Hun Manet: In His Father’s Long Shadow

Children who follow in the footsteps of prominent parents often don’t have it easy. Usually, they are measured and judged by the success of their parents, be it in sport or the arts. This is not always fair. In a family business it can be particularly problematic when the junior takes the helm, but senior refuses to let go.

The situation is not much different in Cambodian politics. Over the last three decades, the way in which political power has been exercised has gradually changed. Starting from a party dictatorship of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the country first transformed into a classic one-person autocracy and then into a family business. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen no longer holds the reins of power alone; the importance of his children has gradually increased, and the Hun clan is preparing to develop a political dominance in Cambodia that Southeast Asia has not experienced since the time of Suharto in Indonesia.

Corruption and Nepotism as a System of Government

Prime Minister Hun Manet, 46, is the figurehead of the family’s generational transition. In August 2023, he took over as prime minister from his father, who had been in charge since 1985. The approval in parliament, where 120 out of the 125 MPs belong to the CPP following the exclusion of the only relevant opposition party from the elections, was a purely formal act.

Similarly, other long-serving ministers passed the baton on to their sons (and one daughter) last year, sometimes in the same portfolio, creating quasi-dynastic hereditary courts comparable to those of Cambodia’s aristocratic era. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of secretaries and undersecretaries of state by 122 percent to an astronomical 1,422 posts spread over around 30 ministries represented the latest example of patrimonial bloat in a country already plagued by corruption and nepotism.

These personnel decisions are revealing. Obviously, the pacification of the country still depends fundamentally on the regime’s ability to feed as many of its followers as possible through the state. Precisely because the construct appears so fragile, its virtuoso creator will not let go of it so quickly: Hun Sen is not only indispensable to Manet’s self-image, but also remains the personal guarantor of a political order in which, according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2024, state institutions have been almost completely undermined by patronage and informal networks. Whether Hun Manet can ever succeed his father in this respect is questionable.

Political Consolidation and Economic Troubles

Since April, in addition to his office as CPP leader, to which he was elected, effectively for life, in 2015, Hun Sen has become president of the Senate, making him the de facto deputy head of state. As he can interpret this role quite freely, he has turned the Senate into a secondary Foreign Ministry and welcomes Cambodia’s highest state guests there or, as happened in June, CIA Director William Burns. In addition, Hun Sen remains the central veto player in all policy areas that should be subject to the new prime minister’s right to shape policy.

But in this role, Hun Manet remains even less visible than originally expected. In his first year in office, he has not taken any political initiative that could be associated with his name or that would have left a lasting impression, let alone far-reaching reforms. While his father had at least formulated narratives that legitimized his reign, first with a mythologized version of the liberation from the Khmer Rouge on January 7, 1979, and later with the so-called “Win-Win Policy” credited with ending Cambodia’s civil war in the 1990s, his son has so far failed to convey a more modern narrative of the undemocratic unity of state and party.

This could yet take its toll. As one of the fastest growing economies in the world before the COVID-19 pandemic, prosperity increased noticeably for most Cambodians during the 2010s. This boosted the CPP’s legitimacy and compensated to some extent for the lack of democratic participation. However, there are increasing signs that the party could be over. While private debt totaled $3.3 billion, or 28 percent of gross domestic product, in 2011, six years later it had increased to $19.2 billion (87 percent of GDP), before climbing to $53.1 billion (180 percent of GDP) by 2022.

It is unclear whether and, if so, how long this steep rise, which is unique throughout East and Southeast Asia, can continue. Due to the completely unregulated microfinance sector, private over-indebtedness has already become a general social phenomenon. However, the government perceives no need for action, such as the introduction of a private insolvency law or other stabilizing measures. Instead, the regime continues to pin its hopes on international investors, especially Chinese real estate speculators, to pump even more money into the country.

Systematic Human Rights Violations Continue

Probably to prevent the economic imbalance from leading to widespread political dissatisfaction, the regime is once again increasing its use of repression and making deterrent examples of opposition activists and dissidents. As recently as July, 10 environmental activists were sentenced to prison terms of between six and eight years. The Candlelight Party, the only relevant opposition party, also remains in the regime’s crosshairs. Anyone who did not flee abroad (like leaders Sam Rainsy and Mu Sochua years ago) or switch sides before the last elections is living dangerously.

In July, the Cambodian human rights organization LICADHO counted at least 59 political prisoners, including the well-known opposition politician Kem Sokha. He is currently under house arrest serving a 27-year prison sentence for alleged treason, which was imposed in March 2023. Other prominent supporters of the opposition prefer the alternative of submitting to the regime; Hun Sen himself has called this systematic strategy of punishment against all actual and potential critics of the regime “Isolate and Finish.”

Obvious criminals, on the other hand, often get away scot-free. Cambodia is no longer just a paradise for money launderers from all over the world; it has also become an international center for organized online fraud. The U.S. State Department estimates that more than $12 billion, almost 40 percent of Cambodia’s GDP, is generated annually by online scam syndicates. The largest player, Huione Guarantee, alone, apparently earned around $11 billion between 2021 and mid-2024, mainly as a marketplace for merchants who explicitly offer money laundering services and various other scam-enabling products and services.

Obviously, these activities not only take place with the extensive connivance of the Cambodian government, but have also been linked directly to the Hun clan and its close associates. A key basis of these mafia activities is human trafficking and kidnapping, the victims of which are forced into fraudulent activities such as “pig butchering” scams. A particular group of victims of the Chinese gangs are their own countrymen, which has already prompted disapproval from Beijing.

But the bilateral, partly neocolonial partnership is otherwise intact. As satellite images show, at least two Chinese ships, including the corvette Wenshan, have been stationed at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base between December 2023 and May 2024. As a result, Beijing has finally realized a desire it has cherished since the 1960s: to gain military access to the Gulf of Thailand. However, since the permanent stationing of foreign troops is a violation of the Cambodian Constitution, it has been denied by the Cambodian government.

Unsteady Relations With ASEAN

The foreign policy implications of this Chinese embrace are likely to be serious, as Cambodia is violating or at least ignoring the key security interests of neighboring countries. Above all, relations with Vietnam, which helped installed the CPP government in Cambodia in 1979 and defended it with an occupying army until 1989, have visibly deteriorated and are an example of how unfortunate Hun Manet has been in office.

In addition to the increasingly close military relations between Cambodia and China, the construction of a waterway linking Phnom Penh with its own coast in the south, which is due to begin in the fourth quarter of this year, is also causing further disgruntlement in Vietnam. First, it is unclear how the infrastructure project known as the Funan Techo Canal will change the water level in the Mekong Delta and thus affect agriculture there. Second, security concerns have also arisen, as some believe that the canal, which is financed and operated by China, could be used by the Chinese navy.

However, the Cambodian government apparently does not see any necessity to allay Vietnamese concerns. On the contrary, the comprehensive feasibility study on which the canal is based has not yet been published in order to provide clarity. Other opportunities for talks, particularly during Hun Manet’s inaugural state visit to Vietnam in December 2023, have also apparently not been used to ensure understanding and transparency in the neighborly relationship. Once again, Cambodia is showing that its relationship with China is so important that it will sacrifice relations with its regional neighbors if necessary. And this in turn does not bode well for further security policy cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

As shown, Hun Manet has no shortage of tasks, challenges, and problems to overcome. The only question is how long he will wait to tackle them forcefully or whether he even has enough political capital of his own to take them on. He doesn’t have much time left, because the worst thing that could happen to him is being perceived as a lame duck as long as his father defines Cambodia’s political guidelines. Despite taking a step back from the prime ministership, Hun Sen’s claim to power is clearly far from extinguished.