Why Do Singapore and China Cooperate on Joint Maritime Exercises?

The renowned Singaporean historian Wang Gungwu observed that China has traditionally been a continental power, with Zheng He’s 15th-century maritime voyages as a notable exception. Following the Opium War in 1839, which highlighted China’s vulnerabilities to naval invasions, China focused on building a formidable navy and now boasts the world’s largest surface combatant fleet.

In contrast, Singapore has long identified as a maritime nation, evolving from a regional trading port in the 1400s to a key British naval base. Given its limited resources and small population, Singapore’s survival depends on its naval strength, and it now operates one of Southeast Asia’s most advanced navies.

Both nations recognize the importance of naval power for regional security. In September 2024, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) held their third and largest edition of Exercise Maritime Cooperation, a joint exercise initiated in 2015. According to Singapore’s Ministry of Defense and China’s Ministry of National Defense, the exercise aims to bolster bilateral defense relations and share best practices.

The most recent iteration took place amid heightened territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Singapore’s concerns about freedom of navigation. The 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey revealed that nearly 73 percent of Singaporeans are apprehensive about China’s growing influence and military assertiveness. This raises a key question: Why does Singapore continue to engage in naval exercises with China despite these concerns? What motivates China to participate in these exercises?

For Singapore, its participation signals a desire to remain neutral amidst the Sino-U.S. rivalry. For China, these exercises help build trust with Singapore and ensure the security of its sea lanes through the Strait of Malacca. At the same time, these maritime exercises are crucial in demonstrating China’s commitment to being a responsible power by addressing nontraditional security threats such as piracy and natural disasters.

Singapore: Signaling Neutrality and Relevance

Singapore conducts joint military exercises with China to maintain its neutrality amid the growing Sino-U.S. competition, a practice that has been in place since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1990. During the 1990s, Singapore supported the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia to balance against external threats by signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) allowing the United States to use its naval and air bases for logistics and resupply, especially after the U.S. closed its naval base in the Philippines’ Subic Bay. These facilities later played a role in supporting the U.S. Global War on Terrorism following the 9/11 attacks.

However, by the mid-1990s to early 2000s, Singapore recognized China’s rising economic and military influence, exemplified by the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, and became concerned about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea affecting sea lanes crucial for its trade. Instead of counterbalancing China, Singapore opted to maintain positive bilateral relations to ensure a stable regional security environment conducive to its development.

Singapore signed the Agreement on Defense Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADSEC) with China in 2008 to enhance bilateral defense ties. The agreement, which formalized activities like reciprocal port calls and introduced new cooperation areas such as humanitarian assistance, led to the inaugural Exercise Cooperation in Guilin, Guangxi. Initially involving 60 soldiers from both countries, this exercise focused on counterterrorism and event security. Over time, the scale of the exercise expanded to include 240 soldiers.

However, the intensification of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, beginning with then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” in 2009 and China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, raised concerns within Singapore about being forced to choose between Beijing and Washington, particularly in the maritime domain. While the United States remains Singapore’s primary arms supplier and training partner, Singapore has made efforts to reassure China that it will not take sides in the emerging tensions between these great powers.

It was in this context that Singapore and China initiated Exercise Maritime Cooperation in 2015 to deepen their bilateral defense relationship and foster trust and understanding. The naval exercises also provide Singapore with a platform to emphasize the importance of freedom of navigation for its security and trade, while addressing common nontraditional security threats such as piracy.

The naval exercises have become increasingly significant for Singapore, given China’s ongoing concerns about Singapore’s neutrality. China has long perceived Singapore as too closely aligned with the United States, as evidenced by Singapore’s participation in high-profile U.S.-led multilateral exercises such as Cobra Gold in Thailand and Super Garuda Shield in Indonesia.

This concern was heightened after then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s 2016 speech criticizing China’s refusal to adhere to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruling on the South China Sea dispute. That same year, China-Singapore relations were further strained by the seizure of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Terrex armored vehicles in Hong Kong due to China’s displeasure over Singapore’s continued military exercises in Taiwan, which China considers its territory.

In 2019, Singapore and China signed the Enhanced ADSEC, following the extension of the 2019 Singapore-U.S. MOU, which aimed to expand the scale of China-Singapore bilateral military exercises and deepen defense cooperation.

The 2024 iteration of Exercise Maritime Cooperation was the largest of the three conducted to date and it took place immediately after Singapore’s participation in the U.S.-led Super Garuda Shield exercises, reflecting Singapore’s efforts to maintain a balance between China and the United States.

The exercise involved the PLAN’s latest Type 054A frigate Sanya, and the Type 082-II minesweeper Hejian, as well as the RSN’s Formidable-class frigate RSS Stalwart. The joint military exercise involved two phases, an offshore table-top planning exercise, and a shore exercise involving search and rescue (SAR), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cross-deck helicopter landings, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) exercises.

China: Security Through Cooperation

For China, the Strait of Malacca, with Singapore strategically positioned at its center, has long been identified as a vulnerable chokepoint for its security and trade. In 2003, China’s then-President Hu Jintao highlighted the “Malacca Dilemma,” a scenario in which the strait could be blockaded during a military contingency. Despite China’s efforts to mitigate this risk through overland routes in Central and South Asia, 90 percent of China’s trade and 80 percent of its oil imports still travel by sea, creating significant vulnerabilities.

Given Singapore’s central location in the Malacca Strait, China views Exercise Maritime Cooperation as a key component of its strategy to maintain friendly relations with Singapore, ensuring its neutrality amid Sino-U.S. competition and securing the strait during emergencies. Through these naval exercises, China aims to communicate its vulnerabilities to Singapore and alleviate concerns about its naval buildup and expanding power projection capabilities.

Regionally, the 2024 Exercise Maritime Cooperation took place against the backdrop of China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors. By engaging in joint naval exercises with Singapore, China seeks to deflect criticism of its assertiveness in the South China Sea and underscore its commitment to a cooperative regional order by addressing common nontraditional security threats such as piracy, smuggling, and natural disasters.

Limitations and Broader Implications

The scale of the joint military exercises between Singapore and China is likely to remain limited, focusing primarily on nontraditional security threats. Currently, Singapore’s naval exercises with China are relatively modest compared to its participation in U.S.-led multilateral naval exercises such as RIMPAC, which encompass a broad range of combat and non-combat activities. This limited scope is partly due to Singapore’s delicate balancing act between China and the United States and the lack of interoperability between the two navies. Singapore is aware that conducting combat exercises with China could raise concerns within the United States, its preferred defense partner, while excessive alignment with Washington might exacerbate China’s doubts about Singapore’s neutrality amid the Sino-U.S. rivalry.

For China, the Maritime Cooperation exercises serve not only to build friendly relations with Singapore but also to ensure the security of the Malacca Strait. Regionally, China aims to showcase its commitment to regional peace and stability by addressing nontraditional security issues. However, for these efforts to be effective, China must also address its territorial disputes with its neighbors through diplomatic means.