China’s South China Sea Diplomacy

Ever since Hillary Clinton outlined the United States’ position on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010, Beijing and Washington have been publicly at loggerheads over the issue. In keeping with the multilateral theme set in Clinton’s early remarks on the South China Sea, the Obama administration has been active in courting regional and extra-regional support for its avowed interests: freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of the disputes in accordance with international law, and avoiding unilateral moves that raise tension.

In practice, this means the United States effectively collecting joint and multilateral statements with allies and partners from around the world that reflect (and thus legitimize) its position on the issue. In recent years, the Obama administration has inked joint statements avowing a commitment to freedom of navigation, international law, and maritime security with not only staunch allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, but also with India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and even the G7. None of these statements outright point to China as the perceived troublemaker, but that’s certainly the implied message.

China typically responds by more or less telling the United States and its partners to mind their own business. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson had this to say in response to the recent G7 foreign ministers’ statement: “We urge G7 members to abide by their promise of not taking sides on territorial disputes, respect the efforts by regional countries, stop all irresponsible words and actions, and make constructive contribution to regional peace and stability.” Insert the relevant country or grouping for “G7 members” and you have the basic blueprint of China’s diplomatic response to such statements.

However, Beijing has recently made a fascinating transition in its diplomatic approach. Instead of simply carping about the U.S. obsession with collecting South China Sea-themed joint statements, China has now begun collecting its own.

Russia, currently one of China’s warmest partners (and with its own bone to pick with the United States) was the most obvious place to start. Sure enough, when the Chinese and Russian foreign ministers met in Moscow in mid-April, China’s state news agency, Xinhua, proudly declared that China and Russia “oppose internationalizing [the] South China Sea dispute.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi took the opportunity to reiterate China’s opposition to an arbitration case filed at the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the Philippines, a case Beijing argues is utterly without merit.

“Beijing’s refusal of the Philippines’ unilaterally-proposed arbitration case over the issue is a move meant to uphold the dignity and authority of the law,” Wang said at the time.

A few days earlier, China had been pleased to hear Wang’s counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, call attempts by non-disputants to interfere in the South China Sea issue “completely counterproductive.” Lavrov also expressed support for resolving the issue through dialogue – which China took as a Russian disavowal of the pending arbitration case. China “highly appreciated” those comments, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said on April 12.

Even more surprisingly, China was able to get similar language included in the joint communiqué issued after the latest trilateral meeting of the Chinese, Indian, and Russian foreign ministers. “All related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned,” the statement says – echoing China’s position by leaving out international arbitration as a means of dealing with the issue, and limiting discussion to claimant states.

For comparison, the 2015 communiqué from the same trilateral meeting did not mention the South China Sea, UNCLOS, or maritime issues in general. Neither Russia nor India – who have no direct interest in the issue – would have pushed for its inclusion this time around; Beijing was the driving force behind the new language.

In a way, having the South China Sea make it into the concluding document of a Russia-India-China trilateral meeting is a victory for the United States. China’s repeated mantra, since Clinton first raised the issue in 2010, has been that the South China Sea disputes should not be “internationalized.” That is, the disputes should be addressed and ultimately resolved only by the claimant states – China, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines (Beijing, of course, does not consider Taiwan a separate claimant) – while the rest of the world should stay silent. For years, then, China has avoided talking about the disputes whenever possible rather than trying to sway diplomatic partners to its side.

That China pushed to have the South China Sea included in this joint statement is a stark acknowledgement that Beijing has lost that battle – like it or not, the issue is internationalized. Beijing has come to recognize that it has nothing to gain from ignoring the issue at bilateral and multilateral forums; with Washington raising the disputes at every opportunity, China’s silence is now counterproductive. China’s stubborn insistence that the issue not be “internationalized” has done nothing but cement perceptions that Beijing is diplomatically isolated on this issue. That’s particularly dangerous with the arbitral tribunal’s decision expected later this year. Should the tribunal rule against China’s nine-dash line, Beijing will need all the support it can get to justify defying the judgment. 

So now we’re seeing a new approach. Instead of pretending the disputes don’t exist, China is taking a page from the U.S. book and raising the South China Sea issue in its diplomatic meetings. In particular, China is seeking diplomatic statements that oppose non-claimants (like the United States) becoming involved in the disputes and put forth dialogue – as opposed to arbitration – as the way forward.

Wang’s recent tour of Southeast Asia, with stops in Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, also showcased this new strategy. While in Laos – his final stop – Wang announced that China had “reached a four-point consensus with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on the South China Sea issue.” Each point of the consensus reads like a statement directly from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

First, the ministers (who each met separately with Wang) agreed that the disputes are not an issue between China and ASEAN as a whole. Second, each state should be able to choose its preferred method for solving disputes (translation: no compulsory arbitration). Third, no state should “attempt to unilaterally impose an agenda on other countries” – likely a reference to attempts by some ASEAN members to raise the issue at regional meetings, while close Chinese partners like Laos (the current ASEAN chair) and Cambodia are eager to sweep it under the rug. And finally, all agreed that the disputes “should be resolved through consultations and negotiations by parties directly concerned” – similar to (but stronger than) the language we saw in the China-India-Russia joint statement.

China has also gone outside the immediate region to garner support for its stance. Xinhua recently released a headline proclaiming that “Fiji supports China's proposition on South China Sea issue” after a meeting between Wang and his Fijian counterpart. Unfortunately for Xinhua, the Fiji Broadcasting Corporation immediately issued its own headline: “Fiji doesn’t support China’s proposition of the South China Sea.”

“The government has opposed a media release issued by the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry after talks in Beijing between our Foreign Affairs Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola and his Chinese counterpart.,” FBC explained.

And therein lies the problem: China is late to the game of diplomatic persuasion on the South China Sea. Instead, Beijing has let its actions – reclaiming thousands of acres of land and building facilities that have obvious military applications, for example, or aggressively sending both fishing vessels and Coast Guard ships to patrol far-flung “traditional fishing grounds” in other countries’ EEZs – do all the talking. China’s frantic efforts at coalition-building ahead of the arbitral tribunal’s judgment are likely too little, too late.