China’s Vision for a ‘Multipolar’ Security Order

Two speeches by two Chinese ministers in June helped flesh out China’s vision for an alternative security order. The first was Defense Minister Dong Jun’s address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2; the second was Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks at the at the BRICS Foreign Ministers' Dialogue with Developing Countries (the BRICS Plus) in Russia on June 11.

Dong, speaking at a security-centered forum, was expected to outline China’s thoughts on a global security order, but Wang’s statements on the topics at the BRICS Plus – nominally an economic-centered grouping – were more surprising.

One takeaway from both speeches is the convergence of several of Beijing’s favorite catchphrases – one of which is also beloved by Russia. Both Dong and Wang, of course, mentioned the “Global Security Initiative” proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which as yet has little to no actual substance.

In their explanations, both ministers also referenced some older slogans that are more established and thus easier to parse: the “community with a shared future” mantra that Xi popularized during his “new era,” and the even older “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” which date from Cold War-era China. We might consider the Five Principles, long a mainstay of Chinese foreign policy, to be a blueprint for achieving a “community with a shared future.” (The Five Principles are respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.)

A third, and newer, phrase that was repeated in both speeches was China’s spin on the post-Cold War concept of “indivisible security,” which Russia used to justify its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In China’s diplomatic parlance, the term is “common” or “universal security,” but both convey the same point: military alliances or blocs that build up security at the expense of another country are ultimately counterproductive.

Dong and Wang put a new spin on the phrase by expanding the list of preceding adjectives: “China champions a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.” Wang expanded on that vision by saying, “We must abide by the principle of indivisibility of security, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and take care of each other’s legitimate and reasonable concerns.”

A lot is riding on the terms “legitimate” and “reasonable,” which are very much in the eye of the beholder.

This has always been the issue with “indivisible security”: Most governments show very little inclination to actually practice what has been called “strategic empathy” and take their rivals’ security concerns at face value. China itself is as guilty of this as any country.

Dong argued that “the security interests of all countries should be upheld and their legitimate concerns addressed” – but later insisted that China’s “core interests are sacred and inviolable.” Dong made it very clear, for instance, that Beijing sees Manila’s complaints about Chinese aggression in the South China Sea as “false narratives” meant to “mislead the public,” not “legitimate concerns” that must be “addressed.”

With that in mind, China’s insistence on “common security” seems to be an attempt to claim the moral high ground in its opposition to U.S. security alliances.

This network of alliances is the status quo for the global security order. Dong stressed the need for an alternative, “a framework of regional security cooperation that is open, transparent and based on equality, one that features equal participation, friendly exchanges and is free from bloc confrontation.”

It’s hard to object to the sentiment, but again the devil is in the details. What would that actually look like in practice?

First and foremost, Dong implicitly reiterated the “Asia for Asians” framework that China has heavily promoted – essentially a bid to exclude the United States from participating in Asia’s security architecture. Dong repeatedly painted “people in the Asia-Pacific” with a broad brush, claiming to speak for the entire region – which includes over half of Earth’s population and is famously heterogenous.

This reductivist appeal to “unique Asian wisdom” serves Beijing’s purpose of trying to shut out non-Asian powers – which would have the effect of granting China, the Asia-Pacific’s largest and most powerful state, default hegemony over the region.

“People in the Asia-Pacific are independent and self-reliant,” Dong declared. “... [O]ur people are against any attempt to turn our countries into vassal states or draw us into bloc confrontations.” Regional countries should thus keep “their security firmly in their own hands.”

The governments of states that have actively sought increased defense cooperation with the United States would probably disagree with Dong.

There is some irony to the fact that China’s vision for Asia-Pacific security is highly exclusive – only Asian countries need apply – but Dong pledged to advance China’s security involvement in other regions of the world. Dong said China planned to build up its multilateral defense dialogues, including the “the Xiangshan Forum, China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, and the China–Latin America and the Caribbean States Defense Forum.”

It’s unclear to what extent these talk shops actually contribute to global security, however. China’s security contributions in Africa are the most developed, with a sizable peacekeeping presence, provision of arms and training to soldiers and police forces, and regular participation in anti-piracy patrols focused on Somalia (which, in turn, provided the rationale for China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti). But these were all outcomes of other platforms, from United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to China’s bilateral efforts. The China-Africa Peace and Security Forum itself has few practical achievements to showcase, much less the newer platforms in the Middle East and Latin America.

More concretely, Dong said China intends to “deepen and expand” its military cooperation with bilateral partners “on joint exercises and training, equipment and technology, and logistic support.” With “new cooperation partners, we are ready to start with areas such as military culture, disaster relief and medical service, and advance our cooperation with them step by step,” the minister said.

Dong described this as “open and substantive defense cooperation,” but it’s essentially the same bilateral model of defense diplomacy pursued by the United States – to which China has vociferously objected.

Underneath Chinese officials’ descriptions of China’s preferred new security order, there is always a tension between ideal and reality. The lofty rhetoric of dialogue triumphing over conflict has, sadly, proven to be impractical time and time again. And while China has talked a big game on conflict mediation, its track record is still sparse.

China says it wants an “equal and orderly multipolar world” without “bloc confrontation.” The big question is whether that is even possible. History suggests not.