Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Power Conundrum

Since the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s government made several attempts to introduce nuclear power to its energy mix, but each effort failed, primarily because of robust public opposition. Unlike previous attempts, this time the government appears to be firm in pushing for a nuclear power plant.

A national referendum on October 6 will ask citizens: “Do you agree with constructing a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan?”

Kazakhstan’s energy needs, geopolitics, the Soviet nuclear legacy, and tensions in government-civil society relations feed a heated debate on the country’s nuclear future. Whether and how Kazakhstan builds a nuclear power plant will impact the country’s future beyond the narrow issue of nuclear energy. It will demonstrate how Kazakhstan will deal with its energy security challenges, manage its complicated geopolitical situation and relationship with Russia, and whether the government will live up to its promise of being a “listening state.”

Arguments For and Against Nuclear Power: A Reality Check

The government’s main arguments in support of nuclear power include strengthening energy security, utilizing nuclear fuel production capabilities, stimulating the nuclear technology sector, as well as decarbonization and achieving green economy goals.

Kazakhstan already suffers from an energy deficit, and electricity consumption is projected to grow. In 2023, Kazakhstan imported 18 billion kilowatt/hours of electricity (14 percent of all its electricity needs), nearly five times more than the amount imported in 2022. Russia is the leading exporter of electricity to Kazakhstan. Existing thermal power plants, the majority of which have been in operation for more than 60 years, are worn out. The energy deficit is, indeed, a severe problem that needs to be addressed, and nuclear power can be a good addition to stable baseload electricity generation.

Yet, due to the long period required to construct a nuclear power plant (roughly a decade), nuclear power will not solve Kazakhstan’s immediate energy problems.

Supporters argue that adding nuclear power to the mix will have far-reaching benefits beyond covering energy needs. It will boost Kazakhstan’s nuclear technology development, including in such vital fields as the production of medical radioisotopes. Kazakhstan has a well-developed and growing nuclear industry. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer and has the world’s second-largest uranium reserves. Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry went from complete bankruptcy in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse to one of the world’s most developed.

Kazakhstan’s national nuclear company, Kazatomprom, is one of the major players in the international commercial nuclear market. The company can perform several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, which is the process of producing nuclear fuel. It can produce nuclear fuel elements for different types of reactors. In this sense, adding nuclear power and stimulating further growth of Kazakhstan’s own nuclear sector makes sense. The only caveat is that Kazakhstan relies on Russia for uranium enrichment services, an important part of nuclear fuel production.

The proponents of nuclear power project confidence that Kazakhstan has sufficient expertise and personnel to operate a nuclear power plant, primarily thanks to the three nuclear research reactors currently in operation in the country. But a nuclear power plant will require significantly more people than the existing small nuclear research reactors. It is unlikely that Kazakhstan currently has enough trained personnel. However, the country should be able to train a new generation of specialists during the long construction period.

Moreover, Kazakhstan is not new to nuclear power plants. The Soviet government chose Kazakhstan as the site for fast breeder nuclear reactor BN-350. The plant on the Caspian shore in Aktau fulfilled several tasks: It produced heat and desalinated water for nearby towns and bred plutonium for the Soviet military program. BN-350 operated from 1973 to 1999 and is now waiting to be decommissioned.

In promoting nuclear power, the Kazakh government also points to the country’s international environmental obligations and decarbonization goals. Approximately 70 percent of electricity in Kazakhstan is generated by air-polluting coal-powered plants. Reducing reliance on coal will help reduce the country’s carbon footprint. Nuclear power does not produce emissions and is considered a clean energy source. Still, the environmental burden of a nuclear power plant cannot be measured only by its emission-free process of energy production. The construction of a nuclear power plant, thermal water pollution resulting from reactor cooling, and nuclear waste storage and disposal all carry environmental costs.

The opposition within Kazakhstan to the idea of a nuclear power plant rests on concerns about nuclear accidents and the environmental impact, issues with financing, corruption risks, and the belief that the country has underutilized renewables and gas-generated energy capacity. Another severe and distinct concern is the strategic and geopolitical vulnerabilities that would arise if Kazakhstan chose Russia as its partner in a nuclear power plant project.

Kazakhstan’s general population fears the atom. The main driver for those fears is the trauma inflicted by Soviet nuclear tests. For 40 years, from 1949 to 1989, the Soviet military carried out more than 450 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site. The Soviet government shrouded its testing program in secrecy, with no information provided to the local authorities or the population. Atmospheric and underground nuclear tests imposed horrendous harm on local people and the environment. Locals developed severe illnesses, including cancers. Mortality rates went up. Women and children, especially, suffered from the effects of ionizing radiation: stillbirths, physical deformities, and Down syndrome in newborns became commonplace.

Three decades after the last Soviet nuclear test in Kazakhstan, health issues continue, stretching into the second, third, fourth, and fifth generations. Cancer and mortality rates are still higher for descendants of those who received radiation doses during the tests. Children are still being born with physical manifestations of the legacy of the Soviet nuclear tests. Missing or extra fingers are just one example. More than a million people in Kazakhstan are officially recognized as victims of the Soviet nuclear tests.

Accidents at nuclear power plant stations increased the population’s fear of atom. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States does not feature prominently in the public discourse in Kazakhstan, while both the 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima nuclear accidents have left a strong impression. More than 30,000 liquidators – miners, soldiers and firemen – from Kazakhstan were brought to Ukraine to deal with the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. The Chernobyl tragedy contributed to the rise of an active opposition to the Soviet nuclear tests in Kazakhstan in the late 1980s.

Chernobyl and Fukushima are often brought up in contemporary commentary, but it should also be noted that reactor technology has advanced significantly since those two nuclear accidents. Kazakhstan is considering Generation III+ reactors with superior safety features and state-of-the-art design.

The likely site of the nuclear power plant is another reason for concern among those in opposition. The Kazakh government chose the village of Ulken, situated on the bank of Lake Balkhash, the 15th largest lake in the world. The unusual lake consists partly of salt water and partly of fresh water. Until recent years, the lake boasted an abundance of fish. However, in recent years, water levels have declined partly because of decreased flow from the Ili River, shared with China, and climate change. The opponents of the nuclear power plant worry about the thermal pollution of Lake Balkhash, while proponents argue that the impact will be negligible or manageable.

In addition to legitimate fears of nuclear risks connected with the Kazakh experience with the Soviet nuclear tests and memories of Chernobyl and Fukushima, the public is prone to “radiophobia.” The general population in Kazakhstan does not distinguish between nuclear technology for military and peaceful uses and sees little difference between a nuclear power plant and a nuclear weapons program. Conversations on nuclear topics are often tangled with a fair share of factual errors, further increasing the population’s fears.

Furthermore, opponents of nuclear power plant construction express concern about the financing needed for such an expensive project. The head of JSC Kazakhstan Nuclear Power Plants (KNPP), Timur Zhantikin, estimates the construction of the nuclear power plant will take around 10 years and require $11-12 billion in investment. International practice shows that initial estimates for time and investment for construction are often optimistic. In most cases, nuclear power plant construction takes more time and money than initially anticipated. It is unclear how the Kazakh government plans to finance the project, whether through the help of a loan or financing from the supplier.

A related concern is corruption. Large-scale national projects, such as constructing a nuclear power plant, provide fertile ground for pilfering funds. This risk is acute in Kazakhstan, ranked 93rd out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index.

The Russia Factor

Perhaps the most controversial part of Kazakhstan’s current discourse on its nuclear future is Russia. Russia’s Rosatom is among four potential suppliers of nuclear reactor technology to Kazakhstan, and many believe it is the most likely to be chosen by the government in Astana. Many critics believe that the Russian government, eager to promote Rosatom’s projects abroad, pressured Kazakhstan’s government to pursue nuclear power plant construction.

In fact, prominent voices expressing concern about Russia belong both to those who oppose nuclear power in general and those who accept that Kazakhstan will eventually need nuclear power. The main problem for Kazakh civil society more broadly is that Kazakhstan may subject itself to dependence on Russia through the construction of a nuclear power plant. Kazakhstan will be tied to Russia, or any other partner it chooses for the project, for decades to come.

A lot will depend on the specific conditions of cooperation. Who will build and operate the plant – Russian or Kazakh personnel? Who will pay, and under what conditions? Russia offers attractive financing options to its partners because it sees the export of nuclear reactors as a geopolitically beneficial endeavor and does not necessarily concern itself with economic profit. Who will control the technology used in operating the nuclear power plant? What kind of vulnerabilities will Kazakhstan expose itself to if Russia controls the technology?

Another legitimate concern relates to sanctions imposed on Russia by other major economies. While Rosatom itself is not presently subject to sanctions, sanctions on its subsidiaries interfere with its overseas projects in terms of financing and procurement. For example, the opening of a Turkish nuclear power plant built by Rosatom has been delayed by several months due to supply issues. Germany’s Siemens was unable to supply critical parts to Rosatom due to export controls and sanctions. Rosatom was pushed to order similar parts from China.

The fact that Russian military troops and representatives of Rosatom occupy Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant does not feature prominently in Kazakhstan’s public discourse but deserves to be in the spotlight. Like the majority of nuclear power plants in the world, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant underwent improvements in safety and security in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident. Still, no nuclear power plant is designed to operate in a war zone. By overtaking a civilian nuclear facility of a sovereign state, Russia created significant nuclear safety and security risks.

The plant is shut down but requires diligent maintenance to prevent a nuclear accident. On several occasions, the risks of a nuclear disaster were uncomfortably high when the stable power supply necessary for cooling nuclear fuel was undermined. There are documented cases of torture of Ukrainian nuclear workers at the occupied plant.

Kazakhstan enjoys an exceptional standing in the global nuclear order due to its impeccable record on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and security. Signing up for close cooperation with Russia in the nuclear field in the current circumstances creates reputational risks in addition to the practical challenges identified above.

While Russia is unpopular among civil society in Kazakhstan, it appears to be a preferred choice for Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector. This can be explained by the shared Soviet background, the historically close cooperation between the Russian and Kazakh nuclear sectors, and the absence of language and cultural barriers.

Russia is pushing hard to entrench itself in Central Asia’s nuclear power development. Uzbekistan plans to build a nuclear power plant in the Jizzakh region. In May 2024, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with Rosatom on constructing six small modular reactors with 55 MW each – 330 MW total – capacity. In the past, small modular reactors were used in icebreakers. This will be Russia’s first export of a small modular reactor for electricity generation.

Kyrgyzstan also seems to be on the road toward developing nuclear power. In January 2022, Kyrgyzstan and Rosatom signed a memorandum on cooperation in building nuclear power plants with small modular reactors. In 2024, the Kyrgyz deputy energy minister confirmed that his country plans to sign an agreement with Rosatom on building a nuclear power plant.

Voice of the People

According to a poll conducted by the government-affiliated Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies in August of 2024, 53.1 percent of polled individuals supported the idea of nuclear power plant construction, with the majority hoping it would help solve the country’s energy deficit. The opponents represented 32.5 percent of the total number of polled individuals. Their opposition mostly centered around fears of accidents and impact on the environment.

An earlier poll conducted in October 2023 by DEMOSCOPE, together with Paperlab, with the support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, showed similar trends: 46.6 percent of polled individuals expressed support for the construction of a nuclear power plant, while 37.7 percent of respondents expressed opposition. The most common reason cited for supporting nuclear power was the electricity deficit, and the main reasons for opposition were accidents and radiation exposure risks.

While there is no reason to question the polls, especially those conducted by independent organizations, their results do not match anecdotal evidence that suggests higher levels of opposition to nuclear power. An overwhelming majority of online comments to news reports or interviews on any nuclear subject are highly negative regarding the proposed nuclear power plant. Similarly, in-person discussions that touch on nuclear themes, including Kazakhstan’s nuclear history, quickly switch to heated conversations about nuclear power.

Two potential explanations exist for the discrepancies between the poll results and the empirical evidence. First, poll respondents may engage in self-censorship and choose to express support for government-led projects when polled. Second, it might be that support for a nuclear power plant is more passive, while opposition is more active and vocal and, therefore, more noticeable outside of the polls.

Four individuals in Kazakhstan have received administrative penalties for running unauthorized public polls. Many in Kazakhstan question whether the referendum on building a nuclear power plant will be fair and transparent; other referendums and elections have failed to be.

Most residents of Ulken, a village of about 1,000 residents and a likely site for the future nuclear power plant, support the construction. The history of Ulken and its current socioeconomic situation explains why. Ulken was built during the 1980s as a site for a potential state district power plant. When Kazakhstan gained independence, those plans were abandoned, and the idea of a nuclear power plant surfaced but went nowhere. In 2012, Kazakhstan signed an agreement with a South Korean company to construct a thermal power plant in the area. But by 2016, those plans had been abandoned, and Ulken once again started featuring as a potential site for a nuclear power plant.

Ulken residents hope a big national project will finally come to fruition and offer stable employment. For now, many Ulken residents are forced to work in shifts hundreds of kilometers away from their homes. Others earn their living by fishing in Lake Balkhash.

Over the last few months, Kazakhstan’s government launched an active campaign to promote its nuclear power plant ambitions. This campaign often resorted to a heavy hand. Government-organized public hearings in several cities followed one script: presentations by authorized speakers in support of nuclear power with little opportunity given to opponents to express their views. On occasion, when opponents managed to take the floor, the microphones were switched off.

Any interaction between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear activists quickly escalated into heated shouting matches and personal insults, leaving no space for a nuanced and serious discussion. During a public hearing in Almaty, one participant held a poster: “Opponents of nuclear power are enemies of the people.” When several anti-nuclear activists behind a platform “AES Kerek Emes” (“no need for a nuclear power plant” in Kazakh) announced a panel discussion in one of Almaty’s hotels, they quickly lost their conference room reservation at said hotel and were forced to reschedule.

In an interview, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Almasadam Satkaliyev went as far as to suggest that support for nuclear energy was a test of intellect, patriotism, and decency.

Broader Implications

The nature of the public discourse on nuclear power reveals a deeper problem: A lack of public trust in government. The general public does not trust the government’s decisions and promises. The trauma of the Soviet nuclear legacy runs deep in the popular psyche, and any mention of the word “nuclear” elicits negative connotations in a majority of people in Kazakhstan. The government must develop and implement a thoughtful and empathetic campaign to earn public support for its nuclear power project. Instead, its current efforts to steer the debate and squash dissent undermine its announced aspirations to foster a “listening state.”

Adding nuclear power to the country’s energy mix is a strategic decision that will have implications for future generations. The government of Kazakhstan can either truly engage the population in this decision and work on earning its trust and eventual support for nuclear power, or it can force its will on the people and further alienate the population.