America First: Year One

What does 2018 hold for U.S. foreign policy in Asia? As the first year of the Trump administration's experiment with a new grand strategy under the aegis of “America First” comes to a close, what can be said about the United States' trajectory in Asia in the year ahead?

Perhaps the single greatest question looming over this administration's Asia policy as we enter 2018 is the degree to which it might be seriously entertaining the idea of a preventive war against North Korea – a conflict that would claim lives on the orders of millions as a country with a proven nuclear weapons capability lashes out any way it can.

In the final months of 2017, the Trump administration's debate on North Korea remained unclear, with different senior officials conveying varied policy preferences. While Trump's advisor on national security affairs, H.R. McMaster, continued to suggest that the clock was running out on diplomacy with North Korea, others, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, counseled in favor of dialogue.

While earlier in 2017 observers wondered if the Trump administration had any North Korea policy at all, in the final days of the year, it appeared that it had two policies running in tandem. To be sure, the campaign of “maximum pressure” that was announced as the successor to the Obama administration's policy of “strategic patience” remains in place and has certainly shown results.

The Trump administration has won acquiescence from China and Russia for new sanctions resolutions at the United Nations Security Council and at the same time convinced a range of regional states, including countries in Southeast Asia, to roll back their trade with North Korea. China's implementation of sanctions leaves something to be desired, but the looming threat of extensive secondary sanctions has yielded some results.

The dichotomy between a disastrous preventive war and likely ineffective diplomacy may not resolve itself in 2018, or over the coming years. Instead, outcomes on the Korean Peninsula will neither be as bad as they could be nor as good as they could be. The United States, under the Trump administration, appears destined simply to muddle through with North Korea.

Kim Jong-un, in the meantime, can be expected to make considerable technological advancements in 2018 with his weapons. Moreover, the early months of 2018, with the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and the first U.S.-South Korea mass mobilization military exercises since North Korea's demonstration of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile capability, stand to be exceptionally dangerous.

Asia, however, is greater than North Korea. During 2017, the Trump administration appeared to be myopically focused on the Korean Peninsula and reining in what it considered abusive trade practices by China and other regional exporters. In 2018, can the administration finally show that it is capable of walking and chewing gum at the same time in Asia?

Issues like the future of the rules-based regional order, disputes in the South China Sea, insurgency in Southeast Asia, and cyber espionage appeared to be reduced priorities during the Trump administration's first year. Yes, the administration did authorize four freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea over a five month span, compared to the Obama administration's tolerance of just four operations over a year, but that was largely accomplished by delegating authority to U.S. Pacific Command.

Even the East Asia Summit – Trump's one opportunity to provide renewed high-level ballast to a comprehensive U.S. policy on the South China Sea – was sidelined as Trump cut his Asia trip short and failed to deliver his prepared remarks at the plenary session in Manila.

The Trump administration's first National Security Strategy document, released on December 18, does give considerable attention to the Indo-Pacific region. During Trump's November 2017 trip to Asia, he delivered a major speech around the theme of a "free and open" Indo-Pacific region, defining what appeared to be the successor to the Obama administration's “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia.

Going into 2018, there are serious questions about the extent to which high-flying rhetoric on a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, encapsulated in Trump's speech on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Da Nang, Vietnam, and the 2017 National Security Strategy, will transform into policy.

Much has been made, for example, of a working-level meeting of the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summits in Manila. Will the United States work to operationalize this quadrilateral of like-minded, Indo-Pacific-oriented democracies into something more than a glorified talk shop in 2018? The odds don't appear favorable, especially as high-level diplomatic positions in the U.S. State Department continue to remain vacant one year on.

Looking at U.S. foreign policy in 2017 from the perspective of Asian leaders – both friendly and adversarial to U.S. interests in the region – there can be little faith that the “America First” president will veer toward a more traditional grand strategy in Asia.

Since the days of Harry Truman at the conclusion of World War II, the United States maintained an active interest and stake in regional security in Asia. China's rise has challenged U.S. hegemony in the region in recent years, but the Trump administration's abdication of strategic leadership in the region in favor of a myopic agenda has only accelerated a transition toward uncertain and potentially unstable multipolarity.

Reflecting back on 2017, the Trump administration has especially shown that the president himself – the heart of the supposedly unitary executive in the United States – diverges sharply with his own bureaucrats, many of whom have continued to run much of U.S. policy in Asia on “auto-pilot,” with Obama-era initiatives still paying dividends.

A particularly good example of these auto-pilot dividends paying off has been in the U.S. relationship with India, where the Obama administration's final year of groundwork has kept steady. The Trump administration has treated an expanded Indian role in the Indo-Pacific as a positive and the 2017 National Security Strategy document calls for continued cooperation on defense under the “major defense partner” designation given to New Delhi in 2016 (a bespoke status).

As we enter 2018, much of the momentum remaining from 2016 and earlier will fade away as the “America First” agenda consolidates. U.S.-China ties, for example, are fated for a more turbulent year in 2018. The Trump administration's treatment of China as an economic and strategic competitor (and little else) is slated to intensify.

For those who would favor a clear-headed and strategically astute U.S. approach to Asia, there is little optimism as we head into 2018. Barring dramatic domestic political events in the United States as the investigation into Trump's alleged collusion with Russian interests continues, the United States is likely to remain adrift.

With Chinese President Xi Jinping meanwhile having emerged from the 19th Party Congress with a mandate unseen in China since the days of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing may sense ample opportunity. Already, in 2017, China secured strategic gains in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and even East Asia, all under its series of Belt and Road Initiative-related projects.

Looking back, the Trump administration had it easy in Asia in 2017. In the year ahead, nearly every challenge for U.S. interests that persisted through 2017 will grow more dire and necessitate visionary leadership and a clear sense of prioritization. Nothing so far suggests that the United States will break its present cycle of fixating on the Korean Peninsula in Asia, as a range of other challenges fall down the list of priorities.

If anything, 2018 may seal in a trajectory of decline for the United States in Asia. In the meantime, China's opportunistic rise and the slow-but-steady regional transition toward multipolarity with accelerate.