Yun-han Chu

On May 20, 2016 Tsai Ing-wen will be inaugurated as Taiwan’s new president, closing the curtain on Ma Ying-jeou’s eight years in office. Ma’s term began in optimism – he was swept into office in 2008 with 58 percent of the vote – but ended in disappointment. Ma’s Nationalist Party (KMT) suffered its worst electoral defeat in January’s polls, losing not only the presidency but also, for the first time ever, its legislative majority to Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party. Ma himself has suffered from abysmal approval ratings, with his popularity dipping below double-digits on occasion.

As the KMT rebuilds itself and Taiwan seems poised for a new era, it’s time for a closer look at Ma’s legacy. When historians and political scientists look back at the Ma years, what will they remember? And what’s in store for Taiwan’s soon-to-be former president? Yun-han Chu, professor of political science at National Taiwan University, discusses Ma’s impact on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations and what’s next for Ma and the KMT.

What do you think will be Ma Ying-jeou’s legacy in Taiwan – in other words, what will he be remembered for?

As time goes by, historians will probably revisit Ma Ying-jeou's legacy from time to time and cast him in a steadily more favorable light than his depressingly low approval rate at the end of his tenure might suggest. He will be given the due credit for three accomplishments: first, laying a foundation for cross-Strait peace by deescalating military tensions, resuming official dialogues and negotiations, and normalizing the economic relationship; second, restoring the trust and friendship with Taiwan’s major allies and trade partners, the United States in particular, and building a connecting path to the regional free-trade blocs; third, steering Taiwan's economy steadily through the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression.

The historical meeting between Ma and Xi in Singapore, despite of all the controversies and political backlash it has brought about, will be long remembered as the highest water mark of cross-Strait rapprochement since 1949. On the one hand, this historical meeting set a very high benchmark for Taiwan's future presidents; on the other hand, it enables a like-minded future president to pick up from where Ma leaves off, i.e., to jumpstart the momentum of cross-Strait rapprochement from a very high starting point.

Ma has suffered from extremely low approval ratings in recent years. To what extent do you think Ma’s unpopularity contributed to the KMT’s electoral defeat in January? Is it fair to see the election as a referendum on Ma’s presidency?

There is no question that his extremely low approval ratings significantly contributed to the KMT's electoral debacle in the recent presidential race. However, two other factors carry at least equal weight. First, the KMT leadership made a fatal mistake by replacing its official candidate, Ms. Hung Hsiu-chu, with Eric Chu through a coup-de-grace-like political maneuver less than three months before the general election. Second, unlike her unsuccessful campaign in 2012, this time Tsai Ing-wen effectively projected herself as a pragmatic leader and convinced many stability-conscious middle-class voters that she is able to preserve the status quo and bring no rupture to the on-going cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges. Therefore, it is too simplistic to see the election as a referendum on Ma's presidency.

Furthermore, the victory of Tsai Ing-wen is not as overwhelming as it appears to be. The magnitude of her popular votes, a total of 6.89 million, is virtually the same as what Ma won in 2012, and still trails far behind the historical record of 7.65 million that Ma set in 2008.  The turnout rate in 2016, 66 percent, is also the lowest in history. According to some post-election polls, many disoriented and alienated Pan Blue (pro-KMT) voters abstained this time while young voters came out in record numbers.

What’s next for the KMT as it tries to rebuild?

A large segment of Taiwan's electorate still believe that the country needs a viable alternative to the incumbent party (no matter who is in power) to make Taiwan's democracy vibrant and robust. So the KMT's political future is intrinsically a supply-side issue rather than a demand-side problem. As compared to other splinter parties or nascent political forces, the KMT remains the only political organization that stands the best chance to pose a serious challenge to the DPP in the future general elections.

However, the KMT still faces a daunting challenge of rebuilding itself. First of all, it has to rebuild the party as a coherent and cohesive political force. This requires a lengthy and bumpy process of building up internal consensus on a new, refreshing, and forward-looking party platform that addresses the real long-term challenges that the country is facing in the next decade. These challenges include reversing the trend of being increasingly marginalized and isolated in the region as the shadow of China's rapid ascendance looms large, rejuvenating the international competitiveness of Taiwan's export sector, arresting the widening gap in income and wealth distribution, correcting the serious mismatch in the labor market (saturated with too many college graduates without marketable skills but suffering an acute shortage of technicians and skilled labors), and implementing timely and sweeping reform to the unsustainable pension system against the backdrop of a shrinking and rapidly aging population. This is by no means an easy task and it might take a long time before the party leadership sees the light at the end of the tunnel. However, this is perhaps the only and the most effective way to reconnect the party with the younger generation, regain its agenda-setting power, overcome its internal strife, and bridge the psychological gap between its dwindling mainlander constituency and the party's native Taiwanese supporters at the grassroots.

Will Ma continue to be an influential figure in Taiwanese politics moving forward? What role might he play in the KMT?

Ma will continue to be a significant figure in Taiwanese politics. First, being a former president, his voice will carry a lot of weight in the sphere of public discourse, especially when it comes to cross-Strait relations, the territorial disputes over the South China Sea and Daiyutai [in the East China Sea], and Taiwan's international space at large. Mass media will always be interested in his view about the policies and performances of Tsai Ing-wen. In addition, Ma probably will still be active in shaping cross-Strait affairs through his engagement with Xi Jinping and other top Chinese leaders. 

However, it is unlikely that he will play an active role in the KMT's internal affairs for two reasons. First, he no longer has a tangible power base within the party. Second, staying out of the KMT's internal politics actually helps project himself to be a statesman-like former president. 

Do you foresee any continuity between Ma’s policies and those of new president Tsai Ing-wen? 

Tsai Ing-wen can ill-afford an escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait so she will not repeat the mistakes that Chen Shui-bian made and will avoid explicit provocation. But she is likely to pursue a different set of priorities. Her government will place the emphasis on deepening security ties with the United States, forging an implicit security alliance with Japan, and expanding trade and investment toward ASEAN and India while reducing the economic dependence on China. Therefore, her national security team will give the top priority to knocking on the door of the TPP while putting the ill-fated FTA negotiations with China on back burner. Tsai will also pursue a more conciliatory approach toward the South China Sea, deferring to Washington's strategic agenda on weakening Beijing's legal claim as well as containing its military build-up in the disputed territorial waters. However, this approach might be viewed by Beijing as confrontational or even hostile and trigger a major rupture to the cross-Strait relations.