Where Will the US Rank Asian Interests in the Midst of a Multi-theater Conflict?

There was a collective sigh of relief across Asia in 2011 when then-U.S. President Barack Obama announced a reinvigorated U.S. commitment to the region and a “pivot,” later dubbed a “rebalance,” to Asia. In his speech before the Australian Parliament, Obama declared that “the United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.”

Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States the previous decade, Washington’s foreign policy focus had inevitably focused on fighting the war against global terrorism, and addressing the challenge of warfare against non-state actors. Yet as the United States fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against the Islamic States, U.S. allies in Asia were grappling with the shifts in the regional order.

For Japan, Obama’s declaration of a rebalance to Asia could not have been more timely. After all, Japan had officially been passed by China as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. In the same year, China also banned exports of rare earths to Japan in retaliation against the Japanese government’s detention of a Chinese fishing captain who had rammed a Japanese Coast Guard boat near the disputed Senkakau/Diaoyu Islands. No longer was China looking to Japan for economic partnership and cooperation; Beijing had exceeded Japan and was prepared to leverage its economic might for political purposes as well.

Washington’s declaration of recommitting to Asia was not just welcomed by Tokyo, but also by U.S. allies and partners across the region that were increasingly aware of the rise and threat posed by China. U.S. willingness to take on the challenge of pushing back against Beijing – not just militarily, but also economically and politically – was a welcome development in ensuring regional stability.

But regional countries were also wary, having noticed a distinct pattern: Washington makes a big declaration of its commitment to the region, then a crisis pops up elsewhere (often in the Middle East) and U.S. focus becomes diluted. The Bush administration’s plan to focus on competition with China was derailed by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama’s own “rebalance to Asia” was hampered by the Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State.

Today, history is once again repeating itself – only U.S. attention is arguably more divided than ever. As the United States now faces renewed conflict in the Middle East, as well as a prolonged war between Russia and Ukraine, the question on the minds of U.S. treaty allies as well as like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific is whether or not Washington can add a third theater of potential conflict into the mix, and sustain its commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

For now, the signs are encouraging. The $105 billion security aid package that the Biden administration requested in October would allocate $61 billion to Ukraine and $14.3 billion for Israel. In addition, the package also is asking for $2 billion in Taiwan. The sum for Taipei may be small in comparison to Ukraine and Israel, but combining the budget request for all three regions into a single package is one means to prevent policymakers from prioritizing one conflict theater over another.

Still, the strategy of bundling budget requests has two significant challenges ahead, one of which is the possibility of another terrorist strike within U.S. borders. Following the escalation of conflict between Israel and Hamas, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned that intensifying Israeli air strikes on Hamas as well as a possible ground incursion into Gaza will keep the United States on a “heightened threat environment in the near-to-medium term.” In addition, the DHS cautioned that “escalation in the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas almost certainly will increase the threat of terrorism and targeted violence” in the United States.

A terrorist attack on U.S. soil would without doubt lead to an increase in U.S. budget allocation for domestic protection. The political will to sustain high commitments in the Middle East would invariably surge, and the appetite to engage in in the Indo-Pacific may diminish, or at least take a back seat to dealing with the immediate terrorist threat. In short, it would be a return to the pre-pivot to Asia era, whereby the war on terror defines foreign policy.

The other issue of concern would be the political risk posed by the United States itself, and the difficulty in maintaining the status quo of the global order amid decreasing U.S. engagement. A prolonged war in Ukraine and the prospect of the United States itself becoming a target of terrorism may increase anger toward Russia, but it may also deflect attention from the need for Washington to continue stepping up efforts to reach out to partners and allies across the Indo-Pacific region.

In short, the question is whether or not a three-theater approach to U.S. foreign policy is sustainable. Can the United States could muster the continued political will as well as the financial commitment to keep its engagement in the Indo-Pacific at a high level?

What is clear is that Washington will be calling for even greater military as well as financial commitment from its Asian allies and partners. The wording and nuance may be different, but the message carried by the former Trump administration demanding greater contributions from allies including Japan and South Korea will likely increase in the run-up to the presidential elections next November.