Mimrah Abdul Ghafoor

On September 9, Maldives went to the polls to vote for the country’s next president. A record eight candidates were in the fray, with three looming largest: incumbent President Ibrahim Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), Malé Mayor Mohamed Muizzu representing the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) and People’s National Congress (PNC) coalition, and Ilyas Labeeb of the Democrats, a breakaway faction of the MDP affiliated with Speaker of Parliament Mohamed Nasheed. 

Muizzu won the first round, but did not secure the majority needed to prevent a runoff. He faced off against Solih in a second and final round of voting on September 30, where he again prevailed by a sizable margin, garnering 54 percent of votes to Solih’s 46 percent. That means Muizzu will ascend to the presidency, with coalition partner – and former president – Abdulla Yameen looming in the background of the new administration. 

To understand the implications of the presidential race, The Diplomat’s Editor-in-Chief Shannon Tiezzi spoke with Mimrah Abdul Ghafoor, a regular columnist on Maldives politics and society. Ghafoor, who has worked in Maldives’ President’s Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained the political dynamics shaping the race and the implications for Maldives’ democracy and geopolitical positioning.

What can we expect from Muizzu’s presidency?

Muizzu is poised for a challenging presidency from the very beginning. First and foremost, although he has won the presidential seat, the MDP still largely controls the parliament. Navigating this legislative gridlock will be a considerable challenge. The ability of the PNC-PPM coalition to secure a legislative majority remains uncertain, with parliamentary elections scheduled for March of next year. 

Another crucial consideration is former President Abdulla Yameen’s role going forward. Yameen has the potential to become a rival, given the significant loyalty he commands within the PNC-PPM base. How Muizzu plans to address this potential internal challenge remains an open question, as does his commitment to fulfilling promises of securing Yameen's release from prison.

On the economic front, Muizzu assumes leadership at a critical juncture. Maldives is still recovering from the economic shocks induced by the COVID-19 pandemic and is burdened with rising debt-servicing obligations.

Finally, in terms of foreign policy, Muizzu can be expected to moderate the “India Out” rhetoric now that he is in office. However, he will need to navigate a complex relationship with India, which has reacted unfavorably to such rhetoric. This situation may compel him to foster closer diplomatic and commercial ties with China.

What drove the split in the Maldivian Democratic Party? Is this mostly a personal feud over power-sharing, or are there deeper policy or ideological differences between Solih and Nasheed?

A combination of both. Personally, Nasheed, longtime leader of the MDP and for many years the face of the country’s democratic transition, has long wanted to regain executive leadership. His 2018 decision to relinquish the MDP ticket to Solih was reluctant, motivated by legal constraints stemming from a “terrorism” conviction under the previous Yameen administration.

Nasheed’s subsequent moves – running for the legislature, becoming speaker, and advocating for a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system – clearly aim to position him as prime minister. This ambition led him to challenge Solih in the MDP primary and ultimately to form a new party, the Democrats, with like-minded former MDP members. 

Yet, it is important to note that Nasheed's support for a parliamentary system is longstanding, predating the Maldives’ democratic transition in 2008. 

Additionally, Nasheed and Solih hold divergent views on coalition politics. Solih prides himself on his ability to maintain a coalition that includes other parties like the Adhaalath Party (AP), Jumhooree Party (JP), and the Maldives Reform Movement  – even if that coalition has largely disintegrated. By contrast, Nasheed sees little value in such coalitions, which he views as transactional alliances formed out of necessity. No single presidential candidate in Maldives can secure an outright majority without endorsements from other parties. These parties are then rewarded with select political portfolios, regardless of their subsequent performance in Parliament.

In the 2019 legislative elections, Solih wished for the MDP to contest only in select constituencies, sharing the rest with coalition partners like the JP. Nasheed, then serving as MDP president, went against this strategy, securing a supermajority for the MDP. This move marginalized some coalition partners, such as the AP, from parliamentary representation, and Nasheed has been critical of the government giving them excessive influence. 

For instance, when the government introduced and rescinded religion-based hate speech legislation after the May 2021 assassination attempt against Nasheed, he blamed the government’s equivocation on the influence of the AP. 

Beyond these issues, Nasheed has also been highly critical of the current government's financial management and has openly condemned their inaction concerning a series of major corruption scandals.

One of the most prominent figures in Maldives’ political scene couldn't actually run in the election: Former President Abdulla Yameen was disqualified due to a corruption conviction. How did Yameen figure in the race indirectly and through his party, the PPM?

Evaluating Yameen's current influence is a complex task. Muizzu emerged as a candidate from the People’s National Congress (PNC), an ally of Yameen’s Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM). He was chosen as a contingency candidate should Yameen be ineligible to run due to his ongoing imprisonment for money laundering. 

However, Yameen's actions raised questions about his level of satisfaction with Muizzu as his stand-in. After the Supreme Court upheld the Election Commission's ruling disqualifying him from running, Yameen initially advocated for an election boycott rather than endorsing Muizzu. Only after a tense PPM-PNC senate meeting, during which the alliance chose to disregard Yameen’s call for a boycott, did Yameen reluctantly endorse Muizzu.

When it comes to the issue of securing Yameen’s release from prison, Muizzu has remained notably vague. The possibility of Yameen becoming a competitor to Muizzu upon his release is credible, particularly given Yameen’s ongoing aspiration to retain control of the PPM-PNC coalition. Historical examples, such as Nasheed losing control of his party to Solih and Yameen sidelining his half-brother, former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, are likely factors that weigh heavily on Muizzu’s thinking.

Evidence suggested that Yameen still held some sway over Muizzu’s campaign strategies. Reports indicate that Yameen instructed the campaign to cease coalition talks with Qasim Ibrahim of the Jumhooree Party. However, the extent to which Yameen maintains influence over Muizzu, or even over his own party should Muizzu win the presidency, remains an open question.

The results of the election could have major foreign policy ramifications, especially given the PPM’s vocal backing of the “India Out” campaign. To what extent did foreign policy issues – from “India Out” to relations with China – drive voters’ choices?

I want to clarify that while elections in Maldives do have implications for regional foreign policy, the influence of these foreign policy considerations on our domestic politics is often overstated. Generally, voters are more concerned with issues such as corruption, housing, and employment than they are with diplomatic relations with countries like India or China.

That being said, the opposition has successfully run an “India Out” campaign, accusing the government of being overly deferential to India, to the level that they are amenable to hosting an Indian military presence on Maldivian soil. The government’s response to this campaign has been largely ineffective. Moreover, the decision to formally ban the campaign through an executive order was not only heavy-handed but also set a concerning precedent that can be abused by future administrations. In my view, this move did not resonate well with the electorate.

Conversely, the MDP has occasionally labeled Muizzu as a candidate supported by China, alleging that Beijing is backing opposition-friendly media outlets. Both Muizzu and the Chinese embassy in the Maldives have vehemently denied these claims.

It's important to recognize that the actual foreign policy stances toward India and China are less polarized than campaign narratives suggest. For example, the Yameen administration, much like the current one, adhered to an “India First” policy. Muizzu also pledges to continue with this policy, albeit with reservations concerning the purported Indian military presence. On the other hand,, the MDP criticizes dependency on China when in opposition but maintains strong commercial ties when in power. The primary difference between the MDP and the PPM-PNC lies in the latter’s willingness to ratify a free trade agreement with China, an agreement that was initiated under the Yameen administration but remains unratified under Solih.

Both candidates understand that the Maldives, being an import-dependent and climate-vulnerable small island state, cannot afford to distance itself from either of the major economies of India or China. While there have been obvious foreign policy tilts toward either India or China in the past, there is danger in overemphasizing this or taking campaign rhetoric at face value. 

Maldives is officially an Islamic country, according to its constitution, and has struggled with religious extremism in recent years. What role has Islamism played in this election cycle?

In Maldives, religion and national identity are closely linked. Candidates who overlook this fact are unlikely to gain voter support. However, mainstream presidential candidates generally portray themselves as champions of religious moderation. Ultra-conservative viewpoints usually fail to resonate with the Maldivian electorate and can even damage a political career. 

For example, the country’s main Islamist party, the Adhaalath Party won no seats in the 2019 parliamentary elections, despite being in a coalition with the MDP government, and has performed poorly in earlier contests.

The MDP’s campaign against Muizzu occasionally highlighted his alleged connections to Jammiyathul Salaaf, a conservative religious group to which some of his in-laws belong. Muizzu has categorically denied any formal relationship with the organization and has made efforts to distance himself from extremist ideologies. This suggests he views such affiliations as political liabilities rather than assets.

However, religious extremism remains a pressing issue, particularly affecting vulnerable groups such as prison inmates and gang members. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has recently sanctioned several Maldivian organizations and individuals for their ties to terrorist groups. The number of Maldivians who traveled to Syria to participate in their civil war remains concerning and reintegrating returnees poses complex legal and social challenges.

Further, the assassination attempt on former President Mohamed Nasheed by religious extremists highlights the urgency of this issue. Before the election, both Solih and Muizzu pledged to enact policies to counter religious extremism. It is my sincere hope that both candidates intend to follow through on these commitments. 

Overall, what has the race so far told us about the health of Maldives’ democracy? Are the country’s prospects looking better or worse than they were after the previous election in 2018?

There are both encouraging signs and areas of concern in the electoral landscape. The fact that the country has held its fourth democratic presidential election is a significant milestone, especially given its long history of authoritarianism. Furthermore, this election was less controversial than earlier ones. For example, the 2013 election, which took place after the coup against Nasheed in the previous year, was marred by annulments, and delays, while the 2018 election saw Yameen imprisoning many of his political rivals.

However, several issues arose in the lead-up to the elections that warrant attention. First, the government was accused of misusing state resources for campaign activities, a claim supported by international election observers and the local NGO, Transparency Maldives. Specifically, the government utilized resources from state-owned enterprises for rallies, announced new projects right before the election, and offered financial incentives to private media for positive coverage. Additionally, there have been multiple allegations of vote-buying. All these actions collectively gave the government an unfair electoral advantage.

The independence of the Election Commission also came under scrutiny. For instance, Fuad Thaufeeq, the president of the Election Commission, faced a vote of no confidence from colleagues who are more closely aligned with the government. This vote was a reaction to his efforts to expedite the registration of The Democrats as a political party and his insistence that the PPM should be allowed to participate in the election. 

Moreover, questions surround Yameen's imprisonment. While his administration was plagued by corruption scandals, which he can very credibly be accused of being complicit in, Yameen is the only major figure from his regime who is currently incarcerated. This seems politically expedient for the government. 

While issues such as the above are not exclusive to the Solih administration, their persistence is particularly disappointing given the administration’s outspoken commitment to democratic principles. I remain hopeful that competitive, regularly-held democratic elections will continue to be the norm in Maldives, but I harbor no illusions about a broader, authentic commitment to democratic norms from any of our candidates.