Eight Months of Moon

2017 will be remembered by so many South Koreans as a historical breakthrough. This is not only because of the country’s democratic leap, which began with the candlelight protest that ousted President Park Geun-hye peacefully, but also due to the radical changes in domestic and foreign policy that the new administration under President Moon Jae-in was able to achieve in just a few months.

Moon’s first year in office was largely marked by the dismantlement of what the previous government, led by former Park, had done. In July 2017, the Moon administration conducted a major overhaul of the government’s structure that resulted in the closing of the Ministry of Public Safety and Security (MPSS), first established by the Park administration after the tragic sinking of a South Korean ferry, the Sewol, back in 2014. Until its dissolution, the MPSS had been subject to a plethora of criticism for its ineffectiveness. Under Moon, the two main pillars of the MPSS, the National Fire Agency and the Korea Coast Guard, have returned to whence they came, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, respectively.

Moon is also responsible for abolishing the controversial state-authorized history textbooks for middle and high schools. The previous Park administration took steps in 2015 to allow only history textbooks published by the government to be used in schools, and ban all other history curriculums made by private publishers. The state-authorized history textbooks faced severe criticism on the grounds that they sought to justify the dictatorship of former President Park Chung-hee (Park Geun-hye’s father) back in the 1970s, even going so far as to romanticize parts of Japanese colonial rule. Moon reverted back to the use of private history textbooks authorized by the Ministry of Education rather than government-produced texts.

The Moon administration has been responsive to major accidents and natural catastrophes too. The South Korean public has been particularly sensitive in this area ever since the Sewol sank off the coast of Jindo island, killing more than 300 passengers, back in 2014. Park and her approval ratings took a fatal blow when it was revealed that she did not give any instructions or measures to deal with the Sewol disaster for as long as seven hours after the accident took place. This has motivated Moon to stay noticeably vigilant.

For instance, when a 5.4 magnitude earthquake hit Pohang on November 15, the second largest of its kind since 1978, Moon held an emergency meeting immediately after returning from his tour to Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Lee Nak-yeon and other ministers maintained an emergency posture for immediate responses. Soon after, the government announced its plan to send 144.5 billion won for restoration and relief to affected areas. Moon continued to be responsive in other instances, such as dealing with the fish boat collision off the coast of Yeongheung island on December 3 and the sports complex fire in Jaecheon on December 21.

Overall, the Moon administration’s domestic policy has been well received by South Koreans. Moon’s approval ratings stayed within the 70-80 percent range throughout the first seven months of his presidency. This was quite the contrast considering that the approval ratings for Park never exceeded 60 percent throughout all her years in office.

Moon’s popularity among South Koreans comes not only from his domestic policy, but also from his diplomatic stance in the Asia-Pacific region. As in domestic matters, he’s been taking the opposite road from his predecessor, for example, by approaching China and keeping Japan in check. He has also left open the door for dialogue with North Korea while demonstrating South Korea’s solidarity with the United States.

Furthermore, Moon was able to achieve warmer relations with China after the China-Korea Summit held on December 14 during his official visit to China. The summit resulted in the renormalization of ties between South Korea and China, which had been strained for some time due to the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in South Korea — the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system. Although placing THAAD batteries in South Korea is still an outstanding issue for both countries, China has demonstrated its intent to move on to restore ties with South Korea while leaving the THAAD issue in the hands of military officials.

Restoration of ties with China means, first and foremost, the restoration of economic cooperation for South Korea. At the summit, the two countries agreed to restart various inter-governmental dialogues, including the China-Korea Economic Ministerial Meeting, create a China-Korea industrial cooperation complex, and conduct follow-up negotiations on the China-Korea Free Trade Agreement, particularly concerning the service sector. The summit also concluded seven memorandums of understanding, including on mutual exchange and cooperation for the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Games, and addressing non-traditional security matters including environment, energy, and health.

The two countries also agreed on four principles to secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. They have agreed to never tolerate war on the peninsula, demonstrate their firm resolve to denuclearize the peninsula, resolve all issues, including denuclearization, in a peaceful manner through dialogue and negotiation, and share the understanding that the improvement of North-South relations will contribute to the final settlement of the Korea question.

What’s significant about South Korea’s approach to China is that Seoul seems to have demonstrated a considerable amount of determination toward alleviating tension in the relationship with Beijing. The summit’s success, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has mentioned, is based on the momentum created when Moon and Xi agreed on the so-called “three-nos policy” on October 31, which led to the “official conclusion” of the THAAD debate and reinvigoration of China-Korea relations.

The “three-nos policy” includes not joining the U.S. missile defense program, not placing additional THAAD batteries in South Korea, and not forming a U.S.-South Korea-Japan military alliance. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-hwa said “the agreement is merely a reiteration of South Korea’s original stance in the matter,” but China appears to have put heavier stress on confirming South Korea’s commitment to the policy. The Global Times, a Chinese tabloid newspaper under the auspices of the People’s Daily, has claimed that, on top of the “three-nos policy,” South Korea and China have also agreed to limit operation of all THAAD batteries already installed in the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government has strongly rejected this claim.

South Korea’s recent move to warm relations with China goes against U.S. and Japanese interests and policies in many ways. First of all, the United States revealed its new National Security Strategy on December 18, which defined China as its strategic competitor, and officially announced the intent to strengthen missile defense on the Korean Peninsula. The strategy document also says that the United States will “improve options to compel denuclearization of the peninsula,” alluding that the U.S. may take military action on the peninsula if necessary.

All of this is an outright rejection of the four “peace and stability” principles and the “three-nos policy” that South Korea and China have agreed upon, and what makes the Moon administration’s effort to restore relations with China a rather difficult issue in the South Korean political sphere. Some experts say that the U.S. strategy report is an indirect warning to South Korea, particularly when it states that the United States’ alliance and friendship with South Korea “is stronger than ever.”

Torn between China and the United States, the Moon administration’s diplomatic efforts only become more complicated when Japan is added to the equation. Moon has been extremely unpopular in Japan since his rejection of the comfort women agreement settled between Japan and former President Park on December 28, 2015. The agreement was supposed to officially end the debate over Japan’s wartime abuse of women — so-called “comfort women” were essentially sex slaves for the Japanese occupation force — in Korea during World War II in exchange for reparations. Moon claimed that “the public opinion has not yet reached the mood to accept the agreement.”

When U.S. President Donald Trump made an official visit to South Korea, shrimps caught from Dokdo/Takeshima, an island under territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, were served during a banquet. Also, a comfort women victim was invited to meet with Trump, all of which were heavily criticized by Japan as provocative measures.

In exchange for such unpopularity in Japan, however, the Moon administration was able to gain great popularity among South Koreans, many of whom still have strong anti-Japanese sentiment when it comes to political or historical matters. After Trump’s state visit, Moon’s approval rating soared to 73 percent, reflecting public opinion that Moon had successfully represented South Korea’s positions to the U.S. president.

Despite being at odds, however, South Korea and Japan share an important security problem: The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On August 24, South Korea and Japan agreed to extend the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which was concluded during the former Park administration back in November 2016. The agreement was extended as exchanging information between South Korea and Japan was crucial to effectively address nuclear and missile provocations from North Korea.

On December 19, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Kono to agree on adding pressure on North Korea for denuclearization. Both reached the understanding that China needs to take more responsibility in dealing with the North Korea question, and agreed to work together to build strong future-oriented bilateral relations.

Overall, Moon’s first year in office seems to have clearly influenced South Korea’s role in East Asia. In contrast with Park, the Moon administration has moved away from Japan to engage in closer ties with China, while seeking to maintain its strong alliance with the United States. Although the Moon administration’s North Korea policy has softened compared to his predecessor, he continues to bind the United States, China, and Japan together with a common objective of adding pressure on North Korea.

The road ahead remains long and wide for the Moon administration, and resolving difference of interests among the United States, China, and Japan is crucial for its diplomatic survival.

The Park administration gave rise to the phrase “Korea passing,” meaning that South Korea was not able to make itself relevant in East Asian politics and other countries had to skip or “pass” South Korea to deal with diplomatic issues themselves. South Korea, under Moon’s leadership, looks set to make itself relevant in East Asian politics, maintaining its position as the focal point for settling the North Korean problem. Under Moon, no one is “passing” on Seoul.