Moonis Ahmar

Since the dramatic fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina following a mass youth-led uprising on August 5, there has been considerable discussion about the possibility of Bangladesh’s renewed relationship with Pakistan.

However, the situation is more complex than it appears, with the events of 1971 – the year of Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan – remaining a pivotal issue that could make or break a relationship between the two countries. Additionally, there is significant misunderstanding about their shared history, particularly among younger generations.

The narratives of pro-Pakistani and anti-Pakistan sentiments within Bangladesh also have the potential to play a crucial role.

In this context, Bangladeshi researcher and journalist Jannatul Naym Pieal interviewed Dr. Moonis Ahmar, a professor of international relations and former dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Karachi, on the prospects for Bangladesh-Pakistan relations under a new government.

Could the fall of Sheikh Hasina and Bangladesh’s seemingly worsening ties with India lead to a closer relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan?

That is true to some extent.

Over the past 15 years, Sheikh Hasina’s government had not been open to normalizing or improving relations with Pakistan.

If you recall, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan reached out to Sheikh Hasina several times, and Pakistan’s former High Commissioner Imran Ahmed Siddiqui also met with her.

However, there was no positive response from her side. It seemed that her government was not interested in maintaining friendly or cordial relations with Pakistan. Now, with her departure, there is certainly an opportunity to normalize relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Certainly there are efforts being made from both sides to revitalize the relationship. But the interim government in Bangladesh [led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus] seems very cautious. This Yunus regime is neither pro-Pakistan or anti-Pakistan. It wants an even handed approach in its foreign policy. It doesn’t want to tilt toward any country. Pakistan thinks that is something very positive.

Still, I don’t have very high hopes from the regime of Yunus. It still looks very fragile, and it is already bogged down with various issues of its own. Its legitimacy is also in question.

Many argue that if a regime wants to establish itself as legitimate, it has to come to power by holding a referendum or fresh elections. Otherwise, the legitimacy of a government remains questionable.

Isn’t an official apology from Pakistan for the 1971 genocide crucial for fostering a long-term, positive relationships between the two nations, given the strong sentiment against Pakistan in Bangladesh?

I encountered this situation and faced similar questions during my visit to Dhaka University in 2002. Many of the people I interviewed for my study on Bangladesh-Pakistan relations brought up the issue of an apology.

In fact, Pakistan came very close to issuing an apology on two occasions. The first was in 1974, during a tripartite meeting between Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, when Pakistan’s former secretary nearly apologized and expressed regret over the tragic events of 1971. The second occasion was when former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited Dhaka in July 2002.

However, I believe that to close the painful chapter of 1971, two things are necessary. First, the Pakistani Parliament should take the initiative to address the apology issue. Second, the apology should not be one-sided.

In Pakistan, there is a structured and deep-rooted perception that the tragedy was not solely due to the military’s actions. Many also believe that the Awami League and the Mukti Bahini were responsible for the lynching and killing of non-Bengalis in Dhaka before and during the war, and even after December 16, 1971, when the war ended with Pakistan’s surrender to the joint forces.

I agree that, as a responsible nation, Pakistan must take action on this issue. However, the apology should not be used as a bargaining chip.

What happened [in 1971] was indeed unfortunate, especially from Pakistan’s side. If the policies had been fair and just, and power had been peacefully transferred to the majority party, the outcome could have been different.

Additionally, I believe there should be a joint commission of historians and legal experts to thoroughly revisit the historical and legal aspects of this matter. This would help resolve the issue once and for all.

What is the general perception of Bangladesh and 1971 war among Pakistan’s younger generation?

Pakistan’s younger generation is not very aware of what happened in 1971. Even much of the older generation was kept in the dark. In 1971, I was in Class 8, but I had some understanding of what was happening. However, most people didn’t know the reality because they were told that everything was under control. Martial law at the time limited access to information and kept people from understanding the full extent of the situation.

That said, many books have been published on the subject, and they are available in Pakistan. These books present two different perspectives. Some authors condemn what happened in 1971 from the standpoint of the Pakistani state. Others argue that non-Bengalis were subjected to torture and had their properties taken away in East Pakistan, not only after December 16 but also during the non-cooperation movement between March 1 and March 25, 1971.

I believe the best approach now is to move forward and not be weighed down by the past. However, history remains important, and it’s crucial to learn from it. The youth of Pakistan are very forward-looking and eager for good relations with Bangladesh, as they don’t carry the burdens of the past.

What could be Pakistan’s expectations from Bangladesh’s next elected government? And whom might Pakistan favor in the upcoming elections – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami, or a third party?

We need to move beyond the pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan narratives in Bangladesh. Whether it's the Awami League, the BNP, or Jamaat in power, they often fail to formulate policies based on merit, influenced instead by their own misconceptions and polarized mindsets.

I can foresee the rise of a third force – one that is free from dynastic politics. This force would not align with the BNP, AL, nor the Islamists, and could be supported by youth, students, and the common people. New political parties may emerge that are not corrupt, dynastic, or intolerant.

Past experience shows that Pakistan’s alignment with the BNP or Jamaat has always been counterproductive. Because those who are against normalizing relationships with Pakistan used that as an excuse to derail the process of mending the fences of Pakistan-Bangladesh relationships.

In what ways can Bangladesh and Pakistan benefit from strengthening their bilateral relationship?

There are numerous opportunities to improve Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. Unfortunately, over the past 15-20 years, there has been a stalemate.

I believe the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) should be revitalized, and direct shipping and air links between the two countries need to be established. Easing visa restrictions is also crucial. Pakistan has lifted tourist visa restrictions for Bangladeshi nationals, allowing for hassle-free visits, but Bangladesh has not reciprocated.

I found this particularly frustrating during my experience in Karachi. The staff at the Bangladeshi consulate were once very helpful, but over the past decade, their attitude has changed and become more hostile. In December 2017, when I received an invitation to visit Bangladesh, the consulate staff was unwelcoming and repeatedly told me to wait for clearance from the Home Ministry.

While such hostility from India may make sense, imposing visa restrictions on Pakistani nationals from Bangladesh, whom we considered a friendly nation, was unexpected.

Sheikh Hasina’s reluctance to engage with Pakistan seemed aimed at appeasing India, which has ultimately cost her politically. As a national leader, she should not have had to escape from her country and take refuge in India. But with this, the age-old claims of her tilting toward India have been exposed.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has its own issues, and I’m not suggesting we are in an ideal situation. If Pakistan were in a better economic and political condition, things might be different. Currently, the country is facing significant challenges. Still, the government has made unilateral gestures to improve relations, and Bangladesh should reciprocate, particularly regarding visa policies.

Improving trade relations and restoring shipping links are essential, as is the establishment of direct air connections. For the last 8-10 years, there have been no direct flights between Pakistan and Bangladesh, forcing travelers to transit through Dubai or Qatar, which increases costs significantly.

Restoring direct flights would require flying over Indian airspace, hence India’s role is also very crucial in mending relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan.

How important is it to revitalize SAARC, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation?

SAARC has become a casualty of the unresolved issues between India and Pakistan. It is a crucial organization, but in November 2016, the SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Islamabad was boycotted by India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Afghanistan.

At that time, Sheikh Hasina was supportive of the Modi regime. It’s unfortunate because Bangladesh was a pioneer of SAARC, as it was initiated by Ziaur Rahman to address South Asia’s problems.

I believe that Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka could now collaborate to exert pressure on India to end its veto regarding SAARC summits. This would help revitalize the organization and foster regional cooperation.