Mike Green & Zack Cooper on the Asia Rebalance

Three years ago, U.S. President Barack Obama introduced the pivot, later rebranded as a rebalance, to the Asia-Pacific as a guiding strategy for the United States. In the intervening years, the strategy has attracted its share of support and skepticism at home and throughout Asia. Broadly, the rebalance strategy targets three core elements: security, prosperity and values. In a December 2014 report, Assessing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance, David J. Berteau, Michael J. Green, and Zack Cooper of the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed the security element by evaluating both public statements and tangible evidence of the implementation of the U.S. rebalance strategy.

The Diplomat had a chance to talk with two of the authors, Michael J. Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS and an associate professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and Zack Cooper, a fellow with the Japan Chair at CSIS, about the report’s findings.

Broadly speaking, how has the Asia rebalance strategy shifted since it was first introduced three years ago? What factors have influenced the shift?

The rebalance has evolved over the last three years. [Then] Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton’s Foreign Policy article explained the general concept behind the pivot (and later rebalance) to Asia, but no central U.S. government strategy document has guided the effort. Instead, the rebalance has been reflected in the president’s interest in the region and a series of statements and speeches, as well as documents such as the Defense Strategic Guidance. In our research we have found that the rebalance has been articulated inconsistently, particularly in the last two years. The most important developments, though, are progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the president’s speech in early December, which increased the prospects that TPP will actually be negotiated and supported politically in Washington. Increased engagement with regional allies and partners on security, such as the Defense Guidelines Review with Japan, are also a critical part of the rebalance and will require sustained attention and commitment from leaders in the Administration and on Capitol Hill.

A large section of the report is dedicated to examining regional perspectives. You note that while there appears to be substantial elite support, many regional governments are reluctant to comment publicly. Why the hesitation?

Although many regional states have expressed public support for the rebalance, a number of our partners have been hesitant to endorse it publicly. There are multiple reasons for this hesitation, but perhaps the most pervasive is concern, particularly in Southeast Asia, that expressing support for the U.S. rebalance might somehow be seen as siding with the United States against China. Some have interpreted this cautiousness on the part of some partners as an implicit critique of the rebalance policy. Yet, many of these states have worked very closely, if quietly, to encourage strengthened engagement from the United States on shared interests such as security, prosperity, and common values. In polling of “strategic elites” in Asia, we find strong support for the rebalance from most states in the region, with the notable exception of China.

A simplistic reading of the rebalance strategy is as a containment policy aimed at hemming in or hedging against China’s regional ambitions. In what ways is China a target, a potential partner, and an obstacle to the strategy?

It is definitely not containment. During the Cold War U.S. trade with Moscow was well below 1 percent of overall trade, but today China accounts for 15 percent of U.S. trade. We and the Chinese are making each other rich – that is hardly containment. However, the administration is responsible for causing some confusion about exactly what their objectives are in the Pacific. Recent U.S. policy toward China has been personality and event dependent. As a result, the administration has at times been accused of containment and at other times blamed for appeasement. In reality, the main theme of U.S. China policy has been one of continuity. But the articulation of policy has definitely been a problem. For example, many in the region have noted a difference between Secretary Clinton’s critique of China’s labeling of the South China Sea as a “core interest” and the administration’s more recent reference to constructing a “new model of great power relations” with China. On the whole, the administration has set a positive trajectory with Beijing since the president’s APEC visit in November. John Podesta’s work on a climate change agreement was a success and increasing military-to-military ties and agreements are also helpful. None of these steps are transformational, but they all help.

Ashton Carter has been nominated to be the next secretary of defense, what does this mean for the Asia rebalance?

Secretary of Defense nominee Ashton Carter’s nomination is looked on favorably by many in the defense and Asia communities. Carter is well known for his technical proficiency, and he was involved with a number of positive rebalance efforts while serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense, such as outreach to India. In his confirmation hearing, Carter will no doubt be asked many questions about how he intends to prioritize Asia as compared to other parts of the world, but to date Carter and the Department of Defense have led the charge on the rebalance. There are additional steps that can be taken to modernize U.S. alliances in Asia, to work more closely with emerging partners, and to improve U.S. military capabilities in the region, but if anything, some in the region worry that the rebalance has been too focused on the military. Supporting other efforts, such as TPP, will be vital over the administration’s last two years.

After taking stock of the security element of the rebalance in your report, what is your general sense of its overall success?

On the security portions of the rebalance, the United States gets fairly good marks. An “A-” for the U.S.-Japan alliance, but progress on the Defense Guidelines Review will be an important measuring stick as the two sides prepare for a late April summit. A “B+” on Korea – it was a good decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea, but the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance’s role in Asia is still being debated and several vital capabilities, such as missile defense, are in the balance. On Southeast Asia and Australia, the Administration also gets high marks for improving ties, particularly with Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore (as well as improving relations with Myanmar), although in many cases we are pushing on an open door and the political and technological absorption capacity on the other side for U.S. defense cooperation is limited. One area where the Administration and the Congress get low marks is on the defense budget, which is an important signal to both allies and adversaries in Asia. We are nearing the point where the United States will have to choose between the Advanced Capability and Deterrence Panel’s high technology future capabilities and the capacity of the current force. This can’t be a choice – we need to do both. There are two vital areas in which the Administration and Congress should work together over the next few years: the defense budget and TPP.