‘Not Welcome’: China’s ICBM Test Raised Alarms in the Pacific Islands

In late September, China fired an unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean between the northern islands of French Polynesia and the southern islands of Kiribati, highlighting its long-range nuclear capabilities and marking the first such test in more than 40 years. The U.S. response was relatively muted, with a Pentagon spokesperson saying that it was “a good thing” that Washington received prior notice of the launch.

But for Pacific Island countries and territories, which were not notified, the ICBM test underscored their concerns about growing China-U.S. competition. Pacific Island leaders fear that their region, which still carries the scars of World War II and nuclear testing, could be drawn into a future conflict in Asia. These concerns are unlikely to fade as China holds military exercises around Taiwan and the United States prepares to bolster its defenses on Guam.

Pacific Island leaders are intensely aware of the costs they bear when Oceania becomes a battleground between external powers: from the unexploded ordnance and wreckage of World War II to the waste created by nuclear testing, the region is littered with reminders of this reality. China’s ICBM was capable of delivering a strategic nuclear warhead, also reminding regional leaders that if the United States and China go to war, it could become nuclear.

How Did Regional Leaders Respond?

Just days before the ICBM test, Fiji published a foreign policy white paper that described a climate of “uncertainty and risk” due to China-U.S. competition, and asserted that “a stable Indo-Pacific region is Fiji’s highest strategic priority.” The document pointed to “the painful legacy of nuclear testing in the Pacific” that “has instilled a deep awareness of the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” After China’s ICBM launch, Fiji President Ratu Viliame Katonivere called for “respect” for the Pacific region and the “cessation of such action.” Fiji recognizes China, so Katonivere’s directness was notable.

Palau, which recognizes Taiwan, also criticized the ICBM test. In late September, Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. said Beijing owed the region an explanation. He also said that the test was not peaceful, as China had claimed, and that given the missile’s range, China “could strike any one of us in the Pacific.” Geopolitics is one of the key issues on the agenda ahead of Palau’s presidential election in November. Whipps and his opponent, former president Tommy Remengesau, have debated whether an increasing U.S. military presence in Palau – which is about 1,285 kilometers southwest of Guam – could protect the Pacific country or make it a target for China in a future war.

Baron Waqa, the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), echoed concerns about escalation in early October, saying that geopolitical competition was “not welcomed” by the members of the PIF. In August, he said that the Pacific Islands don’t want the United States and China to “fight in our backyard,” adding, “We are a peaceful region.”

Kiribati delivered its own criticism in early October despite its otherwise close relationship with China. The Office of the President said that Kiribati was not given prior notice, and “does not welcome China’s recent ICBM test.” While previous news reports said that the ICBM fell in international waters, New Zealand’s 1News reported on October 2, a week after the test, that it splashed down within Kiribati’s exclusive economic zone.

Kiribati’s statement continued, “The high seas in the Pacific are not isolated pockets of oceans, they are part of our Blue Pacific Continent and are parts of Kiribati and therefore we appeal to all countries involved in weapon testing to stop these acts to maintain world peace and stability.” Kiribati switched recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019 under President Taneti Maamau, who is seeking reelection this month and has overwhelmingly welcomed China’s engagement.

Just as Kiribati wanted to receive prior notice, so did French Polynesia, but China isn’t the only one to blame for the oversight. France was notified before the launch, but French Polynesian President Moetai Brotherson said he was not, and that he would seek clarification from both China’s diplomatic representative and French President Emmanuel Macron. It is unclear why Macron did not inform Brotherson.

The development comes as France’s Pacific territories become increasingly restive – particularly New Caledonia, which has experienced political instability since May – and as the PIF continues to support discussion of decolonization. France’s handling of the ICBM launch doesn’t help with its reputation as a colonial power or its overall relationship with French Polynesia.

While the countries that recognize Beijing will continue to welcome its engagement and assistance, regional leaders have probably criticized China more for its ICBM test than anything else in recent years, even more than its controversial security agreement with Solomon Islands in 2022. And since most Pacific Island leaders tend to avoid criticizing China, it’s worth exploring why this was an exception, and what lessons the United States can draw from Beijing’s mistakes.

What Lessons Can the U.S. Learn?

While China claimed that the test was not aimed at any country or target, in reality it was probably meant to demonstrate China’s military capability and to send a message to the United States and its partners. Pacific Island leaders know they weren’t the target, but that doesn’t lessen their concern. During the Cold War, the United States and its allies used the Pacific Islands as a nuclear testing ground to compete with the Soviet Union, and it was Pacific Islanders who suffered the consequences. During World War II, Pacific Islanders paid the price of a conflict that was not of their making. In other words, the Pacific Islands weren’t the primary targets of these conflicts, but they became battlegrounds anyway.

China also said that the “relevant countries” had received notice prior to the test. Beijing considered the United States and France to be “relevant countries,” but Kiribati and others didn’t make the cut. Not only did China fail to notify regional leaders of the ICBM test in their own ocean, it then implied that they are irrelevant. This sent a message that Pacific Island leaders have heard too many times before: that world powers can use the Pacific to project power and threaten their adversaries without seeing the islands as players in their own region.

The United States should learn from China’s mistakes and treat the Pacific Islands as relevant countries when it comes to its own military activity and presence in the region. It has already been seen how the announcement of AUKUS was met with regional outcry. Some Pacific Island leaders welcome a greater U.S. military footprint in the region, but others are concerned that it could precipitate an arms race and make them targets in a future conflict. This is an issue that the United States should handle carefully to avoid creating further mistrust as it implements its regional strategy, which is only two years old.

The United States traditionally views its own military buildup as defensive, while seeing China’s military buildup as offensive, but it should not assume that Pacific Island countries share that perspective. For example, Pacific Island leaders are likely to see U.S. military buildup on Guam as escalating regional tensions, including missile testing that is expected to begin there later this year. If Washington says that such buildup is defensive and is not aimed at any one nation, it is unlikely to sway Pacific Island leaders, who remain concerned about being caught in the potential crossfire.

There are lessons to be learned from France’s mistakes, too. Paris didn’t notify French Polynesia about the ICBM test, reflecting a mindset that its own territories don’t need to know what’s happening even when it affects them. The other question is whether dependent territories should have a say in policy when it directly impacts them. There is a debate occurring in New Caledonia about whether France’s military bases make it safer or make it a target, and how this dynamic figures into the territory’s political future. Pacific Island countries have become increasingly vocal in their support of New Caledonia’s decolonization and independence, and France’s regional reputation has taken a hit due to its handling of the crisis there.

Similar discussions are playing out in Guam: does the U.S. military presence make it safer or make it a target? Whatever one’s stance on the issue, the fact is that Guam doesn’t get a say in its role in U.S. defense posture. Not only do Pacific Island countries want the United States and China to treat them as relevant players in their own region, they also want the dependent territories of the region to be treated as such, because all of them, regardless of political status, could pay the price of a conflict between the United States and China. Pacific Island countries will be watching closely to see if Washington listens to perspectives from Guam – or uses it like a chess piece in its competition with Beijing.