Central Asia’s Good Neighbor Approach to Afghanistan

“We have rich and shared history, common traditions and future. There are many avenues we can jointly utilize,” Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov said after a March 12 meeting with Taliban officials in Kabul.

The visit took place amid a steady beat of Central Asia-Afghanistan diplomacy, which underscores the region’s adaptation to the reality of the Taliban next door. This regularized engagement also highlights a pragmatism rooted in the fact that landlocked Central Asia has limited options for trade and transport routes, a situation exacerbated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and the trickle-down trade difficulties it generated for the region.

The Murkiness of Diplomacy

While no Central Asia state has officially recognized the Taliban government in Kabul, the regular meetings between Central Asian officials and their Taliban counterparts attest to the practical normalcy of these relationships. All five Central Asian states appear to have kept their embassies in the Afghan capital open through the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. But it’s important to note that information about the actual operation of these missions is, at times, scarce.

Kyrgyzstan, for example, is listed among the 16 or so countries with embassies open in Kabul but the embassy’s website does not appear to have been meaningfully updated since 2021, save for a 2022 news update denying that U.S. forces had launched the drone strike that killed al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahiri from Kyrgyzstan’s Ganci Air Base (formerly officially known as the transit center at Manas International Airport). U.S. forces left the base in 2014.

Uzbekistan, meanwhile, is not always included in public lists of countries with open embassies in Kabul, but it seems their embassy never closed. As early as October 2021 Uzbek Ambassador to Afghanistan Yodgorkhuzha Shadmanov was meeting with Taliban officials to discuss the resumption of flights between Tashkent and Kabul and the reconstruction of the airport in Mazar-i-Sharif, where Uzbekistan maintains a consulate. In August 2023, Kun.uz interviewed Shadmanov. He laid out the consistency of interactions, noting, “We have maintained our relationship and continue cooperation in all areas.”

The murkiness continues when it comes to many Afghan embassies abroad, but some of the Afghan embassies and consulates in Central Asia have been turned over to the Taliban.

The Afghan Embassy in Tashkent was seemingly transferred to Taliban control in February 2024 when the previous ambassador, appointed by the erstwhile Afghan government, departed and Moghfurollah Shahob – who had been dispatched to the embassy six months prior by the Taliban – was appointed ambassador. Shahob is the son of current Afghan Minister of Mines and Petroleum Maulvi Shahabuddin Dilawar, sparking allegations of nepotism.

During his March meetings in Kabul, Saidov reportedly said Tashkent would soon accept Shahob’s  credentials officially.

In April 2023, Astana said it would welcome Taliban diplomats – stressing that “the arrival of representatives of the new Afghan administration does not mean recognition.” Eight months later, Kazakhstan dispatched a new ambassador to Kabul.

Although Tajikistan has not transferred the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe to Taliban control, it has allowed the Taliban to operate out of the consulate in Khorog since March 2023.

Turkmenistan accepted a Taliban-appointed ambassador and handed over the Afghan embassy in March 2022.

The Clarity of Trade

Beyond the murkiness of the embassies and the touchy subject of recognition, however, Central Asian officials have made regular visits to Kabul and welcomed Taliban delegations in their own capitals. Trade and transit have been top agenda items.

Astana hosted a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum in August 2023 with reportedly 300 participants. At the forum, Kazakh Minister of Trade and Integration Serik Zhumangarin said that trade turnover in 2022 had reached almost $1 billion, double the 2021 figure. The bulk of that turnover, he said, was exports of processed products from Kazakhstan to Afghanistan.

Zhumangarin was clear that Kazakhstan – and arguably the rest of Central Asia – views Afghanistan as a route to critical markets in South Asia and the Middle East, saying, “Afghanistan is the transport corridor of Central Asia leading to Pakistan and India, which are currently of high interest for Kazakhstan in trade.” He praised efforts to build up the the Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, a project of deep interest to Uzbekistan as well.

It’s not just Kazakhstan looking at Afghanistan through a business lens. In early March an Afghan-Uzbek business forum was hosted in Kabul with more than 150 participants. Shadmanov, the Uzbek ambassador to Afghanistan, said there were 586 companies with Afghan capital operating in Uzbekistan, noting 114 joint ventures and 17 joint investment projects with a value of $111.3 million.

Earlier, in January, the Afghan Ministry of Industry and Commerce said that trade turnover with Uzbekistan had reached $266 million in 2023. Most of that – $239 million – was imports to Afghanistan of electricity, flour, fertilizers, and oil and gas. Most importantly, that figure was nearly six times the trade of 2022, underscoring the acceleration of the relationship.

Around the same time in early March, Ashgabat hosted an Afghan-Turmen business forum of its own featuring 76 Afghan businesses, including 15 female Afghan entrepreneurs. Trade turnover between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan reached $481 million in 2023. It’s likely that the bulk of that are exports of energy – electricity, oil and gas – from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan. The Afghan Ministry of Industry and Commerce has said that Afghanistan’s key exports to Turkmenistan were “ marble, dried fruits, potatoes, and non-alcoholic beverages.”

Worries Over Security and Water

The Taliban government’s relations with Central Asian countries continue to deepen despite major concerns, or perhaps because of them. Primary among Central Asian worries when it comes to Afghanistan are security issues and water.

On the security angle, Central Asian states perpetually seek to avoid the “spillover” of conflict from Afghanistan into Central Asia, either directly or via radicalization. There have been occasional rocket firings from Afghan soil into Central Asia since the Taliban takeover, largely attributed to Islamic State-affiliated militants in border areas. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has carried out a number of attacks – most successfully in Turkey and Russia – using Central Asian fighters, often Tajiks. In March, Russian security forces killed two Kazakh nationals, allegedly ISKP members it claimed were organizing an attack on a synagogue in Moscow. Two weeks later, four Tajiks were implicated by Russian authorities in a horrific attack on a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow that killed more than 130 people. ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack.

While it is little discussed publicly, it is a given that Central Asian governments are seeking the Taliban’s assistance in rooting out ISKP. In this the two sides are in alignment. While the Taliban has had generally positive relations with extremist groups like al-Qaida – despite pledges to crack down on transnational terrorists operating from Afghanistan – it has not had such close ties with ISKP.

But despite intentions, experts like Shanthie Mariet D’Souza argue that the Taliban “are neither demonstrably capable of weakening ISKP, nor are they willing to accept any capacity enhancing external cooperation in this regard.”

If the Taliban are going to accept any external help with regard to ISKP, Central Asian governments may be the safest bet. It’s certainly in the interest of Central Asian governments to assist Afghanistan on this issue before it comes home to roost.

Another area of mutual yet divergent interest is the Qosh-Tepa canal in Afghanistan. The planned 285-kilometer canal is envisioned to run from Balkh – a province that borders Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – through Jowzjan to Faryab. An old idea resurrected by the Taliban, the canal is already under construction and scheduled to be completed by 2028, with a present price tag of $684 million.

During the Soviet period, water in the Amu Darya basin was allocated on a quota system, which transformed into a regional water agreement in 1992 after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Amu Darya River traces along the Afghan border with Central Asia, but Afghanistan has never been party to the region’s water sharing agreements. And therein lies the present challenge.

Few dispute the Afghan right to some portion of the Amu Darya’s flow, but there are no existing agreements to manage the reality that Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all experience water shortage issues, and all want a fair share of the river system’s water.

While this could be a point of tension, at present it’s a core aspect of the ongoing diplomacy between the three countries. Uzbekistan, for example, has serious concerns about water shortages given its vast agricultural industry, including the very thirsty cotton crop. But instead of expressing anger at the Taliban’s canal construction, Tashkent has dispatched its diplomats to discuss the matter directly, and repeatedly, with Kabul. Whether these talks lead to a larger regional water agreement or not, they underscore a shift in Central Asian attitudes when it comes to Afghanistan. Instead of an external problem, Afghanistan is now approached as a neighbor, one that has to be dealt with directly.

This places the region at a curious nexus. At a time when the West has very little access to and influence over Afghanistan, the states of Central Asia do. And at a time when the Taliban are rather friendless in the world, their neighbors have taken an active interest in the country’s stability. This isn’t to say that Central Asian governments are pleased with the Taliban’s draconian domestic policies, but they are acutely aware of the risks of an unstable Afghanistan.