Japan-South Korea-US Trilateral Continues to Push Forward ‘Camp David’ Spirit

While international headlines understandably focused on the big summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden in mid-November, that was just one of several summits on the sidelines of the APEC gathering in San Francisco last month. Another meeting, one that largely flew under the radar, was a trilateral gathering involving Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol.

It was their fourth trilateral summit in less than a year. The three leaders also met on the sidelines of the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, in May, and again during the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July. Most famously, they held the first-ever standalone summit of the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and the United States in August at the U.S. presidential retreat of Camp David. The Camp David summit resulted in a major joist statement pledging to institutionalize cooperation between the three countries.

Expanded cooperation between its two East Asian allies has long been a dream for U.S. policymakers. On paper, Japan and South Korea have much in common: They are staunch U.S. allies and liberal democracies. Both consider North Korea to be a serious threat and are suspicious of China’s rise as well. But in practice, nudging Japan and South Korea toward greater cooperation has been a struggle.

Historical issues are one of the main stumbling blocks. Japan instituted a brutal colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula from 1910 until 1945, only relinquishing control after its defeat in World War II. During those years, the military and political struggle to win Korea’s independence back became a seminal building block for Korean national identity.

Even then, reconciliation might have been possible, but Japan’s conservative turn prevented a true reckoning with the atrocities in the nation’s imperial past. Particularly starting with the second stint in office for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, historical denialism gained steam. From a Korean perspective, it seemed that Abe’s conservative wing was going out of its way to deny the suffering of Koreans forced into labor during World War II or the “comfort women” sexually abused at the hands of Japan’s military.

Meanwhile, the return to power of South Korea’s liberal faction with President Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) changed the political calculus for Seoul. Liberals in South Korea lean more strongly into the independence war as a source of national identity, even to the point of stoking anti-Japanese sentiment to shore up political legitimacy. For many Japanese, Moon’s abrupt about-face on a deal reached by his predecessor regarding the “comfort women” issue was proof that South Korea could never be trusted to shelve historical issues.

These twin dynamics led to a period of deep divisions between the United States’ two allies in East Asia – both of whom play key roles in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Right as Washington began to truly gain steam in its determination to counter China, Japan and South Korea were no longer on speaking terms.

But that all changed with the election of Yoon in March 2022. The new president, from South Korea’s conservative party, immediately pivoted to strengthen Seoul’s alliance with the United States and its relationship with Japan. He effectively capitulated to Japan’s demand that a court decision ordering Japanese companies to pay compensation for wartime forced labor be scrapped. That kicked off a series of bilateral summits that saw Yoon travel to Japan twice and Kishida to South Korea once.

It also paved the way for trilateral summitry with Washington, including the much-acclaimed Camp David summit in August. The three leaders pledged to institutionalize the relationship with annual summits and new regular consultation and information-sharing mechanisms – with the latter being especially important as North Korea ramps up its pace of missile tests.

As significant as these developments are, it’s worth remembering how fragile this progress is. Yoon barely squeaked out a victory, topping the rival presidential candidate, Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, by just 247,000 votes out of 32.5 million ballots cast – or just 0.7 percentage points. We can easily imagine a parallel universe when Lee pulled out the victory instead.

Had that happened, the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral would look very different. Lee has consistently attacked Yoon over his overtures to Japan, which are admittedly unpopular at home. When Yoon made the first move to overcome tensions by absolving Japanese companies of the court-ordered responsibility to compensate Koreans for wartime forced labor, it outraged many South Koreans. Lee was happy to lead the critics.

More directly, Lee has called into question the Yoon administration’s strategic decision to strengthen ties with the United States and Japan, expressing concern that leaning too far into a trilateral alliance could alienate China. “A trilateral military alliance that goes beyond the current military cooperation with the U.S. and Japan is not necessary as it would only spark an equivalent alliance including the North, China, and Russia,” Lee declared in May.

After the Camp David summit, Democratic Party leaders declared the pivotal meeting had been “one where the national interests of the U.S. and Japan are visible but not those of South Korea.”

Yoon’s victory in 2022 was narrow to begin with and his approval rating is low – it has been stuck in the 30 percent range for months. Yoon cannot run for president again, given South Korea’s one-term, five-year presidency, and it’s unclear at this juncture if his tenure will provide fertile ground for a conservative successor. Thus, Lee may get another shot at the presidency in 2027.

And in that case, the Camp David spirit will truly be put to the test.

For now, then, the approach seems to be to hold as many summits and meetings as possible, while the political winds in South Korea still favor doing so. That will make it harder for someone like Lee to disengage from the trilateral – but not impossible.