of renewable energy – but the disaster also had the effect of severely harming the party’s public standing and electoral support. The LDP thus returned to political power in 2012 in a strong position to reverse or water down the DPJ’s reforms.

Ambiguity in Strategizing Policy Goals

Suga’s 2020 carbon neutrality pledge came with a promise to transform Japan’s industrial structure and social and economic system. The carbon neutrality plan was framed around technological innovation and development, such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and the use of hydrogen and ammonia as clean energy sources, along with the maximization of renewable energy alternatives.

Promotion of nuclear energy has been a consistent theme of LDP governments since the Fukushima disaster. The government has focused on the development of advanced and next-generation nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors and high temperature gas-cooled reactors, and established international cooperation with the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Furthermore, the pro-nuclear policy coalition has initiated programs on funding support, access to R&D facilities, and human resource development for the promotion of nuclear energy. Carbon-intensive industries have prioritized lowering electricity costs and praised nuclear energy as a stable and cost-effective energy source.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 severed LNG and crude oil exports, highlighting Japan’s vulnerability to supply shocks. For the first time since the Fukushima disaster, a majority of the Japanese public now favors restarting nuclear plants. The Kishida government has used this political opening to adopt fresh pro-nuclear policies such as the extension of the lifespan of existing reactors and the construction of new reactors.

It has also initiated a new green transformation policy, the Basic Policy for the Realization of Green Transformation (GX) in 2022, aiming to reach a target of 36-38 percent of renewable energy and nuclear energy usage of around 20-22 percent by 2030, together with the introduction of a carbon pricing scheme for companies. Additionally, the Japanese government aims to raise investment funds of 150 trillion yen ($1.16 trillion). In line with Suga's vision, GX also aims for Japan to achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050.

However, the GX plan has been harshly criticized by civic actors. As pointed out by the Renewable Energy Institute, a Tokyo-based non-profit think tank advocating for renewable energy, GX lacks a clear strategy and the determination required to place renewables at the center of Japan's energy supply and demand. Japan still lags behind its international peers in renewables promotion and adoption, and abundant resources like geothermal energy remain underutilized due to resistance from local interest groups.

Furthermore, the GX plan has been criticized for not having clear objectives, not providing sufficient information on the methods to achieve decarbonization, and not achieving a domestic consensus. Rather, it largely focuses on promises of technological innovation through financial investment.

Weak Civic Engagement And Public Apathy 

Another important aspect of Japanese policymaking is the relatively limited engagement of civil society organizations in environmental policymaking and the increasing apathy of the general public.

According to an international survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2021, Japan stood out as the only country that saw a decline in concern about the personal effects of climate change between 2015 and 2021. Furthermore, a recent survey by the Japanese Cabinet Office shows that concern about climate change is lowest among young people in Japan, with only 20 percent of those in the 18-29 age group feeling “concerned” compared to 61 percent of those over the age of 70.

In addition to low levels of public concern, compared to most Western countries, civic organizations have limited input in the decision-making processes of environmental and energy-related issues. However, several environment-oriented civic organizations are showing a growing interest in the renewable energy debate in Japan, especially in the post-Fukushima and post-Paris Climate Agreement era. These civic organizations call for the Japanese government to retire all coal-fired and nuclear power plants by 2030 and achieve net zero by 2050.

The most well-known activist and advocacy-oriented environmental civil society organizations that are lobbying the Japanese government, such as WWF Japan, have proposed scenarios with zero coal-fired power generation, requiring full phase-outs of nuclear and coal, and calling for renewable energy to account for at least 50 percent of the electricity mix by 2030 and 100 percent by 2050. Environmental NGOs have also successfully called attention to the Japanese government’s shortcomings. For example, Japan received a “fossil award” from the Climate Action Network for the government’s coal promotion and inadequate climate policies.

Environmental civil society organizations criticize Japan for its focus on solutions that continue to rely on fossil fuel sources, such as CCS, hydrogen, and ammonia. Hydrogen in particular has been a major priority in Japanese government policy, and it is typically presented as a decarbonized option. However, hydrogen is only carbon-free if it is made via renewable electricity and electrolysis. Furthermore, while hydrogen is a promising fuel for specific industries and use cases, widespread adoption in areas like consumer automobiles remains highly uncertain.

A Path Toward Decarbonization

Is there a realistic chance for Japan to emerge as a leader in international decarbonization efforts? Despite the setbacks and disappointments of the past three decades, there are some grounds for optimism. Japan’s current political institutions place far greater power in the hands of the prime minister compared to before; leadership from the top can make a big difference in the direction of policy. Suga’s commitment to net zero was an important step, and a younger cohort of rising LDP leaders – such as Kono Taro and Koizumi Shinjiro – have demonstrated a greater interest in environmental issues and climate change.

Kishida has publicly emphasized green investment and climate change as an important component of his “New Form of Capitalism.” However, his political capital has largely been devoted to other priorities, such as defense spending increases and childcare policies to tackle demographic challenges. His signature energy policies have been a gasoline subsidy and a reinvigoration of nuclear power. Placing more serious emphasis on climate change, particularly policies to accelerate Japan’s renewable energy transition, would put New Capitalism on a firmer foundation and burnish Kishida’s legacy as a transformative leader.

Although Japan’s renewable energy share has consistently lagged behind other high-income countries, there has also been meaningful progress. Solar energy adoption accelerated rapidly after the DPJ government’s feed-in tariff, albeit from a low base. Government plans call for steady increases in renewable energy capacity, which will be essential to meet Japan’s climate goals.

Private sector investment has also accelerated, partly motivated by a desire to capitalize on global decarbonization business trends, illustrated by initiatives such as Science-Based Targets and RE100. Climate-friendly companies, enterprises, and industry groups are increasingly vocal, and they are urging the Japanese government to do the required homework and catch up with global trends on climate change by implementing carbon-reducing policies. Accelerating these trends through more generous financial support and measures to overcome local resistance to renewable energy projects will be critical.

Japanese policymakers care about the country’s international reputation and status, and the country’s politicians are ultimately accountable to Japanese voters. This means that international pressure and shaming can play an important role in accelerating Japan’s green transition. It is important to raise awareness among the country’s public about international criticism of Japan’s climate policies. Reaching younger generations – who appear to be increasingly apathetic about environmental issues – is paramount.

The Fukushima disaster undermined domestic and international trust in Japan’s governmental regulators, private utilities, and experts associated with the energy sector. The government still has work to do to win back confidence, as illustrated by the recent decision to release treated wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant into the ocean. The Japanese government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company have made repeated safety assurances with backing from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Most polls indicate that a small majority of the Japanese public supports the water release. However, the assurances were greeted with skepticism from the scientific community and intense criticism from neighboring countries, especially China and South Korea.

Japan would also benefit from greater inclusivity and participation in the policymaking process. The role of nonstate actors and policy entrepreneurs in climate change governance is increasingly critical. Climate change policymaking dominated by vested interests is not conducive to transparency, public trust, or innovation. The government should support bottom-up initiatives with attention to expanding domestic and international policy networks. Civic engagement in the policymaking processes will bring new ideas to the table, reduce public apathy, and strengthen Japan’s ability to play a greater international leadership role.