Willy Lam

It was the week the world had been awaiting for over a year – from October 18-25, the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened in Beijing. By the end of the gathering, which is held only once every five years, China had new elites, in the form of five new faces on the Politburo Standing Committee, while CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping cemented his power even further through the inclusion of “Xi Jinping Thought” in the Party Constitution.

To explain the intricacies and significance of the political signalling at the Party Congress, The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi interviewed Dr. Willy Lam, an adjunct professor in the Center for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and editor of the just-published Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party, about China’s biggest political event.

On the opening day of the Congress, Xi Jinping's contribution to Party doctrine was revealed as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” What did you make of this slogan? What does it tell us about Xi's desired legacy in the Party?

“Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” refers largely to a grand plan to render China into a “great modern socialist country” by mid-century. Thus, China will realize overall socialist modernization during the 2020 to 2035 period. And in the ensuing 15 years, China will develop into a “great modern socialist country,” or a superpower that is capable of challenging the United States. Xi listed in his Congress address 14 ways and means to achieve this overarching task. They include boosting “comprehensive rule by law,” “perfecting democratic systems,” and “encouraging and supporting… the non-state-sector economic development.” However, these efforts clearly contradict Xi’s most important principle, namely that the “Party exercises leadership over everything.”

Independent historian Zhang Lifan has noted that “there is no theoretical innovation” in the idea of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Other analysts have pointed out because this is a long-term goal lasting decades, the concept has provided the justification for Xi to remain practically “emperor for life.”

As per recent tradition, eventual successors to Xi and Li Keqiang would have been expected to make it into the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at this Congress. With Xi having broken that precedent, how likely is it that he will seek to hold his titles for more than the usual 10 years? 

Contrary to a number of reports in the global media, neither Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua nor Chongqing Party Secretary Chen Min’er – who are deemed rising stars from the Sixth Generation (officials born in the 1960s) – has been promoted to the PBSC. This confirms widespread speculation that Xi has no desire to hand over power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 – and that he will remain No. 1 at least until the 21st Party Congress in 2027 (and perhaps even the 22nd Party Congress in 2032 if his health permits). If Xi were to follow long-standing party convention, and rule for only ten years, he is obliged to induct two Sixth Generation cadres to the PBSC at the 19th Party Congress. This is because the two heirs-apparent (one for the position of general secretary; the other for the post of premier) will require an apprenticeship period of five years.

Wang Qishan, best-known as Xi’s anti-corruption czar, was expected to retire based on his age. Prior to the Party Congress, however, there was some speculation that the unwritten retirement rules would be broken to allow him to stay on the PBSC; that was not the case. What does his retirement mean for the future of Xi's anti-corruption efforts?

Xi Jinping has accepted the retirement of his most solid ally and confidant, Wang Qishan, with reluctance. Wang has been widely criticized for using the anti-corruption apparatus – the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) – as a potent political tool to take out or intimidate Xi’s political foes. In the process, however, Wang has made a startling number of enemies in the party, government, and army. And his retirement can be interpreted as Xi making an indirect concession to party cadres who are opposed to the negative fallout of his five-year anti-graft campaign.

Wang’s successor Zhao Leji, who will also take over the leadership of the soon-to-be-established National Supervision Commission, might exercise more caution in fighting “big tigers,” a slang term for corrupt senior cadres. At least for the foreseeable future, Xi hopes to restore stability within the party. However, Zhao may shift the focus of fighting graft to sectors which have not yet been heavily targeted, for instance, gigantic private companies. There is supposed to be a close connection between these multi-billion-dollar firms and the big clans within the party.

Other than Xi himself, which of the new PBSC members do you expect to be the most influential over the next five years?

Certainly NPC [National People’s Congress] Chairman-designate Li Zhanshu and CCDI Secretary-designate Zhao Leji will be the most prominent players in the new administration. Li will oversee a plethora of legislation geared toward promoting “rule by law with Chinese characteristics,” which will also bolster Xi’s supreme status as the arbiter of national affairs big and small. Zhao, who as head of the Party’s Organization Department has promoted dozens of Xi loyalists to top posts, may whenever necessary continue to use the anti-graft apparatus to eliminate or marginalize cadres who have refused to pledge fealty to Xi. But the number of “big tigers” nabbed will be smaller, partly due to the fact that the most dangerous political foes of Xi have already been removed or jailed in the past five years.

Internal Party control and governance was a major theme of the Congress. Given that the Congress was seen as a triumphant sign of Xi's control, what do you make of this emphasis? Is there still work to be done in cementing Party obedience to Xi?

The well-known axiom in political science – the more power a dictator has accumulated, the less secure he feels – is certainly applicable to Xi. This is despite his apparent success in gaining the status of “emperor for life” at the Congress. Xi’s Machiavellian and highly divisive tactics in grabbing power have made him an untold number of enemies in the party. These political foes are lying low, waiting for their chances to pounce on Xi once he has made a big mistake in either domestic or foreign affairs. One day after the Congress opened, a senior minister accused Xi’s enemies, who range from former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai to the newly disgraced successor of Bo, Sun Zhengcai, of “plotting to usurp the party’s leadership and to seize state power.” Xi is expected to further tighten his grip on the party and army by, for instance, administering frequent “loyalty tests” to ensure cadres and generals’ total obedience to the “party core.”

Now that the Congress, which doubled as a full-fledged celebration of Xi, has wrapped up, let’s revisit the often-heard claim that Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping -- or even Mao Zedong himself. Is this a useful comparison, and if so would you agree with it?

Party veterans have said that Mao unified China, Deng made China rich, and Xi is making China strong. Despite the Mao-style personality cult being erected around Xi, however, the Fifth Generation “core leader” could hardly measure up to the statue of Mao or Deng.

Despite his disastrous policy failures after 1949, Mao was deemed a demi-god who automatically commanded the fealty of cadres as well as the people. The market-oriented reforms of Deng made possible the emergence of the country as a quasi-superpower. Xi, however, is feared, not loved, by party members. And the retrogression of political norms and institutions under Xi’s watch could only curtail his legacy as China’s “red emperor in the 21st century.”