Taiwan and the Quad

On November 12, officials from the foreign ministries of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related meetings in the Philippines “to discuss their shared vision for increased prosperity and security in a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” according to a statement from the U.S. State Department. The meeting itself was largely unremarkable; the participants were low-level enough that they weren’t even named, and there were no concrete outcomes. But the gathering gained attention for what it could signify for the future: the rebirth of the Quad, a coalition of four Indo-Pacific status quo democracies first proposed in 2006.

According to the State Department statement, the meeting ended with all parties “committed to deepening cooperation, which rests on a foundation of shared democratic values and principles, and to continue discussions to further strengthen the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.” Though never stated, the general assumption is that the Quad aims to defend the “rules-based order” against a specific foe: China. If the Quad is centered around those three factors – suspicion of China, democratic values, and a commitment to deepening cooperation – then there’s another contender for inclusion: Taiwan.

Of course, political realities make it impossible for Taiwan to join the Quad in any formal sense. Official meetings between Taiwanese officials and their counterparts from other countries are verboten, lest both parties face China’s wrath. Generally, Taiwan’s ministers and president have their travel restricted to the 20 countries with which Taipei has formal diplomatic relations.

Instead, Taiwan’s relationship with other countries – including the Quad members – are only quasi-official, with interactions kept on the non-governmental level. Trade and people-to-people relations provide the most scope for cooperation; political and security talks (the sort of interactions on which the Quad is based) the least. But it would be possible to unite Taiwan with the Quad in an informal sense, through increased bilateral relations with the four countries taking part.

Taiwan is already seeking to boost exchanges with other countries, part of the current Tsai administration’s strategy for lessening dependence on mainland China. President Tsai Ing-wen herself, on December 11, declared that Taiwan could contribute to the Trump administration’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” policy. “Not only are we willing to defend the common goal of freedom and openness, we will go all out to protect the fundamental international order,” she said in a meeting with James Moriarty, the head of the American Institute in Taiwan.

Could an informal affiliation with the Quad be in the cards? To answer that, we’ll need to look at the strength of Taiwan’s relations with each member.

The United States 

The United States is far and away Taiwan’s closest informal partner, thanks to a long-standing alliance during the Cold War (when Washington recognized Taipei over Beijing) and then the Taiwan Relations Act, put into place to ensure the relationship continued even after the dissolution of diplomatic ties. While the relationship has historically been strong, both sides are poised to deepen ties thanks to a convergence in domestic factors.

In the United States, to generalize, Republicans tend to be more hawkish on China – and more friendly toward Taiwan. While Donald Trump is far from a typical Republican president, the officials staffing his administration’s foreign policy and defense apparatus are closer to the mold. Accordingly, the Trump administration’s first arms sale to Taiwan, valued at $1.42 billion, came only five months after Trump’s inauguration – it took over a year before the Obama administration approved its first arms sale to Taiwan. Trump’s administration also mentioned Taiwan in its National Security Strategy (unlike the Obama administration), promising to  “maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our ‘One China’ policy.”

The U.S. Congress has likewise strengthened its traditional support for Taiwan, advancing legislation that would allow U.S. and Taiwan to exchange naval visits and even high-level political visits (much to China’s chagrin).

Meanwhile, the Tsai Ing-wen administration, which is being stonewalled by the authorities in Beijing, is eager to expand other partnerships wherever it can – especially with its de facto security guarantor. Less than two years into her term, Tsai has already made three stopovers on U.S. soil – in Texas, Florida, and Hawaii – on her way to visit diplomatic allies, as well as a stopover in U.S. territory Guam. She also mentioned in December, while hosting a delegation from the U.S. National Committee on American Foreign Policy, that her government plans to increase Taiwan’s defense budget to finance larger arms sales in the future.

The United States is traditionally the loudest voice supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in international groupings. If Taipei is to enter any sort of affiliation with the Quad, Washington will be the key backer.

Japan 

Japan is another close informal partner to Taiwan, which was a Japanese colony from 1895-1945. The two are drawing even closer today thanks to Tokyo’s increasing concerns over Chinese behavior as well as a change in government in Taipei. Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party are historically friendlier toward Tokyo than the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which has bitter memories of fighting Japan during World War II, when the KMT controlled mainland China. Tsai even visited Japan shortly before her election as president to conduct talks with Japanese officials and lawmakers.

Those positive trends saw Japan send its senior vice minister of internal affairs to Taiwan for a tourism fair in March 2017, marking the highest-level official visit since Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1972. The two sides have also signed partnerships on economic and social issues, including MOUs on customs enforcement and cultural exchanges. However, Japan remains upset with Taiwanese restrictions on food imports after the Fukushima nuclear disaster – reportedly a topic of discussion during the vice ministerial visit. 

In Japan, as in the United States, a vocal group of legislators is supportive of advancing Japan-Taiwan relations – with some even calling for a Japanese version of the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act – but to less overall influence.

Comments by Tsai have indicated that Taiwan is pinning its hopes on Japan to help it enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) now that the United States has withdrawn. That, however, may prove to be a bridge too far for Tokyo, as Beijing would certainly respond ferociously (especially as mainland China is not invited to the group). Yet Japan remains a strong supporter of informal interactions with Taiwan.

India 

India-Taiwan relations are also in the middle of an upswing. As India pursues its Act East policy and Taiwan its New Southbound policy, both are proving willing partners – within limits. The relationship here is much less developed than Taiwan’s ties with either the United States or Japan, with unofficial ties between India and Taiwan only established in 1995.

The past few years have been especially fruitful. Current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi previously visited Taiwan to boost trade relations while chief minister of Gujarat, and this interest seems to have carried over to his government. As Jeff M. Smith, writing for The Diplomat, pointed out, “in recent years India-Taiwan economic relations have flourished, albeit starting from a low base,” nearing $6 billion in 2016. Growing ties may provide new life to an Economic Cooperation Agreement, first mooted in 2013 to little interest from India. Still, to put trade ties in perspective, India accounts for only 1 percent of Taiwan’s global exports (compared to the United States at 12 percent and Japan at 7 percent).

Developments in the political and security fields follow a similar pattern: progress, but from a low base. In February, India made headlines when it hosted a delegation of Taiwanese legislators, thanks to a newly-formed India-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Forum. Defense cooperation at the moment largely consists of irregular officer exchanges and education programs, which Taiwan is keen to expand. So far India has not moved seriously to take up that offer, however.

Some in India are pushing for more progress, including expanding defense relations. However, these views seem to be motivated out of a desire to “punish” China for not respecting India’s territorial concerns in Kashmir, rather than a wish for closer relations with Taiwan for its own sake. Such an attitude will leave any progress vulnerable should India-China ties warm in the future. Taiwan is understandably nervous about the prospect of being a “bargaining chip” in a third party’s relationship with China; unfortunately, that is exactly how many analysts in New Delhi view the India-Taiwan relationship.

Australia

Alone among the Quad members, Australia has not seen a marked uptick in its relations with Taiwan in the past few years, though relations are generally strong on the trade and economic front. To quote the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Australian Government strongly supports the development, on an unofficial, basis of two-way economic and cultural contacts. Two-way visits of a range of government officials take place each year.” Yet Taiwan merited not a single mention in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, aside from a reference to concern over the potential for the use of force in the Taiwan Strait.

Generally, Canberra seems to have overlooked Taiwan, unsurprising given the pressure from Beijing to do precisely that. Australia, for example, was supposed to begin work on a free-trade agreement with Taiwan after concluding one with China in 2015, but there has been little visible progress. According to a report in the Australian Financial Review, any deal with Taiwan has been put on hold under Chinese pressure, lest it jeopardize an FTA currently in the works between Australian and Hong Kong.

However, Australia has begun to take a generally sterner approach toward China. Its Foreign Policy White Paper was frank about the concerns Australia has about China’s rise, which motivated Canberra’s commitment “to help advance a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific and strengthen the rules-based international order.” Australia’s interest in the Quad itself is a manifestation of this trend. And with Australia currently in the throes of debating the political influence of Chinese donors, there is a window for Taiwan’s supporters in Canberra to push for progress on ties. Few politicians in Australia now want to seem beholden to Beijing.

Taiwan and the Quad

Based on existing trends in its relationship with each of the members, there’s potential for Taiwan to unofficially engage with the Quad. The same sentiments that made a resurrection of the Quad concept possible – concern over the liberal order and distaste for Chinese actions – make Taiwan an even more appealing partner. But as with all things Taiwan, any engagement will be on the unofficial level, and increased security cooperation will be a big ask.