The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?

After nearly a half century, the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., bid adieu to its Asia Program. In its place, the U.S. think tank chartered by Congress established the Indo-Pacific Program.

The change sparked questions from both supporters and skeptics. Many both within and outside of the Wilson Center asked why the change was necessary; for others, however, the question was why it took so long.

Ultimately, the christening of the Indo-Pacific Program speaks to a bigger dynamic: how evolving U.S. strategic interests and challenges are reshaping the agenda and indeed the raison d’etre of think tanks focused on Asia.

The Biden administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022, and U.S. security policy has continued to focus on the region despite being pulled by the ongoing war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. Both Japan and South Korea have released their respective Indo-Pacific strategies, as have Britain, Germany, France, Canada, and Australia. All of them feature similar statements highlighting a commitment to a “rules-based order,” and enhanced partnerships with “like-minded partners” to protect regional stability. These Indo-Pacific strategies have emerged as shorthand for strategies on how to meet the China challenge.  

Yet there is a divide even among U.S. allies and partners on how to define the risks China poses to global growth in particular.

On the security front, there is broad consensus about the threat posed by China’s territorial claims, from Taiwan to the South China Sea and beyond. The enhancement of the Quad and efforts by Japan, Australia, and India together with the United States to bolster their military partnerships is certainly one indication of that concern. The rise of AUKUS between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, alongside the appointment of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (the AP4) as official observer nations to NATO also highlight the shared concerns among some of Washington’s key allies.

Yet such clear unity has yet to emerge on the economic front, not least because there is no consensus in assessing the economic threat posed by China. To be sure, advanced economies share Washington’s concerns about Chinese economic statecraft and Beijing weaponizing its economic dominance for political gain. They also share the U.S. view that China’s abuses of advanced technologies for military purposes and social control need to be averted.

Efforts to coordinate export controls of critical technologies have been key to that end, while there is shared recognition that establishing the rules of emerging technologies could not only define the trajectory of global economic growth, but also shape national security considerations moving forward.

At the same time, Washington is committed to defending the United States’ standing as the world’s biggest economy, and it is also driven to remain the world’s most innovative and technologically advanced nation. Such concerns, however, are not shared with even the staunchest of its allies. Rather, the so-called middle powers – including U.S. allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea – are focused on becoming resilient to Chinese economic statecraft but also remain engaged with China commercially.

Striking a balance between protecting critical technologies and maintaining robust trade relations on non-critical sectors – which make up the bulk of commercial interests – will be of foremost concern to countries finding themselves in the middle of the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

But maintaining the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific cannot be assured simply by advanced economies or the most reliable U.S. allies in the region. A rules-based order cannot be preserved without buy-in from the Global South. For that, adherence to the rule of law must be seen as a pathway for greater economic opportunities, including the ability to move up the value chain and escape the middle income trap.

As countries such as minerals-rich Indonesia seek to further their ability to process resources and become an integral part of the technology supply chains, the United States and its partners should prioritize creating more investments and incentives for Southeast Asian nations to commit to good governance and the rule of law.

The United States cannot and should not try to match China dollar for dollar in pursuit of greater influence in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Washington needs like-minded partners including Japan and South Korea in securing peace and stability in a region increasingly fraught with rivalries and competition. The rise of the Global South also means that the United States can ill afford not to seek out partners of varying degrees of economic development that can be swayed to be committed to a rules-based order.

With that in mind, the real test of an effective U.S.-based think tank will be not only to articulate Washington’s regional goals, but also to ensure that the diverse and disparate goals of the Indo-Pacific are reflected in crafting policies and partnerships.