Australia Seeks to Boost Surface Naval Fleet

As a continent-size country sitting at the junction of three oceans, Australia’s naval power is its most important defense capability. The enormous investment in a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS arrangement is testament to this; however, in mid-February the government announced another massive new investment in the country’s naval fleet. This investment will see the country increase its “surface combatant fleet” from the current 11 vessels to 26.

These investments will include three air warfare destroyers, six frigates with undersea strike capabilities, 11 general purpose frigates with maritime and land strike capabilities, as well as six new Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs), which will increase Australia’s long-range strike capacity.

This significant upgrade to Australia’s capabilities comes after an independent Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant review, which recommended that the Australian Navy grow larger and increase its firepower in order to meet the challenges that the Department of Defense laid out in the 2023 Defense Strategic Review. (DSR). It also aligns with the government’s stated objective for better “impactful projection” – the ability to apply military power at a greater distance from Australia’s shores.

The DSR was frank in its assessment that the collective Australian Defense Force (ADF) was currently “not fit for purpose.” It stated that Australia’s strategic environment was deteriorating, and that Australia’s core interests – which are intimately tied to open sea lines of communication through the Indo-Pacific – were potentially under threat.

The DSR evaluated that China’s military expansion is “the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second World War” and that this build-up is being conducted without any “transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent.” The document asserted that the organizing principle of the ADF should be to work with its allies and partners toward the deterrence and denial of the military objectives of China’s People’s Liberation Army.

However, as with the AUKUS submarines, the work necessary to achieve this increase in Australia’s naval capabilities is substantial and will take considerable time. While Australia may now have identified what it requires to enhance its naval fleet, the tenders to build the vessels are still under consideration. German, Japanese, South Korean, and Spanish platforms are all being considered. The objective is to have several vessels built quickly in one of these countries, before transferring shipbuilding to Australia.

While finding the right designs and strategic considerations for shipbuilding is one problem, the next problem is the ability to actually crew twice the number of current vessels. In January, ADF Chief Angus Campbell told a parliamentary hearing that the ADF had a shortage of 4,300 people, with the navy’s personnel shortfall being around 900 people. Attracting people to the various arms of the defense force – particularly in a period of strong economic opportunities elsewhere – is now also a strategic priority for Australia.

The investments Australia is now making – with both AUKUS and a new surface naval fleet – are an indication of just how nervous Canberra is about China’s intentions in the region. Beijing’s ignoring of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and an UNCLOS-mandated arbitral tribunal’s decision in favor of the Philippines over claims in the South China Sea is a strong indication that China seeks a new regime of norms in the Indo-Pacific – one where mutually beneficial rules are dispensed and Chinese dominance is exerted.

To Australia, as to most other states in the region, this is an unacceptable outcome. The uncertain circumstances therefore require not only a strong projection of deterrence, through both enhanced capabilities and coordination between allies and partners, but also the ability to push back with force if necessary.

Australia is, of course, a power of limited capabilities. Even with these enhancements to its fleet and eventually nuclear-powered submarines it will remain a middle power whose role is to supplement the power of its primary ally, the United States. However, there is another, unacknowledged, calculation to Australia’s naval investments, rooted in the question of whether the U.S can continue to be a reliable ally and maintain its role as the guarantor of rules and norms in the Indo-Pacific region. If the answer is no, then whatever new investments Australia makes in its capabilities may not be enough.