Changing China’s Mind on North Korea

Just after North Korea conducted its nuclear test on January 6, calls began anew for China to help force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. It’s part of the same pattern we’ve seen since the first nuclear test in 2006: U.S. outrage at North Korea morphs into dismay over China’s unwillingness to bring substantial pressure to bear on its neighbor. In the end, both sides settle for sanctions that are largely a symbolic indication of displeasure – and do little to stop North Korea from continuing its nuclear and missile experiments.

The focus on China started early, with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry suggesting on January 7 that China’s approach had been a failure, and that the United States was going to demand more from Beijing. “China had a particular approach that it wanted to make, and we agreed and respected to give them space to be able to implement that,” Kerry said. “But today in my conversation with the Chinese, I made it very clear: That has not worked and we cannot continue business as usual.”

But actually getting movement from China on the Korean nuclear issue will take a lot more than declarations that “we cannot continue business as usual.” Before U.S. policymakers can convince China to change its approach, they must first understand China’s interests in North Korea, how they differ from those of the United States, and how that difference blocks cooperation. Only by clearly grasping these factors can we understand how to use Beijing’s own interests to leverage a new approach to North Korea.

For U.S. analysts, the frustrating thing about the North Korean nuclear issues is that every country with a stake in the security environment of Northeast Asia – with the exception of Pyongyang itself – agrees on the fundamental point that North Korea should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. The problem comes from the different priorities different countries place on achieving the goal of denuclearization, not from the goal itself. As long-time State Department nonproliferation expert Ambassador Joseph DeThomas put it in a recent briefing hosted by 38 North, China’s “hierarchy of negative outcomes” on the Korean peninsula does not match the United States’. That is, China considers a nuclear Pyongyang a bad outcome – but not as bad as regime collapse, with the instability and chaos that would cause along China’s northeastern border. For the United States, the opposite is true.

Like any country, China’s primary concern is domestic affairs. Any major crisis in North Korea, from famine to a collapse of the current Kim Jong-un regime, would undeniably spill over to affect Liaoning and Jilin, the two Chinese provinces that border North Korea. In the case of widespread instability in North Korea, China’s greatest fear is a mass exodus of North Koreans into China – including refugees as well as criminals. Already, there are occasional reports of North Korean deserters crossing the border to rob or even murder Chinese citizens; things would get much worse if the North Korean government lost control.

There’s also the consideration that the Kim regime is unlikely to go quietly, meaning China could be in for a protracted conflict, including the possibility of guerrilla or even terrorist-style attacks, right next door. Add in the fact that China’s northeast – the Chinese “rust belt” – is already suffering from an economic downturn that would be exacerbated by chaos in North Korea, and you have a convincing argument for why China would do almost anything to prevent a failed North Korean state.

U.S. analysts tends to focus on this aspect of China’s interests in North Korea, and hope that they can convince Beijing that a nuclear North Korea is actually the worst possible outcome, even from China’s strategic perspective. There are a few ways to do that. One is convincing China that a collapsed North Korea wouldn’t be as bad as expected, for example, by promising substantial aid to assist with refugee relocation and border control. The other is to convince Beijing that a nuclear North Korea would be a worse outcome than China’s leaders currently believe – achieved most easily by detailing the changes in U.S. security posture that would take place should North Korea be deemed to have the nuclear capability to strike the American homeland. Beijing’s opposition to the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea gives some indication of how dangerous it would deem the deployment of U.S. B-52s or other nuclear-capable assets on the Korean peninsula as part of an upgraded deterrent.

The problem with this rationale is that while it does raise the stakes of allowing North Korea to go nuclear, it actually works against the United States when it comes to another important Chinese interest. Put simply, Chinese analysts continue to view North Korea as a “buffer state” that separates Chinese territory from a staunch U.S. ally. In addition to the domestic concerns that would accompany regime collapse, China is also worried that a unified Korean peninsula would be a direct threat to its security interests, particularly if U.S. troops were to be deployed north of the 38th parallel.

On this point, U.S. analysts have been less willing to work to change Beijing’s strategic logic. Doing so would require great efforts to reassure Beijing that a unified Korea would not be a threatening outcome – for example, by providing guarantees that the U.S. military presences on the Peninsula would not change (except, perhaps to decrease, as the North Korean threat would be effectively neutralized). But given the deep-seated mistrust between China and the United States, Washington has been reluctant to give such assurances, and Beijing is unlikely to believe them.

In fact, it is South Korea that can be of more use here, and it has already made a good start with President Park Geun-hye’s pointed outreach to China. Friendly ties between South Korea and China make it far more likely that Beijing will listen to assurances from Seoul regarding the limit of the U.S. military presence in a hypothetical unified Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea can also give its own pointed warnings regarding what it may be forced to do should North Korea continue down the current path – starting with accepting THAAD deployment.

If the United States is truly interested in changing Beijing’s calculus, and thereby placing serious pressure on the North Korean regime by way of China, it will need to address both of China’s main strategic concerns: fear of domestic instability through North Korean regime collapse and fear of the external security threat potentially posed by a unified, U.S.-allied Korea. Addressing these concerns convincingly will involve not only outlining the consequences of “business as usual” – through warnings about the U.S. military response – but also making a changed approach truly attractive to Beijing. That means serious attempts at reassurance about U.S. intentions and military postures in a post-unification Korea; reassurances from Seoul that it does not intend to join Japan and the United States in what China sees as a long-term plan of containment; and promises to help China deal with the fallout should the regime collapse in North Korea.

All these actions still might not be enough to change China’s logic. After all, it’s been pursuing the same approach for decades, and that diplomatic inertia will be hard to overcome. But the only alternative is exactly what Kerry has already denounced: a return to “business as usual,” in which largely ineffective UN sanctions are the only consequence for North Korea’s bad behavior.