Van Jackson

On January 6, an earthquake was detected in northeast Asia, its epicenter located in North Korea. Observers almost immediately noted that the shaking was a man-made event rather than the actual violent shifting of the earth. Shortly after, North Korea claimed it had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb – a claim dismissed by the international community. The seismic yield of the detonation was reported as 4.9 by China’s Earthquake Networks Center and as 5.1 by the U.S. Geological Survey. Both estimates place the detonation yield as close to that of Pyongyang’s February 2013 nuclear test, which involved a non-thermonuclear device. The location of the test was also traced to coordinates near the site of the 2013 test, both close to the nuclear facility at Punggye-ri.

North Korea’s nuclear program is a point of great tension in northeast Asia. The latest test, while not necessarily as advanced as Pyongyang claimed, nonetheless demonstrates that North Korea hasn’t given up its nuclear ambitions just yet.

The Diplomat talked to Van Jackson, an associate professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, about the fallout of North Korea’s latest nuclear test.

What does North Korea’s latest test tell us about Pyongyang’s nuclear program and its intentions?

The test confirms that North Korea’s rhetoric about its strategic intentions can be taken at face value (a subject I take up in my book, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations). No serious Korea watcher doubted that North Korea intended to develop an advanced nuclear capability prior to this test, and many are increasingly convinced it’s moving toward a mutually assured destruction capability. This latest test simply confirms that. The implication, of course, is that there can be no serious denuclearization negotiations with North Korea; the best that can be achieved through negotiations is a kind of strategic stability, arms control, or nuclear reduction. 

North Korea says it tested a hydrogen bomb, but international observers are extremely skeptical of the claim. How do we know what kind of bomb was tested?

Most people are skeptical about the hydrogen claim for two reasons. The first is that hydrogen bombs have much larger explosive yields than fission bombs and the most recent test didn’t register as nearly large enough. The second reason is that a hydrogen detonation would force us to conclude that North Korea had mastered nuclear fusion, which is highly complex. So the smart money is on North Korea overhyping its capability.

But there are also three problems with this line of reasoning, even if it’s ultimately correct. First, even if North Korea had only tested a fission bomb, the fact that it’s laying out discursive markers about a hydrogen capability implies that’s the direction it’s moving; whether it happens in the present or in the near future should be irrelevant from a policy planning perspective. Second, it’s widely understood among nuclear experts that North Korea may have conducted a “boosted fission” nuclear test, in which case the yield wouldn’t be the same as an ideal-type hydrogen test but would involve a grain of truth about North Korea’s claim of hydrogen testing. Third, doubting North Korea’s nuclear capability on the grounds that hydrogen would be too advanced for them is a fool’s wager; North Korea has repeatedly shown it’s capable of acquiring modern and sophisticated capabilities, if not indigenously then at least by importing expertise (from Iran or Pakistan, for example). 

The United States had previously undertaken several measures in response to North Korea’s developing nuclear program, including sanctions. What does the test say/not say about the utility of these measures?

U.S. measures in response to North Korean behavior – whether nuclear tests, missile tests, or militarized violence – have always served the purpose of signaling our enmity toward North Korea, but not our resolve to bring meaningful coercive pressure to bear on North Korea. This is an historical phenomenon going back to the 1960s that I document in great detail in my latest book. We’ve generally shown an unwillingness to hazard risks when confronted with a North Korean act of belligerence, but when we’re at a safe distance from crisis, we’ve been more than willing to take measures that send “bad guy” signals to North Korea, but that no reasonable person would expect to change the decision-making calculus in Pyongyang. Sanctions, B-52 deployments, ramped up military exercises are all political signals that North Korea discounts to the point of triviality.

What steps have the United States and South Korea taken thus far in response to the nuclear test?

There’s a promise of greater sanctions on the table, and the deployment of more U.S. “strategic assets.”  South Korea’s resumed propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The question is whether these or other measures will signal enmity/hostility or resolve? Their fleeting nature and the lack of costs they impose on North Korean elites implies strongly that they’re little more than meager signals of enmity. 

What do you see as the next steps for the parties involved?

The Peninsula has become a powder keg. There’s very little room for maneuver now, and micro-decisions about what capability to deploy or what White House public statement to craft will do nothing to change the strategic situation. As long as circumstances in North Korea remain what they are, we’re on a trajectory that gradually erodes the ability to deter North Korea from attacks large and small, to say nothing of preventing nuclear tests. Most people – even Korea watchers – don’t appreciate just how dangerous current circumstances have become, or the degree to which alliance decisions over time have gradually boxed in future alliance decision-makers.

The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, DKI-APCSS, or the U.S. government.