The Politics of the APEC Summit
The upcoming summit showcases Washington’s dilemma: it must be tough on China, but not too tough.
When Joe Biden won the presidential election in 2020, there were high expectations for the United States to recommit to its status as a Pacific power and for the new administration to work closely with its allies and partners in the region. The Biden White House has made clear its focus on Asia, and it has also been relentless in looking to strengthen partnerships across the region over the past three years.
Granted, efforts to win over countries to work together with Washington have had mixed results, with some initiatives being greeted with greater enthusiasm than others. Yet the fact remains that a strong commitment to working together with like-minded nations has been a hallmark of Biden’s foreign policy strategy. The question, though, is whether the United States can wield the influence that it expects in the Indo-Pacific as it rapidly evolves in the face of new challenges. As the host nation of the APEC summit this year, Washington’s efforts to build up its network of partnerships and alliances will be put to the test both at home and overseas.
For a U.S. audience, the San Francisco summit in November should be nothing less than a triumph of the United States as a commanding presence in the world’s most populous and dynamic region, with Washington leading the way in confronting authoritarian rule in the Indo-Pacific. From its leadership role in enhancing the Quad, to establishing AUKUS to enhance security networks in the region, to the start-up of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to build trade relations, there has been no lack of trying on the part of the Biden administration to weave the fabric of partnerships closer together across the region.
It is, of course, wariness about the China challenge that has motivated the Biden administration to further its commitments to Asia. The administration has gone far beyond simply viewing China as a unfair competitor in the global economy, but has come to sharpen perceptions of the threat that Beijing poses to the United States economically, militarily, and politically. In short, the Biden presidency is following in the footsteps of Donald Trump more than the Democrats would like to acknowledge by building upon the issues Biden’s predecessor had begun addressing.
Indeed, hardening the U.S. stance toward China remains one of the few issues that unites American policymakers on both sides of the political aisle. The premise that the United States must push back against the China threat has remained unchanged since Trump took office in 2017, although the Biden administration more readily acknowledges the need for partnering with other nations to do so.
While Washington has backed away from pressing for a decoupling from China and is instead intent on pursuing a de-risking strategy, the lack of clarity about the U.S. goal in managing relations with China is increasingly becoming a source of uncertainty between Washington and its regional allies.
To be sure, the theme of the San Francisco APEC meeting is to “create a resilient and sustainable future for all,” with a focus on the issues that unite the 21 member economies. Still, whether Chinese leader Xi Jinping will actually attend the summit remains in question. For Biden, it is almost a no-win situation.
Having Xi attend would elevate the U.S. position in the eyes of the Indo-Pacific nations that are keen to have a more realist approach in dealing with China, especially amid concerns about the potential fallout of a hard landing of the Chinese economy across the Indo-Pacific. Xi’s presence in San Francisco would also validate the Biden administration’s efforts in recent months to engage directly with Beijing by having key cabinet members including Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken go to China to keep the lines of communication open between the world’s two biggest economies.
On the other hand, displays of positive personal relations between Biden and Xi could backfire against the U.S. president amid the general hostility toward China that currently prevails across Washington, especially when Biden is gearing up to campaign for a second term in office.
For staunch U.S. allies including Japan, however, Xi not attending APEC would be seen as a missed opportunity to engage with China at best, and at worst a failure of Washington to manage relations with Beijing, thereby increasing uncertainties in an already unstable region.
As the United States looks to host what will be one of the highest profile APEC summits to date, Washington’s challenge will be to cement its position as a Pacific power amid seismic shifts in the regional order. It will require the Biden administration to reassure like-minded nations to align with its efforts to push back against China as a source of military as well as economic security risk, while not alienating an Indo-Pacific that is increasingly wary of systemic tensions between Washington and Beijing.
And as the 2024 election campaign heats up, all that will have to be managed while ensuring that U.S. voters see a United States that is strong not just against China, but leading the Indo-Pacific.
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Shihoko Goto is the director for geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific enterprise and acting director for the Asia Program at the Wilson Center.