After the Election: Where Will Lai Lead Taiwan?

At one point, many analysts and observers considered Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election dull. Just two months before election day, there were four presidential candidates, three of whom – Hou Yu-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and independent Terry Gou, who had unsuccessfully sought the KMT nod – were all on the Blue end of Taiwan’s political spectrum. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, was running unopposed representing the pan-Green camp.

With the opposition forces divided, Lai held a clear advantage for the majority of the summer months through the fall of 2023. For all intents and purposes, he was poised to coast toward victory.

That said, the later stage of the race brought unexpected drama. Beginning in late November, the potential for the opposition to settle on a unity ticket to run against Lai finally fell apart in one of the most spectacular press conferences in Taiwan’s history. Hou, Ko, and Gou repeatedly needled each other on live television.

In the end Taiwan ended up with three tickets: Lai and Hsiao Bi-khim of the DPP, Hou and Jaw Shao-kong of the KMT, and Ko and Cynthia Wu of the TPP. Unlike previous presidential elections, campaigning with full tickets only lasted a little over a month. In that time, candidates did their best to fight, sway, and win over Taiwanese voters.

What was this election about? For the DPP and KMT, this was a classic Taiwanese presidential election: It was about China, and who could keep Taiwan safe. The frame of “war versus peace” featured heavily in the KMT’s campaign slogans and rhetoric, while the DPP spoke of the election as a choice between “democracy and autocracy.” For these two parties, this approach made sense; decades of public opinion research demonstrates that for the majority of Taiwanese voters, it is China and cross-strait issues that matter the most when it comes time to vote for presidents.

But for Ko, the face of a young political party, China was not the top issue (although it was an issue). Ko’s campaign rhetoric was focused on two things: opposing the DPP and the KMT, and appealing to social issues. Ko and his populist appeal attracted many Taiwanese voters, especially younger voters, who do not see China as an existential issue in the same way that the DPP and KMT do. Ko was able to campaign on being anti-establishment, claiming he would improve wages, housing, and other domestic related problems, and focused less on China.

Nevertheless, Taiwan’s contested status is deeply ingrained in everyday politics, and even Ko could not escape from the very real, structural issue of what to do about Taiwan’s future. In the end, Ko, like his DPP and KMT counterparts, came out in favor of the status quo.

Being “pro-status-quo” was the most commonly heard phrase from all three presidential candidates when it came time to stating their position on China and the future of Taiwan. This is how current President Tsai Ing-wen has defined herself throughout her two terms in office, and none of the candidates to succeed her dared to move the needle. Instead, they all did their best to convince both domestic and international audiences that they would essentially be a Tsai 2.0.

Where these presidential candidates differed was in how they would maintain the status quo. For Lai, it was about diversifying away from China and prioritizing Taiwanese interests. For Hou, it was about re-engaging with China and re-opening ties that had been closed since the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai’s immediate predecessor.

For Ko, defending the status quo was also about selective engagement with China. Ko agreed with many of Hou’s proposals on cross-strait issues, including resurrecting the infamous Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement bill that Ko had once protested against in 2014. At the same time, late in campaigning, Ko reversed course to state that he would maintain the cross-strait policy of the Tsai administration.

Lai and Hou were also not quiet on social issues. It was no secret that the majority of undecided and independent voters wanted to hear more specific policy platforms when it came to social and domestic issues. All three candidates had proposals on wages, housing, inflation, trade, and more.

On many domestic issues, all three presidential candidates were in radical agreement with each other: wages are too low, housing prices too high, and the government needs to do more to solve these daily way-of-life problems. There was so much convergence on policy issues – along with a lot of vaguely worded policy proposals – that it was difficult to truly distinguish how one party was going to tackle these matters differently from the others.

Subsequently, along with China and domestic policy, the presidential campaign leaned into another Taiwanese electoral tradition – exposing scandals to smear the opponents. The last month of the election cycle was full of seemingly small issues blown drastically out of proportion – Lai renovated his house when he maybe was not legally sanctioned to do so; Ko’s father may have owned some problematic land, and so on. In response to media questioning, both candidates cried on national television about their family homes. These sorts of non-policy and non-China related issues were more a way of trying to de-mobilize voters away from opposing candidates than about winning hearts and minds over from other camps.

Outside of the presidential race, Taiwanese voters also selected their legislators for the next four years. In the end, the DPP and KMT both failed to win a majority, with the KMT notching 52 seats and the DPP 51 in the 113-seat Legislative Yuan. Another two seats were won by independents. With eight seats, Ko’s TPP now holds a crucial balance of power that may allow it to expand its influence going forward – or, if the party plays its cards wrong, it may end up awkwardly sandwiched between the KMT and DPP.

To this extent, the Lai administration may face challenges in pushing through any program of social change, as the TPP and KMT combined outnumber the DPP in the legislature. [possible update re: TPP’s choice for speaker] That being said, the TPP has signaled that it may cooperate with the DPP on an issue-by-issue basis. The TPP needs to avoid falling into lockstep with the KMT; otherwise, it runs the risk of being absorbed into the larger party.

As such, the TPP may possibly cooperate with the DPP on policies aimed at moderating its image, such as the military budget. On the other hand, the TPP is still likely to take shots at the DPP on social issues and the economy, so as to differentiate its domestic program from that of the DPP. This is ironic, given that the DPP, KMT, and TPP all recognize the shared social ills facing Taiwan.

Lai’s victory is the product of the split pan-Blue vote. Had the pan-Blue camp united in a joint presidential ticket, Lai – who pulled in just 40 percent of total votes – would likely have lost. Yet ironically, after the election, it is not likely that one will see a unified opposition against him from the TPP and KMT. Their political interests differ too substantially, as the dominant party of the pan-Blue camp faces off with an upstart younger party.

For his part, Lai has emphasized continuity with the policies of the Tsai administration, downplaying his previous stances overtly in support of Taiwanese independence. Likewise, though Lai was historically seen as closer to the conservative wing of the DPP, Lai has promised to continue the outgoing president’s program of social progress.

At the very least, Lai will keep his head down for the initial phase of his term, though he cannot coast on Tsai’s coattails forever. Given his narrow win, if Lai does not eventually find his own political message – one that is still in line with Tsai’s moderate stance on cross-strait issues, but manages to have broader appeal to the public on intractable issues regarding domestic growth – the electorate is likely to punish him in the 2028 elections.

How has the world reacted to the election results? From the United States’ perspective, there was no preferred result. The U.S. made its position clear the week before the election: Washington would accept any outcome of Taiwan’s election so long as it was done through a free and fair democratic process.

The United States sent a delegation led by former government officials to visit Taiwan the day after the election. The timing of the delegation was seen by some as provocative. However, such delegations fall into standard U.S. policy toward Taiwan; for example, shortly after the 2016 election, Washington also sent a delegation.

Beijing, however, was less than thrilled that the DPP had won yet another term. We have already seen China react in an antagonistic way based on the results. First, the Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement with typical rhetorical fanfare, denouncing the elections and reminding their audience that China would still one day “reunify” with Taiwan.

The more notable reaction from Beijing came just over a day after the election was over. Nauru, one of Taiwan’s last diplomatic allies, announced that they would be switching their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. The foreign ministers of China and Nauru inked documents formally restoring their relationship in Beijing on January 24.

Many had already anticipated that China might try to poach another diplomatic ally in the event that the DPP maintained its hold on power. Such a response from China is not surprising, but the event happening so close to the election results was a shock for many. It is probable that China planned out the move ahead of time to coincide with an expected DPP victory.

Although Taiwan losing another diplomatic ally due to an election result may seem like a sign of weakness on the part of the DPP, it has the potential to backfire on Beijing. Oftentimes, China’s habit of bullying Taiwan by poaching allies makes Beijing look bad in the eyes of Taiwanese rather than making the Taiwanese government looking weak. Although many anticipate that Lai’s popularity may decline once he steps into office, China prying away Taiwan’s remaining allies may ultimately bolster Lai’s popularity, contrary to Beijing’s intentions.

Beijing’s reactions to the election results may not yet be over. Lai does not take office until May. When he makes his inauguration speech, all eyes and ears will be on him. How he describes his approach to cross-strait relations along with his foreign policy agenda will be key to understanding how China may react. In 2016, for example, Beijing waited until Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration speech before moving to sever cross-strait links.

If Lai leans into more nationalistic rhetoric, China may look even more unfavorably on cross-strait relations. If Lai keeps to his word about maintaining Tsai’s status quo approach, then we can expect a similar level of tension but perhaps not a sharp deterioration.

China has already begun increasing military activity around Taiwan, including sending balloons through Taiwan’s airspace. China may conduct live-fire drills around Taiwan, as has occurred in the past when Taiwanese presidents met U.S. speakers of the House of the Representatives, in the near future. Otherwise, China could potentially announce bans on Taiwanese products or other measures intended to ramp up economic pressure on Taiwan.

The ball is now in China’s court as to what extent it aims to pressure Taiwan. Yet this may ultimately depend on how much China is willing to dial up tensions with the United States, more than Taiwan’s own possible reactions over such pressure.

Going forward, Taiwan will also be keenly watching where the United States turns with its upcoming November presidential election. Despite the DPP having good relations with both major U.S. parties, a switch in administrations will introduce a new level of unpredictability and uncertainty in the China-Taiwan-U.S. triangular relationship. Although the U.S. election is still months away, it has the potential to sway the balance of cross-strait relations just as much – and potentially more – than Taiwan’s own presidential election.

Although the possible outcome of the U.S. election is not yet widely discussed in Taiwan, with most news coverage understandably focusing on the elections in Taiwan, one anticipates growing social discussion of the U.S. presidential race in coming months. Taiwan will no doubt be cautious of the unpredictability of a second term for former President Donald Trump. The initial wave of Taiwanese enthusiasm around Trump after he took a phone call from Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 has long since given way to cautiousness in light of statements made by Trump demeaning Taiwan’s importance relative to China, and as a result of his many flip-flops.

As such, the 2024 Taiwanese election results will not mean an end to political uncertainty about Taiwan. The U.S. election will also have profound significance for Taiwan’s future.