Bangladesh’s Make-or-Break Elections

On November 16, the Election Commission of Bangladesh announced January 7 as the polling day to elect members to the 12th Parliament of Bangladesh, known as Jatiyo Sangsad. Preparation for the elections, keeping in mind that the main opposition party the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) may not participate, started much earlier. 

On October 23, the government of Bangladesh enacted the Ansar Battalion Bill 2023. Its timing raised eyebrows. The bill empowers the Ansar, a paramilitary auxiliary force, to enter the homes of suspects, arrest, detain, and hand over alleged offenders to the police. For some time it has been speculated that the government will take all necessary steps so as to ensure that it gets re-elected for another five years, which would be a fourth term for the Awami League (AL). 

Emphasizing economic achievements during her three-term tenure, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has been busy inaugurating several projects in quick succession, among them the Dhaka elevated expressway and the Bangabandhu tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, South Asia’s first under-river tunnel. She also made a show of receiving the first batch of uranium from Russia for the 2400 MW nuclear power plant in Rooppur and attended the soft opening of Terminal 3 of the Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport (HISA) in Dhaka, built by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In recent months, Hasina’s government has also inaugurated the Akhaura-Agartala broad-gauge line, Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line, Padma Bridge Railway Link, MRT Line 6, and Unit II of the Maitri power plant. The purpose was clear: to drive home the point that under Hasina Bangladesh has made immense economic progress. 

Yet the AL is still nervous heading into the polls. Hasina said in Parliament that the United States is interested in removing her from power, as the Biden administration has taken a particularly vocal stance on the upcoming elections. In particular, the United States announced it would “impose visa restrictions on Bangladeshi individuals responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh.” 

Hasina is suspicious of the United States and its objectives in Bangladesh, and has been since the assassination of her father and other family members in 1975. The threat of visa restrictions has only added to this suspicion, as has the AL’s falling out with Nobel Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus. Hasina believes Yunus’ lobbying with the U.S. led to the cancellation of World Bank funding for the Padma Bridge, one of her administration’s signature infrastructure projects, on the grounds of corruption. 

In this context, the massive BNP rally held in Dhaka on October 28 unsettled the AL. After the opposition rally, thousands of activists and leaders were arrested on accusations of being engaged in violence that resulted in the death of a policeman and a BNP leader. Already, the country’s 68 jails have more than 88,000 inmates, almost double their capacity. 

None of the parties involved – the AL or the BNP – seems at all concerned that U.S. visa restrictions will focus on political violence, even if it clearly “undermines the democratic election process.” instead, street scuffles remain a go-to staple in the political playbook. 

Shadows of the Past

Across three terms, stretching 15 years, the AL has consolidated its hold over power in Bangladesh. Democratically elected in 2008, the AL scored a massive victory amounting to 230 seats against the BNP’s 30. Following that landslide win, Hasina first took steps to amend the caretaker government (CTG) system, which has been part of the constitution since the 13th Amendment Act was passed in 1996. 

The CTG was at the root of controversy in 2006 when the BNP increased the retirement age of the Supreme Court chief justice from 65 to 67 so as to enable Justice K.M. Hasan, the then-chief justice to become the chief adviser of the CTG, as per the constitution. The AL challenged his appointment and organized street protests; Hasan then declined to become chief adviser, and the BNP announced President Iajuddin Ahmed as chief adviser of the caretaker government instead. In doing so, the BNP ignored the constitution’s clear guidelines as to how the chief adviser should be chosen if the last retired chief justice were not available.

The Supreme Court delivered a judgement on May 10, 2011, that the CTG system was illegal but stipulated that if Parliament wanted it could retain the system for the next two elections. But Hasina, who saw how the CTG had allowed the military to intervene with the blessings of external powers and how the BNP politicized the CTG to retain power, acted immediately. Her government abolished the system with the 15th amendment to the constitution. 

Unfortunately, Hasina did not introduce a strong Election Commission that could have replaced the CTG and ensured free and fair elections. 

In response to the end of the CTG system, the BNP boycotted the 2014 election. The AL went ahead with a one-sided election and, naturally, won. The BNP expected that the international community would intervene to prevent the election, or there would be a repetition of the Jatiya Sangsad election of 1996, when the BNP was forced to pass the CTG amendment bill and dissolve the Parliament to allow re-election. But the AL-dominated Parliament that was elected in the controversial opposition-less election of 2014 remained adamant and refused to re-introduce the CTG. 

Violence erupted during the first anniversary of the 2014 election. Nearly 100 people were killed in petrol bomb attacks in 2015. Afterward, Western countries asked the BNP to cut off its ties with Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the country’s largest Islamist party, which was believed to be behind the violence. The BNP was divided internally over its continued partnership with JI, particularly in light of war crimes convictions against many JI leaders. But ultimately BNP leaders favored the continuation of the partnership. 

The BNP and its alliance partners – including JI, which lost its registration as political party in 2009 – remained outside the 10th Parliament. Four years later, in 2018, the BNP rethought its strategy and agreed to contest the 11th parliamentary election under a broader coalition led by the former foreign minister of Sheikh Mujib’s cabinet, Dr. Kamal Hossain, a reputed lawyer. Hossain led the alliance under the banner of Jatiyo Oikya Jote (National United Front) but with the election symbol of the BNP: a rice sheaf. 

The 2018 election belied all the hopes of the BNP. The BNP and its alliance partners only won seven seats. The BNP rejected the results of the election as “farcical,” and there were widespread allegations of ballot-box stuffing and closed polling booths.

As the campaign for the 2024 election heats up, the BNP has made a point of showing off its public support. In 2022, the party held impressive rallies across the country, culminating in a grand rally on December 10, 2022 at Golap Bagh, a large field in Dhaka. Its rallies in 2023 have come under attack by AL activists, starting with a July 28 rally in front of the party office in Dhaka’s Naya Paltan neighborhood.

Islamists Churning

At the same time, JI has been revived as well. The BNP’s alliance partner faced an internal crisis after many of its top leaders were convicted and executed for committing war crimes during Bangladesh’s Liberation War. Many JI cadres were also arrested for being involved in violent street agitation in 2015.

Since then, the party has been more careful. Although it announced a separation from the BNP, ostensibly to escape from the government’s repression, JI is now actively organizing rallies and supporting BNP programs for the restoration of the CTG, which it sees as a necessary feature to ensure free and fair election. In 2023, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court rejected the party’s appeal against its 2013 deregistration, but JI is contemplating filing independent candidates to contest all 300 seats in Parliament, a dodge around its lack of registration.

JI has always faced questions on its role in the Liberation War. Many young cadres have advocated that JI shun the leaders convicted of war crimes and reinvent the party to represent the aspirations of the post-independence generation. This fundamental disagreement between the older generation of leaders, who control JI, and the newer generations that form the party’s future has for decades triggered splits within the party.

In 1982, Dr. Ahmad Abdul Qadir left JI. In the more recent past, barrister Abdul Razzaq, a former assistant general secretary of the party, resigned, and the former president of its student wing, Mojibur Rahman Monju, was expelled from the party in 2019. Both questioned JI’s role and why the party’s new generation has to carry the burdens of its past. 

Today, Qadir is part of Khelafat Majlish, while Monju formed the Amar Bangladesh Party with like-minded erstwhile JI cadres. However, both these parties have not been able to make a major dent in JI’s support base. Rather, JI has questioned the war crime tribunals and holds the view that its leaders were convicted for political reasons and were not involved in war crimes. 

Another newcomer, the Bangladesh Development Party (BDP), is suspected of being an alternative experiment for JI. Although JI officially denies that the BDP is its new incarnation to fight the 2023 election, many members of the new party are drawn from JI and Islami Chhatra Shibir, JI’s student organization.

Hasina’s government has tried to wean JI away from the BNP, as it believes that their partnership strengthens the BNP’s coalition. JI is ideologically closer to the BNP, but the party leadership are also aware that JI grew exponentially politically when its leaders were ministers in the BNP cabinet. JI has been allowed to hold meetings and even a rally on October 28 without requisite administrative permission. Some interpret this as the AL government keeping its options open. Similarly, the AL allowed Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB), another Islamist party, to hold a massive rally on November 3 in Dhaka.

The AL government has courted Islamists directly as well. It emboldened Hefazat-e-Islam, a far-right Islamic advocacy group, by revising textbooks to meet the group’s demands, recognizing madrassa degrees, and opening Saudi-funded mosques. Permissive AL policies have seen an explosion in Islamic education. According to the Daily Star, around 115,000 imams have received training since 2018, while “the number of teachers teaching under [a] mosque-based education program is around 76,000.” 

While these steps have diminished Hasina’s secular credentials, it has not helped her party to expand their support base into Islamist circles. Rather, it has distanced secular civil society activists and freedom fighters who find it difficult to accept this rightward turn. The shift has also upset minority communities, who feel that AL is exploiting their vulnerability. There have been several attacks on minority communities – Hindus, Buddhists, and Santhals – during Hasina’s rule. Some Hindus have suffered directly at the hands of AL cadres who occupied their property. 

However, the AL still has the support of the minority Hindu community, despite the government’s turn toward the right. It is important to state that during the AL regime minorities continue to occupy important positions, and Hasina has provided equal opportunity in her government. 

A Weakened BNP?

Since the victory of the Awami League in 2008, and especially after 2014, the BNP has politically weakened. It is facing a leadership crisis. Party chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia is in jail and her son Tarique Rahman, the party’s acting chair, is not a popular leader and has been living in exile in London since 2007. Several corruption charges were brought against the party’s leaders and many were arrested on violence and arson charges after 2015. The BNP’s absence in the Parliament and its inability to force re-election on the AL government completely demoralized the party cadres. 

The BNP is actively led by Mirza Fakhrul Alamgir, who is the general secretary, yet the leadership is technically controlled by Tarique Rahman. Rahman holds unchallenged control over the party. He promotes rivals to keep a check on the current leaders who are steering the party in Bangladesh.

The stakes are high. For the BNP, this election is integral to its survival. For the AL, its continuation in power is also a question of survival for its leaders, many of whom are alleged to have accumulated a disproportionate amount of wealth through corruption. In the last 10 to 15 years the interests of the political elite, the bureaucracy and the law enforcement agencies have been entwined to such an extent that no one wants to see what happens if Hasina falls out of power. 

In the past, both parties have used the security agencies against their political opponents. However, the AL has gone a step farther. The draconian Digital Security Act passed by the government in 2018 and amended in 2023, effectively silences voices critical of the government. As a result, the press exercises utmost restraint. 

Forced disappearances of the politically troublesome or overly critical had become a norm and both the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and the police operated with impunity until sanctions were announced by the United States in 2021, which designated the RAB “a foreign entity that is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.” After that, there was dramatic reduction of such cases. 

Producing a Multiparty Election Minus the BNP

AL knows that it cannot repeat the 2014 or 2018 election. A multiparty election is feasible by clubbing together smaller parties or allowing so-called King’s parties – AL-sanctioned smaller parties – to participate in the election. 

For its part, the BNP’s efforts are paradoxically directed at preventing opposition participation in the elections. It has worked out a strategy since last year of mobilizing public opinion for restoration of the CTG. Rather than a traditional campaign to win votes, its political program at the union and district levels is meant to boost cadre morale and mark its political presence in a strong way by successfully foiling the election. As a senior BNP leader said, “We will not allow the election to happen without the CTG.” At the moment, the BNP remains steadfast in sticking to its stance of not participating in the election.

The BNP is working on a single objective: to prevent the election from moving forward without a caretaker government. It already has organized a few impressive rallies, but in reality the BNP is banking on Western countries to nudge the AL to restore the CTG to ensure a free and fair election. While Western countries are indeed insisting on free and fair elections, they are noncommittal on the CTG. 

The BNP remains firm on its decision to not participate in the 2024 election. Its exiled leadership perversely would not like the party to win elections in his absence. This, in the long run, will loosen the control of the Zia family over the BNP. Yet, the party does not have a clear strategy on how to prevent the election, except for engaging in further violence and expecting an intervention to stop the process. 

With even more of its leaders arrested after the October 28 rally, the BNP’s prospects look uncertain. It has been without power since October 2006 and lost its presence in Parliament in 2014. 

Non-participation in the 2024 polls will not help the party to retain its leaders. Those who want to participate in the election may be persuaded by the AL to do so via other parties in the opposition space.

Trinamool BNP, Bangladesh Jatiyobadi Andolan, and Bangladesh Supreme Party are seen as parties where some senior opposition leaders can be rehabilitated and win election, providing in turn evidence to which the AL can point of a fair election. The Jatiya Party, which participated in the 2014 election, is yet to take a stand on whether it will engage in the 2024 contest. Minor Islamic parties have not been given registration by the Election Commission, with the hope being that they either contest for seats as independents or join other already-registered parties.

The last date to respond to the Election Commissioner’s circular to inform the Election Commission whether a party wants to contest elections or not was November 18. Only ten parties signalled their intention to field candidates by the deadline. 

The BNP cannot trust the AL government to allow it to win even in a few seats. This time around such a proposal is not even on the table. Rather the inducement is aimed at individual party members, to convince them to leave the BNP. Knowledgeable sources point out that many former disgruntled BNP leaders who were sidelined by the party have now been taken into the fold, as the party leadership fears political poaching by the AL government. 

Generally, Bangladeshis want an alternative, which some see in the BNP. But many are also averse to the leadership of Tarique Rahman, who ran a parallel government from his post as BNP chairman during his mother’s premiership. 

Geopolitics of Election and Party Politics

Unfolding geopolitics has brought a new dynamic to Bangladesh’s political space. Several foreign governments, from the United States to India and China, have expressed their opinion on the forthcoming election. 

Hasina has developed close ties with both India and China. Both countries have now emerged as important stakeholders for the regime to remain in power. For India, its security interest in stability and economic development of the Indian Northeast is tied to Bangladesh and Myanmar. India’s experience with the BNP between 2001-2006, where ministers within the government sheltered Indian insurgents, remains a security nightmare. India has not forgotten the episode where ten truckloads of arms meant for use against the Indian Army were allowed to be unloaded at a jetty owned by a BNP minister in Chittagong. 

For much of the 15 years of Hasina’s regime, the northeastern region of India has been largely peaceful, with the notable exception of the internal conflict that erupted in Manipur this past year. India has extended a significant line of credit and grant projects to Bangladesh, amounting to nearly $10 billion. Trade has seen significant growth, touching $18 billion. 

India’s stance is that it is the people of Bangladesh who will determine the democratic process there, and that elections are an internal matter. New Delhi supports a “stable, peaceful, and progressive nation.” Although India is closely watching the growing nexus between the Hasina government and its engagement with extremely conservative forces like Hefazat-e-Islam and Islami Andolan Bangladesh, it remains appreciative of her government’s effort to eliminate the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), offshoots like the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and other extremist groups, especially after the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in 2016. 

China has remained a steadfast friend of Bangladesh and was critical of the U.S. decision to threaten visa bans in the name of a free and fair election. Beijing is critical of the U.S. effort to rope Bangladesh in to its Indo-Pacific strategy. 

Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also visited Bangladesh, followed by French President Emmanuel Macron. 

These visits demonstrate Bangladesh’s role as an important geopolitical player. The U.S. pronouncement of possible sanctions related to on Bangladesh’s election has driven a wedge between Hasina’s government and Washington. Hasina has tried to counterbalance the United States, and its multiple engagement strategy has helped the government find friends at a difficult time. 

An Economic Downturn?

Amid the political posturing and the geopolitical wrangling  as 2023 ends, is the question that traditionally determines democratic elections: are people feeling economically empowered or deprived? As the saying goes, “It’s the economy, stupid.”

The economic boom over the past few decades has brought significant improvement in people’s lives, but absolute poverty has still increased. Corruption has skyrocketed and bribing officials remains unavoidable to get basic services. Hasina’s government has failed to tackle corruption, and many people in the street point to massive corruption as the major reason for her unpopularity. 

The clout of the security agencies, which are believed to have delivered the AL’s election victory in 2018, has increased. Arbitrary arrests in the name of maintaining law and order have become a profitable business, as without bribes it is difficult to get the release of the arrestee. 

Parliament is increasingly being populated by businessmen. They owe their seats to their monetary power and cynically are in Parliament simply to further their business interests. Some in Bangladesh believe that Hasina has crafted a house of cards: Her failure, and fall, would bring down a whole host of vested interests, and the cards may be sharp as they tumble.

In the post-pandemic period, the economy bounced back, showing signs of resilience. However, foreign reserves have been depleted, with the demand for Ready Made Garments – a staple of Bangladesh’s economy – slowing down in the West. Bangladesh is yet to expand its export market and heavily relies on garment exports. 

Things could also get worse. When Bangladesh graduates from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2026, it will lose priority access to several markets and in particular lose the concessions it is receiving with the EU’s GSP+ scheme. Bangladesh is negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India to continue to enjoy the “Duty Free Tariff Preference” (DFTP) Scheme. Remittances have also decreased, in spite of government efforts at upskilling workers to find jobs that earn them higher salaries and thus trigger higher remittances.

Already the government has received International Monetary Fund (IMF) support, which critics point to as evidence of a downturn in the economy. That’s a bad look for an economy touted as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Bangladesh owes $100 billion in foreign debts and the budget deficit has widened.

What Next?

What is the way out from the present political impasse? The army is not interested in getting involved or being dragged into politics. At the same time both of Bangladesh’s major parties – the AL and BNP alike – view street violence as a political tool, and are working to exploit it to their favor. 

Bangladesh’s Parliament has never been the venue for expressing opposition and debating issues. Political parties have always preferred to settle their fights in the street. With the election around the corner, each rally organized by the opposition is countered by the ruling party. Often on the same date, the AL organizes a rally close to the venue of the opposition, leading to violence and clashes between the parties’ supporters. 

Now, the ruling party has moved a step further in this election game. Its courts are now convicting BNP leaders for violence and arson attacks in cases that were registered between 2013 and 2018. A jail sentence of more than three years makes the person ineligible to contest the election for the next five years.

The BNP is working on a January 2007 model, which allowed the military-backed caretaker regime to assume power with the support of Western countries. A repetition of the October 2006 and January 2007 violence will help the BNP, while a repetition of the 2015 violence, which resulted in international censuring of the BNP, will help the AL. The political program of the two parties in the run up to the election will be based on this calculation. 

The AL has been highlighting its achievements over the past 15 years to showcase the government’s successes. The BNP, in spite of its ten-point agenda, is stuck on just two points – Hasina’s resignation and the restoration of the CTG. 

The political division and distrust between the two major political parties runs deep. Dialogue between the two leaders is non-existent and both parties are pursuing a zero sum game. It is likely, given the non-negotiable stances of the two main parties, that Bangladesh politics will turn more violent in the days to come.