Chekhov's Gun and the Tangled US-Philippines-China Triangle

Lord Palmerston, the 19th century British leader and empire builder, famously noted that countries do not have eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only indefinite national interests. The tangled triangle of U.S.-Philippines-China relations is testing Palmerston’s maxim.

For more than a century, the Philippines has served a critical role in America’s rise as a world power. In turn, Manila has been one of the region’s largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid and military assistance. The people-to-people bond between the Philippines and United States is unique. According to a 2015 poll by the Pew Research Center, 92 percent of Philippine residents held a favorable view of the United States (the highest in Asia). However, traditional U.S.-Philippine ties may be fraying under the new leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, the former mayor of Davao City on the southern island of Mindanao.

The mercurial leader in Manila has verbally lambasted Washington while extending a hand to Beijing. Chinese President Xi Jinping has reciprocated through inducements such as infrastructure mega-projects and the relaxing of tensions in the South China Sea. Perhaps the Philippine legal triumph at The Hague has provided an opportunity for both parties to reassess their positions? Regardless, the Trump administration is facing uncharted waters in its dealings with the Philippines and China. Already, the new White House has made a splash: issuing – and then retracting – specific threats of action in the South China Sea. The theater of international affairs continues in the Asia-Pacific.

A Complex Relationship

The Philippines and the United States have a long and complex security relationship dating back to U.S. intervention during the Spanish-American War (1898-1902) – Washington’s introduction onto the world stage. The foundation of the modern bilateral relationship is the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. Under Articles IV and V, the countries have committed to protect the other against an “armed attack” in the “Pacific Area” of either party, including “on the island territories under its jurisdiction” or “on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft” in the Pacific. Washington has not formally extended the scope of its obligation to Philippines’ maritime claims in the South China Sea, such as over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama, when articulating his rebalance strategy, stated that “our commitment to defend the Philippines is ironclad.”

In the past, the Philippines-U.S. alliance has been subject to moments of revision and unease, owing in part to the trauma of U.S. colonial rule and its dominant role in foreign affairs. For example, during the Cold War period, the U.S. maintained a large military presence at Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. Following a close vote in the Philippine Senate (12 to 11) to revoke the Military Bases Agreement, these U.S. military bases closed in 1992. Subsequently, the countries entered into a Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 that mandates that U.S. military forces assume a non-combat role and permits only a temporary (non-permanent) base of operations in the Philippines, reflecting Manila’s sovereignty concerns.

More recently, the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) further deepened military ties. The EDCA is a 10-year, renewable arrangement, allowing for the rotation of U.S. military personnel and development of U.S.-built facilities and improvements, utilized rent-free by Americans, but owned by the Philippines. The EDCA allows for enhanced opportunities for joint-military exercises and modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). For instance, the EDCA calls for increased Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder”) exercises; 2016 witnessed the 32nd iteration of the joint U.S.-AFP war games.

The Philippines has also been a strong partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Philippines received designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003 following Manila’s support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq. The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) has targeted Abu Sayaf and Jemaah Islamiyah in Mindanao. U.S. special forces operate according to specifically crafted rules of engagement respectful of Manila’s sensitivities, acting in a supportive role and using force only to defend themselves or when fired upon.

Increasingly, U.S. military support has been designed to increase the maritime capability of the AFP, considered one of the weaker militaries in the region. Last year, $42 million of more than $120 million in U.S. military aid to the Philippines fell under the U.S. Southeast Asia Maritime Initiative, which is designed to develop capacity of littoral states in the region. In March 2016, Washington and Manila identified five military bases for hosting rotating U.S. personnel, pursuant to the EDCA and consistent with Obama’s rebalancing strategy (see Figure).