Xiplomacy: The Party Congress and China’s Foreign Policy

Foreign policy was not the main focus of the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which convened in Beijing from October 18-25. The massive gathering of CCP cadres, held once every five years, was mostly focused on domestic politics, from the economy to internal Party governance, culminating in the announcement of the new lineup for the almighty Politburo Standing Committee. Foreign policy may be an afterthought in that context, but it is still present; domestic issues are impossible to completely separate from the global context.

CCP General Secretary (and Chinese President) Xi Jinping’s most famous catchphrase, the “China Dream,” is a case in point. The full slogan, which calls for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” is primarily domestic, referring to achieving prosperity in all senses of the word. However, it has an important diplomatic component as well – winning (back) respect for China as a major player on the world stage, as it was during its imperial heyday.

As proof of the importance of foreign policy, even at a domestic political event like the Party Congress, state media undertook a major propaganda push highlighting Xi’s foreign policy in the run-up to October 18. The effort even came with its own hashtag: #Xiplomacy. The centerpiece was a six-episode documentary series titled “Major Country Diplomacy,” which aired on CCTV starting in late August. The series showcased the diplomatic achievements of the Xi regime.

The main takeaway went beyond the enumeration of key initiatives like the “Belt and Road,” however. The central feature of “Xiplomacy” is an ironclad belief that China is now a world leader, and as such its vision for the new world order is increasingly important. As the introduction to the documentary put it, “The global community is looking to China” to solve global problems – indicating the new level of respect and clout China enjoys under Xi.

At the opening of the 19th Party Congress, Xi’s work report introduced his key contribution to Party doctrine: “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era.” Like the China Dream, this concept is primarily domestic but has a vital diplomatic component as well. The “new era,” in fact, refers equally to China’s domestic and foreign policy environments. China has long seen the tide shifting globally toward a multipolar world, in which China will be a (but not the) leader. The difference in this “new era” is that China is no longer seen as slowly ascending toward great power status; instead, it has already arrived.

Summing up the past five years, Xi noted in his work report that China “has encouraged the evolution of the global governance system… we have seen a further rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape.” Compare that to Hu Jintao’s far more modest comment at the 18th Party Congress that “[e]merging market economies and developing countries are gaining in overall strength” and his pledge that “China will … get more actively involved in international affairs.” For Xi, China “has stood up, grown rich, and become strong” already. The new era, then, “will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”

What will those “contributions to mankind” be? For those who have followed foreign policy during the Xi era, there were few surprises. The Party Congress is not meant to introduce new initiatives, but to officially recognize and endorse the endeavors of the past five years. Accordingly, the “Belt and Road” concept, along with related projects like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, led off the list of accomplishments Xi mentioned in the diplomatic realm. Xi’s call for a “new type of international relations” and “community of shared destiny” was also not new; these phrases in fact began to be used while Hu was still in power, though even then they were most heavily promoted by then-Vice President Xi.

The idea of “new type international relations” has gradually gained more substance under Xi, which was reflected in the work report. Xi made pointed calls for China and the world to “reject the Cold War mentality” and seek “partnership, not alliance” – clear shots at the decades-old U.S. alliance system. These comments recall Xi’s vision for a “new regional security architecture” as outlined at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai. That the same themes were highlighted in his work report last month attests to their central position in China’s foreign policy conception.

There is also continuity between Xiplomacy and preexisting foreign policy, at least on paper. In his work report, Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to old standbys: the “path of peaceful development” and the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”; “opening up”and “win-win cooperation.” Yet overriding all these commitments is the assumption that China will be given the respect and deference Xi believes his country is due. Thus, China’s “peaceful development” now has a hard edge – as Xi put it, “No one should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests,” peaceful or no.

Some observers had speculated that Xi and the rest of China’s leaders would tread carefully ahead of the Party Congress, wary of creating a diplomatic firestorm before the most important domestic political event of the next five years. That turned out to be only part true. For example, while China actively sought to keep the South China Sea disputes relatively quiet this year, that didn’t stop Chinese leaders from reportedly threatening both Vietnam and the Philippines with war should either country attempt to exploit fossil fuels lying within disputed maritime areas. China also had no qualms about sustaining a dangerous standoff with India near the Bhutan-China-India triboundary point. In Xi Jinping’s “new era,” “peace through strength” is an apt mantra for China’s foreign policy approach.

The speeches and state media articles coming out of the 19th Party Congress all agree on this point: China is already a major country, and if it is not given its due deference it will move quickly to rectify the situation. Far from Deng’s foreign policy axiom to “hide your strength and bide your time,” Xi wants China to showcase its strength on the world stage – precisely because he believes its time has come. That, in a nutshell, is what #Xiplomacy is all about.