Invading Taiwan: Lessons From History

Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, and China has conducted several large military exercises around Taiwan in the past two years. Most recently, on May 23 and 24, the Chinese military and coast guard held a large-scale military exercise, code-named Joint Sword-2024A, around Taiwan’s main island and the Taiwanese outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin in the Taiwan Strait.

With the drills, China stepped up military pressure against Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing considers a “Taiwan independence” separatist. Lai was inaugurated on May 20.

Xi Jinping, who became president of China in March 2013, has set “reunification” with Taiwan as a policy goal. Xi has publicly talked about the possibility of an armed reunification, rather than a peaceful settlement, on several occasions. There is widespread speculation that the Xi administration will employ force to unify Taiwan with China by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army’s founding.

Taiwan has never been invaded by a large-scale foreign military force in modern times.

However, one month after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed between the Qing Dynasty and the Empire of Japan in April 1895 to end the First Sino-Japanese War, remnants of the Qing Dynasty and some local Taiwanese residents staged an armed uprising in opposition to the cession. The Meiji government of Japan dispatched its army, navy, and air force to carry out a pacification operation.

This incident is called “Taiwan Heitei” in Japanese, meaning the Taiwan Pacification Campaign of 1895. Meanwhile, it is called the Yiwei War in Chinese (1895 was the year of Yiwei in the Chinese 60-year astrological cycle).

From a military perspective, there are precious lessons that we can infer from this historical incident in preparation for China’s invasion of Taiwan.

The remnants of the Qing Dynasty in Taiwan sought Taiwanese independence and declared the establishment of the “Democratic State of Formosa” in May 1895. The Taiwanese military force consisted of about 33,000, but the exact number of military volunteers in Taiwan is unknown. The official war history published by the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office in 1907 suggested that there may have been tens of thousands of militia troops.

The problems began with their weapons. Firearms were not widely distributed among the volunteer soldiers. Even including hunting rifles, only about 30-40 percent had firearms, and the rest fought with swords, and metal or bamboo spears.

By contrast, the Japanese military dispatched about 50,000 army soldiers and 26,000 military porters (laborers) to Taiwan. In the battle, the number of Japanese soldiers killed or wounded, including those who died of disease, reached 5,320, and the number of military laborers killed reached 7,000. On the other hand, the Taiwanese side suffered a total of 14,000 deaths, including volunteer soldiers and residents, according to Japanese historians.

The second problem is Taiwan’s topography. About three-quarters of Taiwan’s land area is mountainous and hilly, with the remaining quarter being flat land. The flat land stretches to the west facing the Taiwan Strait.

The plains on the west side were suitable for the landing and movement of troops. After occupying Taipei in June 1895, the Japanese army occupied Hsinchu in early August, Changhua at the end of August, Chiayi in early October, and Tainan in late October. This line connecting Taipei, Hsinchu, Changhua, Chiayi, and Tainan is the main artery of Taiwan. Currently the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail, which uses Japanese Shinkansen technology, runs along this route.

At the time, Taiwan had many factories and munitions depots in the northern part of the western plains. The Japanese army occupied the plains from the north, so Taiwan, which was already poorly equipped, faced a shortage of weapons and ammunition from a very early stage.

The anti-Japanese forces were compelled to move to the mountainous regions to the east and continue their resistance.

Also, at that time, Taiwan only had land forces, so Japanese naval shipping was not attacked. If Taiwan had laid mines in the shallow waters to the west, the Japanese military would have suffered great damage. It would have also had a psychological effect.

The shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait make it ideal for laying mines.

On the other hand, the eastern and southern sides of Taiwan’s main island reach depths of 2,000 meters not far from the coast. The undersea terrain is rugged and deep ocean water flows in. Deep ocean water is cold and has a low salinity, which affects the speed of sound waves, making it easier for submarines to avoid enemy sonic detection.

If Chinese submarines control the waters east of Taiwan, it will pose a danger to the shipping routes connecting Taiwan with Guam and Hawai‘i.

Thus, in the event of a Taiwan emergency, the struggle for control of the sea – and under the sea – to the east of Taiwan will intensify. If Taiwan takes control of this sea area, it can also be used as a base for launching anti-ship missiles from submarines into the Taiwan Strait. In this case, it will be necessary to communicate the location of enemy ships to submarines, and the U.S. military may support Taiwan by providing this sort of  information.