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Asia Is Watching the Future of the US Foreign Aid Bill
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Asia Is Watching the Future of the US Foreign Aid Bill

In a rare move, nine sitting U.S. ambassadors to Asian countries wrote to Congress regarding the importance of the bill.

By Shihoko Goto

The U.S. presidential elections are eight months away, but the political divide on Capitol Hill is already intensifying and spilling over into the realm of foreign policy. When it comes to Asia, though, there has been less divergence between the Democrats and Republicans. In fact, one of the few issues where there is bipartisan support is in addressing the China threat and the need for greater U.S. commitment to confront Beijing’s military aggressions and, in particular, to push back against China’s claims of Taiwan.

Certainly, the latest bipartisan Congressional delegation visit to Taiwan – a February trip led by Representative Mike Gallagher (a Republican from Wisconsin), who is chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party – demonstrates how eager U.S. legislators remain to demonstrate their support for Taipei. While the motivation for congressional members to visit Taiwan may be geared more toward demonstrating their anti-China stance to voters back home, rather than supporting Taiwan per se, the U.S. will to demonstrate support for Taiwan remains strong.

One might think it would be be easy enough to leverage such support into actual assistance for Taiwan. But it has been anything but straightforward. As the House debates the modified foreign aid bill passed by the Senate, which includes assistance for Taiwan as well as Ukraine and Israel, there is wariness that the additional focus on U.S. border security and immigration policy is making the bill politically contentious.

The stalling of U.S. foreign aid support has already had consequences in Ukraine, where Washington’s deadlock over the bill decreased the Ukrainian troops’ capabilities and hampered their defense efforts. In the case of Taiwan, the bill is expected to allocate $1.9 billion to enhance its defense capabilities against China. But what Taiwan needs most now is not U.S. weapons, but rather reassurance from the United States that it would come to the defense of Taiwan and further its commitment to the survival of the Taipei government.

While congressional delegations – from then-House Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s trip in 2022 to the latest visit by Gallagher – may be welcomed by the Taiwanese government, there is growing concern about the staying power of the U.S. presence in Taiwan and the region more broadly. So deep is the anxiety in the region that nine current U.S. ambassadors across the Indo-Pacific – those stationed in Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and China – jointly submitted a letter to legislators in February to express their concerns about the risks of Congress failing to pass the foreign aid bill.

The ambassadors, including Rahm Emanuel and Caroline Kennedy, stated in the letter, “Governments are watching what we do at this pivotal moment in history – a time when decisions that we take now will have lasting impacts for years to come… they want to see that when the chips are down, the United States will be there for our allies and partners.”

Open letters directly addressed to members of Congress by sitting ambassadors are rare. The letter thus speaks volumes. The ambassadors see an urgent need for the United States to demonstrate its steady, unwavering commitment to the Indo-Pacific. In the case of Taiwan, the 100 days between the January elections and the presidential inauguration in May are said to be when the government is the most vulnerable to aggression from Beijing. While the Gallagher visit may be seen as a demonstration of U.S. solidarity, it does not necessarily convey Washington’s longer-term commitment to Taipei, which is critical for its stability and very survival.

But the rest of the region is closely monitoring the U.S. commitment to Taiwan and beyond, too. In the case of Japan, a Taiwan contingency has come to be seen as a de facto Japanese contingency and a test of U.S. capabilities and will in the case of regional conflict. As such, Washington’s ability to deliver on its rhetoric through legislation will be closely scrutinized in Tokyo and beyond.

As political tensions rise ahead of the presidential elections, the United States’ ability to remain a Pacific power both in words and deeds will be critical for maintaining the regional order in the Indo-Pacific.

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The Authors

Shihoko Goto is the director the Asia Program and director for geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific enterprise at the Wilson Center.

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