Letter from the Editors

Governments, unfortunately, don’t time their elections with our publishing schedule in mind. Five days after this issue goes live, the citizens of the United States will cast their votes for president, choosing either to promote Vice President Kamala Harris to the top spot, or to return former President Donald Trump to the White House.

Asia is watching closely.

In this issue, we explore some of the ways policymaking in Washington impacts Asian governments and peoples. From the U.S. alliance network in Asia to the intricate, and critical, supply chains that generate this century’s most important technology, and the convoluted course of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in South Asia, U.S. policy decisions will impact Asia’s security, economic, political, and human rights landscape.

In our cover article, Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at RAND and a professor at the University of Southern California, argues that “the popular notion that the November 5 election represents an inflection point for U.S. foreign policy is vastly overstated, at least in the Indo-Pacific.” Instead, he traces the continuity of U.S. alliances in the region – with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand – under both the Trump and Biden administrations. “U.S. alliance engagement has been exceptionally strong in recent years, and will be very difficult to undo no matter what a future administration might decide in the Indo-Pacific,” Grossman concludes.

Another area where U.S. policy is having a direct impact on the Indo-Pacific is Washington’s effort to “de-risk” supply chains – including weaning the critical semiconductor industry off a reliance on Taiwan, while preventing China from gaining market share. Southeast Asian governments are hoping to reap the benefits, by either breaking into the chip industry or moving up the value chain. James Guild, a specialist in trade, finance, and economic development in Southeast Asia, outlines the complex and intertwined nature of the semiconductor industry, highlighting the roles of countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. While few countries in Southeast Asia are interested in taking sides in the China-U.S. competition, they are keen to cooperate with the U.S. effort to diversify chip supply chains.

One of the most marked differences between Harris and Trump is the former’s emphasis on the ideology of democracy and human rights. Trump is far more comfortable embracing authoritarians, even praising them for their supposed efficiency and wisdom. That has implications for U.S. democracy promotion efforts abroad. From India’s perspective, however, the U.S. insistence on democratic values is largely seen as a fig leaf for the hard-nosed pursuit of national interest – an argument, ironically, bolstered by the Biden administration’s willingness to soft-pedal criticisms of India’s Modi government. S.D. Muni, a professor emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University, outlines three case studies in South Asia: one where India backed pro-democracy revolutionary forces and the U.S. didn’t, one where both New Delhi and Washington found common cause is supporting the ouster of an authoritarian-leaning president, and one where the U.S. welcomed regime change while India resisted it. These examples help tease out the divergences in national interests between the world’s oldest and largest democracies.

We hope you enjoy these stories and the many more in the following pages.