Understanding China’s Maritime Silk Road

According to a grand diplomatic proclamation, 2015 is the Year of China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation. That includes, in part, a renewed focus on completing projects under the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund – projects that Beijing will almost certainly link to its own vision for the Maritime Silk Road. The oceanic twin of an overland route passing through Central Asia, the Maritime Silk Road is China’s vision for a chain of commercial ports stretching from eastern China through the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean up to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

It’s no coincidence that this trade route is vital to Chinese interests. In particular, as many commentators have noted, more than one-third of China’s oil demand is met by imports that pass through the Strait of Malacca, making this an easily identifiable chokepoint. Beijing has attempted to reduce its reliance on shipping lanes, particularly those as easily blocked as the Strait, through the construction of overland pipelines connecting China to Russia, Myanmar and Turkmenistan. But while hedging energy bets in this way can reduce the scope of the problem, it can’t entirely free China from reliance on the maritime trade routes of Southeast Asia.

For all the U.S. concern about China using its “nine dash line” claim to block freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Beijing is equally worried about the possibility of an American blockade cutting off trade. Forestalling such an eventuality is one of China’s top goals when it comes to maritime diplomacy. The Maritime Silk Road, at heart, is China’s effort to project control – not through military presence, but through China’s leadership of a new global trade network.

The famous “string of pearls” theory posits that China is seeking to develop ports that could double as overseas bases for the PLA Navy. A recent study by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici of the Institute for National Strategic Studies found little evidence, either physically or rhetorically, to suggest that China is actively pursuing the use of commercial ports as military bases for the PLAN. Instead, China seems genuine in insisting that ports along the Maritime Silk Road (like those under development in Sri Lanka and Pakistan) are intended for commercial use alone.

China’s interest in establishing a series of interconnected ports in the South China Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Indian Ocean is undeniably strategic, but not necessarily in the military sense. Rather, China wants to create an integrated trade network that will expand the amount of trade flowing through the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea – trade that benefits not only China, but the multitude of nations from Southeast Asia to Europe that have bought into the Maritime Silk Road vision. Instead of military control, China is seeking economic dominance over this vital shipping lane.

The problem for China, however, is that some of its neighbors – some of which are geographically critical for the project – are reluctant to join in. India, for example, has steadfastly refrained from committing to the Maritime Silk Road, despite a heavy emphasis on the project during Xi Jinping’s tour of South Asia in September 2013. Tanvi Madan of Brookings, speaking to The Diplomat, speculated at the time that initial Chinese talk of providing $100 billion in investment in India might have been largely intended to fund infrastructure improvements related to the Maritime Silk Road. China’s actual offer of $20 billion in financing may have been a direct result of India’s unwillingness to join the project. Beijing has a long way to go to convince India that the Maritime Silk Road is not an attempt at encirclement.

Without Indian buy-in, China is putting its hopes on two other Indian Ocean countries – the Maldives and Sri Lanka. These two smaller countries, free of the baggage of competition with China (perceived or otherwise) that marks India, have eagerly accepted the chance to be involved in the Maritime Silk Road. Still, while the Maldives and Sri Lanka provide geographical anchors for the route, they don’t bring the sort of geopolitical prestige that Indian cooperation would.

Meanwhile, the Maritime Silk Road also has some speedbumps to overcome even closer to home. In ASEAN, China has buy-in from Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia, but Vietnam and the Philippines will be trickier to enroll. Both logically should be included in the project, but their long coastlines have also made them rival claimants, along with China, over a number of islets and other maritime features in the South China sea leading to tensions and mistrust.

In the case of the Philippines, China seemed to be purposefully excluding Manila from the route, most likely to show Beijing’s displeasure with the arbitration case the Philippine government filed regarding China’s “nine dash line.” When mainstream Western media began reporting as much, Beijing quickly clarified that Manila was welcome to join in – but as yet, the Philippines has not been offered the large amounts of infrastructure funding other Maritime Silk Road partners enjoy. As the Philippines lies well east of the main Maritime Silk Road route, Manila’s participation in not crucial. However, excluding the Philippines will only increase existing suspicions that Beijing’s intentions are not entirely altruistic.

The story with Vietnam is more complex. Hanoi and Beijing are trying to patch up their relationship after a rocky period in summer 2014, when China deployed an oil rig in waters Vietnam claims as its Exclusive Economic Zone. A map of the proposed Maritime Silk Road published by Xinhua shows a stop in Hanoi, but the Vietnamese government has not yet officially embraced the initiative. Like India, Vietnam is reluctant to buy into the Chinese project, details of which remain fuzzy, given territorial tensions. In fact, Vietnam is actively building up its navy in the hopes of deterring Chinese adventurism within waters Hanoi claims for itself. That puts a damper on the possibility that Vietnam will welcome Chinese investments in naval infrastructure, even for commercial purposes.

The progress of the Maritime Silk Road encapsulates regional ambivalence about China’s intentions for the region. Countries that largely see Beijing as a benevolent source of economic aid, like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and several of the ASEAN states, are eager to join in. Those countries that see China as aggressive or irredentist are less inclined to embrace the plan.