Japan’s North Korea Problem

On August 17, the United States and Japan held their first “two-plus-two” meeting — a combined foreign and defense ministers’ meeting — since the inauguration of the Trump administration. In the joint statement released after the meeting, the U.S. secretaries of defense and state and Japanese defense and foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work with the international community to achieve the goal of dismantling North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. They also agreed to continue their efforts to enhance the trilateral cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to tackle the security threat posed by Pyongyang. 

There is little question that North Korea is the most immediate and urgent security threat that Japan faces. From strengthening its own defense capabilities to further deepening defense relations with the United States, as well as pursuing better U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation, Japan should do its utmost not only to enhance deterrence, but also to prepare for the worst case scenario. 

Obviously, Japan should encourage any effort to push for a diplomatic solution to the current crisis. However, Japan’s own foreign policy challenges with the other stakeholder countries will continue to limit Tokyo’s role in the overall diplomatic effort.

Japan’s diplomatic tensions with South Korea remain the biggest obstacle. New South Korean President Moon Jae-in has already spoken about renegotiating the 2015 “comfort women” agreement with Japan. On August 17, the same day of the U.S.-Japan “two-plus-two” meeting, President Moon essentially reopened another history issue between the two countries by referring to the issue of Choyo-ko (Korean nationals who were mobilized to work in factories in Japan during World War II when Korea was under Japan’s colonial rule) in a press conference. 

The issues associated with the Choyo-ko span from human rights (whether they should be considered “forced laborers”) to whether the individuals who were Choyo-ko can claim their right to ask for compensation. However, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the South Korean government took the position that the issue of Choyo-ko had been already settled when Tokyo and Seoul normalized their diplomatic relationship in 1965, and the succeeding South Korean administrations consistently upheld this position. Despite the fact that in 2012 the South Korean Supreme Court rendered a judgment that the former Choyo-ko individuals still had the right to file claims for compensation, the government’s official position has not changed.

The Japanese government already contacted South Korea, requesting clarification on whether President Moon’s statement on August 17 means a change in the government’s official position on Choyo-ko. Even if Moon’s statement is a mere reflection of his personal sentiment on the issue, such a political atmosphere and posture toward Japan will limit the role Japan can play in the North Korea issue, including constraining U.S.-Japan-ROK security cooperation.   

Japan’s relations with China also present a challenge for Tokyo. Japan and China have had a “cold but stable” relationship since 2011, particularly due to China’s increasingly assertive behavior around the East China Sea. In addition to the reference to North Korea, the joint statement following U.S.-Japan two-plus-two meeting also quite explicitly discussed “continuing concern” for Chinese behavior in the East China Sea and “serious concern” about developments in the South China Sea, namely China’s “reclamation and militarization of disputed features, that alter the status quo and increase tensions.” This demonstrated U.S. and Japanese shared sense of concern. As Japan continues to invest in its relationship not only with countries in Southeast Asia which face direct challenges posed by Chinese activities in the South China Sea, but also with other countries in its attempt to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the world, Japan’s bilateral relationship with China will only grow more complicated, not less.

Furthermore, Japan has a tough balancing act to maintain when it comes to its relationship with Russia.  There have been recent media reports suggesting that Russia may be stepping in to provide petroleum and other resources to North Korea as pressure on China to implement sanctions and exercise its leverage vis-à-vis North Korea increases. Although Russia voted for the newly adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371, which builds on Resolution 2270 to impose stringent economic sanctions on Pyongyang, Russia has vetoed resolutions on North Korea in the past, and is said to be wary of the prospect of the United States and China growing closer through cooperation on North Korea.  Already at odds over Syria and now with the ongoing investigation within the United States on the possible interference in last year’s U.S. presidential election, any action by Russia that can be seen as trying to weaken the effect of economic sanctions will be an added source of tension between Washington and Moscow. As Japan continues to pursue its relations with Russia with an eye toward resolving Northern Territory issues and ultimately signing a peace treaty, Japan has to make sure that its solidarity with the United States against North Korea remains steadfast.

Finally, Japan has little leverage of its own vis-à-vis North Korea. It has no diplomatic relations, and there has been no trade between the two countries since 2010. Tokyo and Pyongyang have only engaged in talks over abduction issues, which have come to a stalemate since 2014. Notwithstanding repeated calls from the Japanese government — including one from then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in 2015 when he met North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-Yong in Malaysia at the time of ASEAN-related Foreign Minister’s meeting — there appears to be no prospect for the abduction issue to move forward.

Despite the immediacy of North Korea’s security threat to Japan, Tokyo has almost no tools to proactively engage in easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. That leaves Japan with one option: doing everything it can to maintain the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance. When the escalation of tension between the United States and North Korea is literally one tweet away, however, that option gives much less comfort for Japan, no matter the reassurances from the Trump administration’s senior cabinet members as reflected in the recent two-plus-two joint statement.