Japan’s North Korea Challenge

Tensions are higher than ever in recent memory on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s accelerated pace of provocative behaviors — including the most recent failed missile test on April 16 — is a stark reminder that North Korea presents a clear and present (and imminent) security threat for East Asia.

When Vice President Mike Pence delivered his Easter message to U.S. Forces in Korea hours after North Korea’s failed missile test, he talked about the risks that the U.S. servicemen and women are taking by stationing in South Korea. Although his Asia trip, particularly his visit to Japan, had been expected to feature the administration’s trade agenda, the recent provocation by Pyongyang — and the anticipation that more may be coming in a matter of weeks — inevitably made the national security conversation an equally, if not more, important focus for the trip.

Needless to say, any military option that Washington considers will require consent from the government of South Korea. Beyond that, however, Japan will also be a key player in any crisis management that the United States will consider on the Korean Peninsula. Any serious military option would likely require the mobilization of assets either from or through U.S. bases in Japan.

A crisis on the Korean Peninsula is one of the cases that Tokyo and Washington had in mind when the two governments considered how to modernize the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The principles for the division of the roles between the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) articulated in the Guidelines under “situations in the areas surrounding Japan” (commonly referred to as SIAS-J among policymakers in the two governments) establishes the foundation from which detailed bilateral contingency planning would flow. In fact, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sought to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to expand the role of the JSDF in operations outside Japan, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula was one of the examples that he used to justify why the constitutional reinterpretation was necessary yet still compatible with Japan’s postwar identify as a “peace-loving nation.”

Japan is also moving as quickly as possible to enhance its own capability to defend against the missile threat from North Korea, which Abe now says has reached “a new level of threat.” Last month, the Policy Affairs Research Council of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) issued a set of recommendations to strengthen Japan’s defense capability against the rising missile threat from North Korea. The recommendations were submitted to Abe. Although their reference to a “counter-attack capability” stole the media headlines, the recommendations talked more broadly about how Japan should modernize its existing ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability and accelerate the consideration as well as acquisition of such modernized capabilities.

The recommendations also tackle the question of what Japan should do in the meantime with the assets it already has. This document will no doubt guide considerations within the Japanese government — the National Security Secretariat and the Ministry of Defense, specifically — as Japan updates its guiding principles for defense planning and acquisition for the next four to five years.

The dilemma for Japan is that, when it comes to North Korea, the options that Tokyo can entertain on its own are very limited and reactive in nature. The already small volume of economic transactions between Japan and North Korea makes the real impact of Japanese unilateral economic sanctions questionable. The abduction issue — the case of missing Japanese citizens who are confirmed to have been kidnapped by North Korea — hamstrings Tokyo diplomatically as soon as the United States and other stakeholders — China, South Korea, and Russia — begin to focus more on diplomatic engagement with the regime. There is strong domestic pressure within Japan against providing North Korea any “incentives” (such as economic assistance, even if it is meant to be humanitarian in nature). The current fragile state of the Japan-South Korea relationship (although defense ties appears to be stable, particularly in the context of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral framework), and the tensions in the Japan-China relationship also likely complicate any effort for Japan to play a diplomatic role, making it very much dependent on the United States to have Tokyo’s interests in mind as it engages with other stakeholders.

U.S. National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster recently spoke about the Trump administration’s intention to double down on both pressure and engagement when it comes to North Korea. Japan will be aligned very closely with the United States, as it has been so far, in exerting further pressure on North Korea and enhancing its own deterrence. The real challenge for Japan will be whether it can effectively respond to U.S. efforts on engagement side of the ledger.