The Stumbling Block to US North Korea Policy: China

It took less than a month for North Korea to test U.S. President Donald Trump. On February 12, just weeks after the swearing in of the 45th president, Pyongyang launched a ballistic missile that travelled 500 km before crashing into the Sea of Japan. According to a South Korean lawmaker citing intelligence sources, the missile had an actual range 2,000 km. It was a testament to the unceasing progression of a missile program that experts expect will one day allow Pyongyang to deliver a nuclear payload to the U.S. mainland.

With time running out to halt North Korea’s development of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile, a task that has vexed successive U.S. presidents, the Trump administration has made it clear it believes the solution rests with China, the isolated country’s historical ally and main trading partner. While experts in and out of government have pointed to China’s leverage over North Korea for years, Trump has been particularly critical of what he sees as Beijing’s meager efforts to rein in its neighbor.

Two weeks before his inauguration, the mogul-turned-politician used Twitter to accuse Beijing of not helping with efforts to disarm Pyongyang despite “taking out” massive amounts of money and wealth from the United States, echoing criticism he made during his convention-busting presidential run.

A week later at a hearing ahead of his confirmation as secretary of state, Rex Tillerson leveled extensive criticism at Beijing’s cooperation with Washington on taming North Korea, particularly when it came to enforcing UN sanctions.

"If China is not going to comply with those UN sanctions, then it's appropriate for the United States to consider actions to compel them to comply,” Tillerson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 11.

At the same hearing, Tillerson said the United States could no longer accept Beijing’s “empty promises” about trying to tamp down its ally’s provocations.

Beijing has given mixed signals on its willingness to challenge its neighbor. It has signed on to several UN resolutions aimed at Pyongyang, and cooperated on a criminal investigation of Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., a Chinese company suspected of funding the secretive state’s weapons programs, by U.S. authorities. Just last September, following North Korea’s fifth successful nuclear test, then-President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced their joint resolve to work together on halting Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development.

But Beijing has also exploited loopholes in UN sanctions to continue vigorous trade with its neighbor. Last year, it imported a record volume of North Korean coal. In February, China announced it would suspend all future North Korean coal imports for 2017, but Beijing’s mixed track record on fulfilling such pledges has analysts adopting a wait-and-see approach.

It’s unclear how responsive Beijing might be to pressure or persuasion by the new administration. While apparently exasperated by its neighbor’s repeated nuclear and missile tests, it fears any instability on its border that could result from an effort to seriously strangle the regime.

“China is not a partner that will help us solve the North Korean problem. China probably does not have control over North Korea, but it can abide by the sanctions,” Anthony J. Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told The Diplomat. “China should focus on the activities of its nationals and North Koreans inside China that are contributing to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.”

Ruggiero said there was ample evidence of China undercutting U.S. and international efforts to halt Pyongyang’s weapons development.

“There is a documented case of Chinese nationals assisting North Korea in conducting U.S. dollar transactions through the U.S. financial system,” he said. “That cannot happen and the United States must do more to confront China on this case. The United States needs to present Chinese banks with a clear choice: status quo or sanctions that could include losing access to the U.S. financial system.”

Prior to his confirmation, Tillerson suggested that it would be “appropriate” to apply secondary sanctions against Chinese entities that violate the UN measures. But adopting such a retaliatory approach against Beijing would incur significant risk.

“It feels good to do so, because one is seen to be ‘doing something,’ and it renders more concrete the Washington consensus that North Korea is primarily a Chinese problem,” said Adam Cathcart, the editor of SinoNK. “But there is never any discussion at all of what China has done this far, China's cooperation with the Hongxiang investigation being seen as a one-off, or more importantly [discussion about] how this action might affect the overall US-China relationship.”

Cathcart said that Washington was constrained by the fact Beijing would always be able to stymie efforts to punish its ally if it felt they ran against its national interests.

“If the UN Security Council or Panel of Experts could have its dream come true, UN inspectors would be installed all along the Sino-Korean border, or People’s Republic of China Customs Bureau would be completely transparent in its work,” he said. “But that isn't going to happen, and China can easily loosen every choke point with North Korea.”