China’s Diplomatic Partnerships: What’s in a Name?

When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe from May 5 to 10, two of the major achievements were upgrades to China’s diplomatic relations with Serbia and Hungary. In one sense, these developments are entirely symbolic – a mere rhetorical shift in how the relationship is defined by both sides. On the other hand, a diplomatic upgrade serves as a signal of deepened ties, past and future, that will have practical implications in the real world.

China has a fairly dizzying array of different types of relationships with other states, generally called “partnerships” in its diplomatic parlance. Often the basic formula is adjusted based on the other party’s priorities, so it can be difficult to make one-to-one comparisons. However, there are a few basic levels that are worth explaining. Evaluating which countries fall where on the spectrum of China’s partnerships provides a handy reference for governments that are close to China – and want to get even closer in the future – and those that are keeping their distance.

Beyond the basic level of “partnership,” the first step up is a “strategic partnership.” This suggests an additional level of importance placed on the bilateral relationship by both China and the other party. Generally, there’s another adjective thrown in for good measure as well.

For example, back in 1997 – during what now seems like a mini golden age in China-U.S. relations – China and the United States elevated their relationship to a “constructive strategic partnership.” The phrase has long since fallen out of favor; by 2011, the two countries’ leaders spoke only of a “cooperative partnership.”

China’s relations with Japan and South Korea are in better shape, although both are steadfast U.S. allies that are increasingly active in what Beijing sees as the U.S.-led “anti-China” bloc. With Japan, China maintains a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit.” China-South Korea ties are formally a “strategic cooperative partnership.”

Both speak to the nuances of the bilaterals. Japan hedges its ties with China by referring to a “relationship,” not the customary “partnership,” and only in areas of “mutual benefit.” South Korea, meanwhile, embraces the “partnership” term and emphasizes “cooperation,” although the current government took care to point out that “the strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries should continue to be developed based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and shared interests.”

China has over 20 “strategic partners,” many with their own variations of the term, including Bolivia, Canada, Ukraine, Morocco, and Nigeria.

The next level up is a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The implication here is that the common ground between China and its partner encompasses a broad number of fields. Countries in this grouping represent a curious mix of partners, including two very different groups, which I’ll call the “up and comers” – governments that are rapidly developing ties with China – and the “flatliners” – countries that gained this status a decade or more ago and have not progressed since.

In the former group, China’s newer “comprehensive strategic partners” include Saudi Arabia, which upgraded ties with China during Xi Jinping’s December 2022 visit, and Solomon Islands. The latter may hold the record for fastest ascent in China’s diplomatic books: from no diplomatic ties at all as of mid-2019 to inking a comprehensive strategic partnership in July 2023. In both cases, it’s easy to see where the “comprehensive” piece comes from: China is rapidly expanding ties with these partners in the realms of technology, security, natural resources, and diplomatic coordination.

On the other end of the spectrum are the “flatliners” – countries that signed comprehensive strategic partnerships with China decades ago and have never taken the next step. In some cases, this is simply because both sides are happy to keep things where they are, as their diplomatic priorities fit well with the current level of cooperation. Many of China’s comprehensive strategic partners in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru for example) fit into this category, as do many of China’s partners in Africa (such as Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa).

In other cases, tensions have begun to creep into the “comprehensive strategic partnership.” These relationships have the same formal title but a qualitatively different feel from a country like Solomon Islands’ approach to China. In this group are many of China’s partners in Europe, like France (which upgraded ties to that level in 2014), Germany (also in 2014, using a slightly different phrasing, an “all-round strategic partnership), and the European Union itself (all the way back in 2003). These upgrades were signed during a very different era in China-Europe relations – and the partners might think twice before doing so today.

In this context, it’s notable that France was the only stop on Xi Jinping’s three-country tour of Europe that didn’t bring an announcement of upgraded ties. Likewise, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to China earlier this year didn’t see any formal upgrades made to the now decade-old comprehensive strategic partnership. China continues to refer to these statuses in its diplomatic messaging – unlike the erstwhile “strategic partnership” with the United States – but European leaders have quietly dropped such references.

Moving beyond the comprehensive strategic partnership level, we reach the elite tiers of China’s diplomatic relationships. The next step up is the “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership,” which signifies a new level of commitment to maintaining stable relations. This was the rarefied status Hungary joined during Xi’s visit in May, making it the only EU member to forge this level of ties with China. While France and Germany have put their relationships with China on hold, Hungary is breaking new ground.

It is joined in the category of “all-weather comprehensive strategic partner” by an eclectic group of states: Belarus, Ethiopia, and Venezuela. Overall, the impression is that these states are eagerly committed to their relationships with China – in the cases of Belarus and Venezuela, because they have few other options.

Hungary’s achievement was somewhat overshadowed by Serbia’s, however. During Xi’s time in Belgrade, he and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic elevated China-Serbia ties from the existing level of “comprehensive strategic partners” by committing to build “a community with a shared future with China.” A “community of shared future” (China’s preferred translation, although it’s often called a “community of common destiny” as well) is the highest level of China’s diplomacy at the moment – and a bit of Xi Jinping-specific branding.

While the term was first used in a diplomatic context by Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, in 2012, it was Xi who truly embraced it. The “community of shared future” is now a foreign policy buzzword for China, appearing in submissions to the United Nations and defining China’s own approach to global governance. Countries that adopt the slogan are signing off on China’s vision for the global order – or invested enough in maintaining high-level ties with Beijing that they are willing to pay that vision lip service.

As mentioned, Serbia signed on to the concept in May 2024, becoming the first European country to do so. That brings the total count of countries that hold this top-level status in China’s diplomatic rankings to 15: seven of the 10 ASEAN members (Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam), all five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), Pakistan, Mongolia, and now Serbia.