Kyrgyzstan’s Curse

In commemorating the March 2005 revolution that toppled independent Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, and the April 2010 revolution that ousted Kurmanbek Bakiyev, present Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev said, “It is very important to protect [the revolution’s] gains and not to allow destructive forces to return the country into a state of authoritarianism and lawlessness.” He added:

The people who came out in March 2005 to fight for freedom and justice did not think that very soon another, a more greedy and cruel family would seize power in the country, and the ideals of the revolution would be trampled on. The reign of the Bakiyev family was accompanied by persecution of politicians and journalists… an even more insolent looting of people’s wealth.

These are rich words coming from Atambayev, who rode the 2010 revolution into the White House. He no longer seems so fond of protesters now that he’s the one in charge.

“If you want to stage riots,” Atambayev pledged in early April, “the pretrial detention center is waiting for you; its doors are open.”

He was speaking at a meeting of the National Council for Sustainable Development, but it seems of late that at every opportunity the president takes the time to rail against protesters and the press – just like his predecessors.

It’s springtime in Kyrgyzstan and protesters have taken to the sidewalks outside the White House in small, but fairly regular, crowds. The specific grievances vary, but agitation is clearly in the air.

Since February the list of protesters has been varied. Ata-Meken partisans are upset about the arrests of two of the party’s leaders, Omurbek Tekebayev and Almambet Shykmamatov. Supporters of exiled politician Sadyr Zhaparov took to the streets after he returned to the country voluntarily for unclear reasons and was arrested. While in jail, the authorities say he attempted suicide – slashing his wrist – but was seen by a doctor and survived; his supporters, of course, say the authorities tried to kill him. In March, free press advocates hosted a rally – in part to show support for several media outlets the government has filed suits against – and several were arrested. The residents of the village of Dacha-su protested recently (again), angry that the government has moved so slowly in investigating how and why an airplane missed the runway at Manas International Airport and smashed into their homes in January, killing more than 30 people, including children.

The press, in particular, has become a target for Atambayev. Since the start of 2017, several media organizations have had suits filed against them by the state or by Atambayev’s former party, the Social Democratic Party (SDPK), over their reporting. SDPK filed a suit against 24.kg, journalist Tatyana Kudryavtseva, and Rita Karasartova, director of the Institute of Civic Analysis. Kudryavtseva had quoted Karasartova, who said SDPK had “got carried away in politics, they’re selling positions left and right.”

Then the Kyrgyz prosecutor general filed a defamation suit against RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service – locally known as Azattyk – and ProMedia, the foundation behind Zanoza, a plucky Kyrgyz news website, for “tendentious and biased coverage of unchecked, false information, which directly concern the honor and dignity of the head of state.”

Last November, Tekebayev claimed he was compiling information to impeach Atambayev. Both outlets had covered allegations made by Tekebayev in February that Atambayev was stashing money in Cyprus, and both reported the presidential press office’s reaction and denial at the same time.

Another lawsuit was levied against Tekebayev’s lawyers, with Azattyk and ProMedia named as co-defendants. Tekebayev’s lawyers – Taalaikul Toktakunova and Kanatbek Aziz – held a press conference on March 1 in which they aired allegations that the cargo on the jet that crashed into Dacha-su in January belonged to Atambayev. Azattyk and Zanoza, as well as nearly every other media outlet in the country, reported the explosive claim.

Another lawsuit was filed against Zanoza and its founder for an October 2015 article he’d written.

In each of the first two lawsuits against Azattyk and ProMedia, the government is demanding that Azattyk pay 10 million soms and Promedia pay 3 million soms in compensation to Atambayev. The organizations have had their bank accounts frozen while the suits move forward.

In the meantime, Atambayev continues to speak out against the dangers of bad press.

“People,” he said in early March, “are worried how false information, open slander, is being deliberately distributed in social networks and the media.  As the head of state elected by all the people, I cannot calmly stand by and watch how the people becomes a hostage to falsehoods and rumors.”

Further, he said “rotten politicians and journalists… created a special organization allegedly in defense of freedom of speech, to defend Kyrgyz journalists, but are, in fact, mocking our country in front of the whole world.”

Atambayev, who recently remarked on how the Bakiyev regime persecuted politicians and journalists, seems to be overseeing the persecution of politicians and journalists. Kyrgyzstan – which had two revolutions in the span of a decade – is repeatedly cursed by leaders who simply don’t understand the fragility of a young democracy.

The Kyrgyz presidential elections are many months away, but the first quarter of the year bodes ill for the health of Kyrgyz democracy. Atambayev is perhaps rightfully nervous about what will become of him after the election. As I’ve commented before, no Kyrgyz president has left office without being hounded. Only Roza Otunbayeva, the 2010 interim president, left office voluntarily.

During his speech at the 25th independence anniversary celebrations last August, Atambayev insulted Otunbayeva, said she hadn’t been elected, and blamed her for the “mines” laid in the constitution. Otunbayeva stormed off the stage during his remarks and the political infighting between Atambayev and many of his former allies – including Tekebayev – has only escalated.

Last summer, Atambayev claimed he wasn’t going to stay in politics, but his ambitions have since changed. In March he bragged that a Gallup poll put his rating at “almost 99 percent.” (The Diplomat has been unable to verify his claim). “[T]he leaders of other countries repeatedly told me to run for the second term,” he said. Atambayev said he would not, though if he wanted to he could simply hold another referendum to change the constitutional provisions that bar a second term presently. “But I will not do it, although I will stay in politics. But I will not be either a prime minister or a speaker. I will deal with my own party, SDPK.”

What role Atambayev emerges in after his presidency is a thing of much speculation. There are few established patterns for what former presidents in Kyrgyzstan do, or what status they hold among the political establishment.

Few seasoned politicians in Kyrgyzstan are free from any stain, as they either served with Akayev, Bakiyev, or Atambayev – whose tenure as president has seen serious economic ups and downs and numerous state corruption scandals. For example, the fraud charges being levied against Tekebayev date to alleged financial transactions in 2010. It’s a difficult and contradictory position to be in: the state shouldn’t ignore corrupt politicians but what if most politicians have participated, at one point or another, in corrupt practices? The state is also demonstrably ill-equipped at pursuing such cases apolitically, casting doubt on investigations

Kyrgyzstan’s curse is not revolution; it is the intractable convergence of poor political leadership and a history of corruption.