Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2024: Don’t Be Distracted by the Money

In early September, during the ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing, China’s promise to give $50.7 billion of financial support to African countries over the next three years dominated international headlines.

In the Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027), the most important publication from the summit, China pledged to “provide Africa with RMB 360 billion of financial support in the next three years, includ[ing] RMB 210 billion credit lines, RMB 80 billion in assistance of different types, [and] no less than RMB 70 billion of investment by Chinese companies.” These numbers, which China notably announced using renminbi (previous FOCAC commitments had been denominated in U.S. dollars), have been hotly debated.

Much of Western media reporting about the international forum, attended by 53 African nations, was obsessed with the current African debt problem and Chinese “debt traps” that some critics say are hidden within Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deals. Some even questioned whether the funding numbers signal the next round of debt trap.

Eric Olander lamented this trend on The China in Africa Podcast’s post-FOCAC debrief special. He said that when interviewers ask him about the debt trap, his rebuttal would be to remind them that there “is no evidence to support the debt trap” and that “China only accounts for about 11-12 percent of the total debt” held by African nations.

Meanwhile, other commentators see the big number quite differently: as a positive sign of China attempting to re-energize the relationship. China’s levels of investment in the African continent have been falling since 2016; the $50.6 billion pledge is thus taken as an attempt to right the ship.

For comparison, China made $60 billion in commitments at FOCAC 2018. In 2021, during the throes of the pandemic, the total dropped to $40 billion, sparking much speculation that China’s interest in Africa was waning.

A lot of the money will not be given straight to African nations, however. Most of it is likely to be distributed through Chinese companies and local governments responsible for carrying out the trade, training, and cooperative promises within the action plan. This is nothing new.

Take the BRI as a barometer. Most BRI funding is actually awarded to or channeled through Chinese state-owned enterprises and local governments. While it may finally be put toward foreign direct investment or international trade, it also plays a vital function in propping up China’s domestic economy. Local government officials, during their annual budgetary application process to the People’s Congress, paint their projects as contributing to the BRI in one way or another to receive additional funding. Since 2013, there have actually been more BRI projects planned to take place in China than anywhere else in the world.

Thus, when the action plan mentions that the funding will go toward 1,000 “small and beautiful” projects or the erection of “joint medical centers and traditional medicine centers,” one has to question how many of these will be directed by African companies or governments, be of benefit to the local economies, or even be based in Africa. Not all of the 360 billion RMB will be coming from the Chinese state either. Rather, it will come from private actors in line with China’s “great power diplomacy” strategy. As already quoted, according to the action plan at least 70 billion RMB – almost 20 percent of the financial support promised – will come from private Chinese companies.

The present worrying state of China’s domestic economy is also an important factor. It is thought that at least a dozen provincial-level governments are effectively bankrupt. There have been reports of public hospitals struggling to keep their doors open and countless infrastructure projects being abandoned. In Guizhou, officials have no idea how they are going to pay back the loans accepted to pay for their impressive new high-speed rail.

While only the highest rungs of China’s leadership can see the accounting books, the government most likely is not in the position at present to be promising tens of billions in financial support to Africa, or BRI projects in general, at the expense of the domestic economy.

Main Takeaways

With that in mind, what cannot be overstated is the importance of the framing of the summit and the hype around it.

FOCAC 2024 was a big PR win for China. Countless pictures were taken and shared around the world of African leaders with President Xi Jinping or Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee members smiling, shaking hands, and greeting each other. Commentators have noted the heightened sense of excitement surrounding this summit compared with other “Africa+1” events.

There was even a large “family photo” taken of the heads of state together with their partners, which garnered attention. This photo epitomized precisely the message that China wanted to send to Africa and the rest of the world: China and Africa are part of the same family.

Repeatedly, Chinese and African leaders, but particularly the Chinese, reaffirmed the two sides proudly belonging to the Global South and even the “Third World nations.” Xi, in his toast at the opening banquet, commended China and Africa, saying, “Together we have made the voice of the Global South stronger.” Western countries no doubt would hear Xi championing this divisive self-identification and feel uncomfortable – and perhaps they should.

The West was frequently condemned through the summit for its abusive model of modernization, which crippled the development of poorer countries post-World War II. Also in his opening toast, Xi alluded to this: “Since the mid-20th century, [China and Africa] have been fighting shoulder to shoulder imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism, and advancing hand in hand along the path of development, revitalization, and modernization.” In contrast to the West, peace-loving China presents its own path to modernization, a narrative that has been growing for several years.

China’s commitment to this narrative and their historic, bloodied relationship with the African continent was brought to the fore by the major announcement of investing $1 billion to refurbish the Tazara railway connecting Zambia’s copper-rich region to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. The railway embodies both of these aspects by physically forming a key transport link pointing toward China, away from America, and by recalling the memory of the Chinese “martyrs” lost in its initial construction five decades ago.

China’s current foreign policy guiding slogan of wanting to forge a “community with a shared future for mankind” was woven into what seemed like every bit of the forum’s wording. While not particularly catchy in English, China’s communist-sounding branding might gain traction if it continues to ostentatiously host leaders from developing countries, emphasize their shared identity as proud developing nations, and continue to celebrate its peace facilitating endeavors.

FOCAC was another bearer laid down on China’s railway line toward cementing its position as leader of the Global South.