The Philippines-China-Vietnam Triangle and Limits of the ‘Friends and Enemies’ Maxim

Vietnam and the Philippines have bolstered their maritime ties in the hope of strengthening deterrence against Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. In mid-August, their coast guards held their first-ever joint drills in disputed waters putting aside their own overlapping claims in the waterway in order to foster mutual trust and enhance freedom of navigation.

In late August, the two nations took things one step further, with the announcement of their intent to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense cooperation before the end of this year. Security and defense ties have the potential to expand, and the two Asian middle powers could be well-positioned to form a de facto maritime alignment if and when this MoU materializes.

Maritime security is an important issue in bilateral relations. In his January visit to Hanoi, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. hailed Vietnam as “the sole strategic partner of the Philippines in the ASEAN region” and described maritime cooperation as “the foundation” of bilateral ties. Vietnamese news agencies played down the remarks, but noted that leaders from both sides underscored “the importance of preserving peace, stability, security, maritime safety, freedom of navigation and aviation in the South China Sea.”

Growing bonds between the Philippines and Vietnam, coupled with their territorial woes with Beijing, may prove the saying that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Does it hold true in the current context, though? The answer is complicated.

During Marcos’ visit to Hanoi in January, the two countries sealed two security deals on “maritime cooperation” between their coastguards and “incident prevention,” cementing the strategic partnership that was upgraded in 2015 and enhancing the coastguards’ capabilities to jointly run operations. These MoUs will be crucial in keeping the momentum of engagement and laying the groundwork for a future upgrade of diplomatic and defense ties, including the possibility of a comprehensive strategic partnership.

This middle-power teamwork showcases a degree of solidarity in the face of Beijing’s “divide and rule tactics,” augments mutual understanding in the face of Chinese hostility, and inspires external powers, like Australia and India, to become more actively involved in the region. If the Philippines and Vietnam work more closely together, it could set a precedent or a template for other nations with South China Sea shorelines to follow, thereby steering the dynamics of the region towards an environment that is stable and secure in terms of freedom of navigation.

However, this security collaboration is likely to remain more symbolic than substantive. While recent joint exercises are indicative of the advancement in bilateral security ties, these involve non-sensitive issues such as “firefighting, rescue, and medical response” along with operations relating to aerial surveillance and smooth communications between coastguard vessels. They have also involved just one ship from each nation. For the second exercise, the Philippine Coast Guard is set to dispatch a ship to Vietnam before year’s end, with activities centering on maritime law enforcement and search and rescue operations. Still, Vietnam is taking a prudent approach when it comes to cooperative activities in the South China Sea, judging by the magnitude of joint drills and the number of ships engaged.

The different approaches of the two sides was reflected in a Facebook post on August 30, from which the Philippine president cut a message thanking Vietnam “for supporting the Arbitral Award” – a reference to Manila’s 2016 South China Sea ruling against China. It remains unclear whether this redaction was made at the request of the Vietnamese side or at Marcos’ own discretion. Given that Vietnam, while “denouncing the illegal claims and activities in its East Sea,” as it refers to the South China Sea, and calling all parties to resolve disputes “through peaceful measures that are in line with international law,” has never explicitly stated its support for the Philippines’ historic ruling, this confusion seems to reflect Manila’s “over-expectation” of Hanoi and an effort by Marcos to rally domestic support.

Vietnam’s restraint in stepping up its substantial maritime engagement with the Philippines is predominantly driven by its geopolitical vulnerability. Its giant neighbor, China, has two means of exerting pressure on Vietnam: at sea and on land. In 1979, China launched a “punitive war” against Vietnam in which “hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops” crossed the country’s northern border, creating tens of thousands of casualties and a decade of strained relations between the two communist bedfellows. In March 1988, the Vietnam People’s Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy clashed in the Spratly Islands, during which 64 Vietnamese soldiers were killed as China occupied Johnson South Reef. Vietnam paid a high price on both occasions.

The Philippines, a small island nation with a security alliance with the United States, finds itself in a unique geopolitical position, with Manila primarily facing against China’s incremental expansion in the South China Sea. In June, the Philippines inked a key defense pact with Japan, making joint combat training possible and setting the scene for Tokyo to bolster Manila’s military capabilities to “defend its territorial interests in the South China Sea.” When compared to Vietnam, military alliances put the Philippines in a less precarious position, making it more emboldened to stand its ground in the face of Beijing’s “coercion, interference, and malign influence” at sea, as Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo Año put it in June.

As for Vietnam, both its high-risk environment and its multifaceted ties with China matter. Hence, pursuing meaningful engagement with the Philippines, such as joining naval drills with warfare training, conducting combat-oriented operations, or pursuing defense pacts, could expose Vietnam to the peril of China’s economic and military retaliation. Instead of defying China’s coercion, Vietnam has opposed China’s infringement of its sovereignty through diplomatic means while ensuring Beijing of Hanoi’s benign intentions.

Vietnam’s astute perceptions are palpable in its so-called non-aligned strategy, or “Four No’s” policy, which includes neither pursuing military alliances nor siding with one country against another. During his visit to Manila, Giang reiterated Vietnam’s “Four No’s” policy without mentioning China’s activities in disputed waters. Vietnam has continued to adopt a delicate balancing act, preferring to solve disagreements with China quietly rather than adopting Manila’s proactive and internationalized approach. On August 29, the Vietnamese and Chinese coastguards conducted joint patrols in the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin to preserve and develop the two nations’ “traditional and friendly neighborliness.”

In dealings with China, the Vietnamese government and military leaders have frequently reiterated the necessity of maintaining a “cool head” and not letting emotions cloud strategic calculations. Since the normalization of relations in November 1991, Vietnam has taken great care to avoid inciting public anti-China sentiment and irritating its large neighbor. This is because the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) benefits greatly from China’s support, and ideological ties remain important to the bilateral relationship, which consist of entwined government-to-government relations, party-to-party intimacy, and people-to-people ties.

In its relations with its Chinese “frenemy,” Vietnam has embraced a hedging strategy, which entails paying deference to China’s regional stature, seeking economic benefits with its giant neighbor, and simultaneously beefing up security ties with like-minded partners to counter any territorial encroachment. The “cooperation and struggle” approach is the underlying logic of Vietnam’s relations with China, given their “deep shared interests as well as deep mutual distrust.”

In the joint statement following CPV General Secretary and President To Lam’s debut visit to China in August, the two sides highlighted their “traditional friendship as both comrades and brothers” and vowed to “build the Vietnam-China community with a shared future that carries strategic significance.” The powerful Vietnamese party boss further stated that the bilateral relationship with China was a “top priority” for Hanoi. The political connotation here subtly acknowledges historical, geographical, and cultural ties between Vietnam and its northern neighbor and the enduring strategic weight of China in the eyes of Vietnamese leaders, despite their outstanding maritime disputes.

Considering the differing approaches Hanoi and Manila have taken to their runs-in with Beijing, as well as Vietnam’s love-hate relationship with China, the focus of observers may be on how much stronger the maritime ties between the two Southeast Asian partners can become.