Evolution, Not Revolution

This has been a big year for Japanese defense and security policy. Specifically, the decision by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government to reinterpret Japan’s post-World War II constitutional ban on collective self-defense and Abe’s interest in forging defense partnerships across the region highlight Japan’s changing role in the Asia-Pacific. These initiatives are an attempt to revise Japan’s defense posture in an evolving security context in Asia, defined largely by a confident and expansionist China. The final step for Japan in this process will be to update the terms of its defense cooperation with the United States to meet contemporary challenges. How Japan and the United States manage their alliance going forward will be crucial for the region.

To that end, U.S. and Japanese defense officials have been hard at work in the latter half of 2014 to update their 17-year-old defense cooperation guidelines, which set out the terms of U.S.-Japanese cooperation during times of war and crisis within the framework of their 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The decision to revisit the terms of the guidelines was made in October 2013, preceding much of the Abe government’s initiatives on defense in 2014. According to one U.S. official, the new guidelines will “capture the greater scope of [U.S.-Japan] alliance cooperation, reflecting its more global nature.” Given that Japan’s post-war military has traditionally not operated outside of its immediate geographic environs, the stress on the “global” nature of the U.S.-Japan environment signals a considerable shift in Japanese defense policy.

Indeed, the interim report released in early October highlights a series of other ambitions in Japan’s defense cooperation with the United States. According to the report, the new defense guidelines will emphasize “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses,” “cooperation with other regional partners,” “synergy across the two government’s national security policies,” and “a whole-of-government Alliance approach.” All of this is reassuring, but the fact remains that the overall contours of the alliance will likely remain the same. Also, the report is careful to specify that “the Guidelines will not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, or administrative measures, nor will the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government.” At best, the new defense guidelines will be an evolutionary change, accommodating Japan’s newfound desire for “proactive pacifism,” as the Abe administration puts it, and the United States’ desire for Asian allies that take on additional responsibility in maintaining their region’s stability and security.

Since the release of the interim report, it has become clear that political obstacles in Japan will prevent a finalization of the new defense guidelines by the end of 2014 as scheduled. Specifically, Japan will require additional time to legislate the contours of its newfound ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense.

Throughout its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been described by a series of metaphors. Initially, in the 1970s, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces described a “hedgehog defense” strategy for Japan. The metaphor evokes a particularly benign rodent with a non-threatening bite who nonetheless remains protected from would-be predators from every angle thanks to its spines. The 1980s saw the metaphor shift, taking into account the United States’ role in Japan’s defense posture. Following consultations between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in the early 1980s, a “spear and shield” metaphor came into popular use. The United States military would be the “spear” paired with Japan’s “shield.” Finally, in the late 1980s, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone briefly and controversially alluded to Japan’s role as the United States “unsinkable aircraft carrier” – a metaphor that harkens back to the United States’ island-hopping Pacific campaign against Japan during World War II.

Japanese officials would like this update to the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines to lead to a gradual shift in how the alliance evolves. According to several reports, Japanese negotiators remain unconvinced about the United States’ commitment to Japan. Despite overt guarantees by U.S. President Barack Obama during his April 2014 visit to Japan that the United States would defend Japanese territory from outside aggression, including the Senkaku Islands, the Japanese side has a sense of bearing too much risk for too little reward in the ongoing defense guideline negotiations.

This might ultimately bear little importance, however. Heading into 2015, it seems that tensions between China and Japan, especially regarding their territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, are easing. Neither side is attempting to escalate the situation with either rhetoric or action, and the probability of military miscalculation is considerably smaller now as a result. Beijing, for its part, opened the door to high-level diplomatic contact with Japan after almost two months of no contact. This is good news for the United States, which has the potential to be drawn into a conflict involving China and Japan. Though matters could quickly worsen with an end-of-year prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (as was the case at the end of 2013) or a move by Japan to intentionally militarize the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Sino-Japanese stability is a welcome development as the U.S. and Japan update their defense guidelines.

For both the United States and Japan, the best approach to finalizing a set of mutually beneficial defense guidelines is a measured and patient approach. Negotiators on both sides need to consider that the reason the defense guidelines are being revised at all is due to both countries’ reaction to a rising China. Getting the defense cooperation guidelines right will be important. After all, the alliance between the United States and Japan has been one of the defining geopolitical constants of the post-war Asia-Pacific. Maintaining that relationship will not only benefit the U.S. and Japan, but all regional players looking to safeguard Asia’s status quo order.